





R  
3 vols

157



P











Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2007 with funding from  
Microsoft Corporation

HERESIES

OR

AGNOSTIC THEISM, ETHICS,  
SOCIOLOGY, AND METAPHYSICS



Ex Libris

C. K. OGDEN

# HERESIES

OR

AGNOSTIC THEISM, ETHICS,  
SOCIOLOGY, AND METAPHYSICS

BY

H. CROFT HILLER

VOL. I

London

GRANT RICHARDS

9 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, W.C.

1899



B  
1645  
H53 H4  
v. 1

LIBRARY  
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA  
SANTA BARBARA

## PREFACE TO FIRST VOLUME

THIS volume may be considered, to some extent, an introduction to the main theses of *Heresies*, which constitute a synthesis from the demonstrations of modern science to fresh statements of first principles in religion, ethics, sociology, and metaphysics. The motive impelling the author to deal with the pronouncements of other people preliminarily to advancing his own doctrines is the conviction that the true aim of intellectualism is not so much the extirpation of wrong belief, as the establishment of right principle. Given the right principle, the author has no fear as to the right belief; indeed, he hopes to demonstrate that belief, in itself, is always right. What, in these days, is wrong in connection with belief is, that a multitude of spurious manifestations simulating it are accepted as the genuine thing, with the consequence that the great corroding factor in modern civilisation is intellectual dishonesty.

Through the prevalence of false notions regarding

the nature and significance of belief, doctrines are professed, not because they are believed, but because they gratify personal prepossessions and notions of expediency. One of the most powerful means of annulling these immoral conditions is, in the author's opinion, that everybody with facilities for imposing beliefs or credulities on the public shall be held personally answerable for what he propounds. If he advances what he cannot intellectually justify as truth, such an advocate, in the author's opinion, has no better claim to personal immunity than has the quack who kills his patient by wrong prescriptions. Society, as an organism, should no more permit itself, than it permits the individual, to be *corpus vile* for unqualified empiricists. Those who prescribe truths for society must take the onus of inefficiency, as do those who prescribe medicaments for the individual. If a man likes to quack himself with drug nostrums, that is his affair. If he presumes to quack the public, that is the public's affair. Similarly, if a man likes to hold wrong notions, that is his affair. But when, as a public character, he presumes to foist those notions on his fellows, prone to accept his prominent position as guarantee for what he propounds, then it behoves society to nail that man to his words, and unflinchingly hold him responsible for whatever spurious doctrine he may ventilate.



It may be urged that we have no objective standards to apply to the multitude of doctrines which are thrust on the public, and that, accordingly, holding one man responsible for his doctrines merely involves that another man's prepossessions shall be arbiter. The author maintains that genuine objective standards are now available by which every important issue may be measured, and one of his objects in writing *Heresies* is to show what these standards are. In the present volume he has applied such standards to analysing a set of opinions covering most of the ground of social concerns, and he trusts he has sufficiently adumbrated the standards to enable the reader to estimate the validity of the criticisms. Moreover, to afford the reader a specific indication of the standards and their authentication, to be later further enforced by demonstration and varied illustration in the realm of science, the author has included in the present volume a chapter dealing with truth.

Apart from their mere controversial aspect, the contents of this volume elucidate the great principle of rationalism, as against emotionalism, in the domain of incentive, which it has been one of the author's main objects to render prominent in his own doctrines. In a word, the author has shown that moral virtue is not at all a matter of emotive predisposition, but solely depends on intellectual discrimination.

The moral virtue which we commonly identify with certain emotive predispositions is a purely fanciful quality opposed to scientific demonstration of what constitutes morality. The full recognition by society of the fact will, in the author's opinion, mark a real advance in ethical development. Until we know what moral merit is, as a matter of objective demonstration, we shall not make much real progress towards its practical exemplification, and so long as we identify the quality with emotive manifestations of impulse, we are merely dealing with a product of personal prepossessions, devoid of scientific significance. There is no moral significance in emotive impulses. The enthusiasm now so much in evidence as Socialism is nothing essentially but an epidemic of self-gratification, benevolent in some cases, rapacious in most. No permanent modification of human incentive can emanate from what is not intellectually projected, as right principle, outside the fluctuations of personal preference. In these days, there is only one court to which the reformer can effectively appeal. That court is intellect.

The author selects certain individuals for criticism because they happen to typify what he conceives it his business to extirpate. He has absolutely no sentiment for or against those individuals, except the sentiment of recognition that they are types of wrong principle, and, in their public capacity, should answer

for inefficiency. One of his best esteemed friends is perhaps more severely handled than are any of the others, to whom he is an utter stranger. He is quite ready to submit to the criteria he applies to others; and, if he propounds wrong doctrine, will be among the first to welcome his exposure as a charlatan. Once his doctrines are submitted to the public, they are, to him, as impersonal matters as are the doctrines of other people. Of course, he will try to protect them by intellectual method, but he will have no compunction in renouncing them the moment they are rationally invalidated, and will not shirk personal responsibility for their promulgation. On the other hand, he will take no notice of attacks from the standpoint of subjective prepossession.

It has been suggested to the author that the polemical character of this volume may affect it disadvantageously by exciting prejudiced criticism. He has weighed this contingency, and has decided to face it, rather than evade the right principle which he conceives to be involved. He feels assured that, when the whole work is before the public, what it propounds, if rejected, will have to be met by rigid intellectual scrutiny, whatever prepossessions may be excited by the author's exercise of discretion in regard to method of enforcing his views. Whether he be right or wrong in controversially identifying with their doctrines those whom he believes to be false

guides cannot be decided by personal prepossessions. The author has given his reasons for the course he adopts. It is for those who object to that course to give their reasons. When they have done this, and the question of methodic rightness or wrongness is decided for or against the author, the main point at issue will still be untouched. This point is: Has the author demonstrated that the particular views he assails are wrong in respect to scientific accuracy or moral principle? The author trusts that the genuine critic, before judging the comparatively trivial issue of method, will concentrate his attention on the vital question. Then, if he recognises that the author has justified his contentions against the views he assails, the critic may well concede to the author discretion as to *modus operandi*. If, on the conditions, the author thinks that it is as necessary for society that individuals shall be penalised for publishing false doctrine, as that false doctrine shall be exposed, he claims the "benefit of the doubt" regarding procedure.

The author believes that the chaos of contending prejudices now posing as reasoned beliefs is a plague to the community, and, as already emphasised, that self-constituted guides of the public should be compelled, at their peril for failure, to intellectually justify what they propound. Having lost the counterpoise of religious conviction, society needs, more

than ever, restriction on guerilla propagandism. Though science has permeated society, the fundamental question of human motive is still at the mercy of a thousand partisans, each eager to impose a particular set of prejudices on his fellows. That way lies stupendous peril for society : futile sentimentalism, raw fanaticism, pessimistic cynicism, sordid devotion to expediency. Allow these to mature, the product will be chaotic subversal. The existing conditions of social evolution can hardly be better pointed than by the fact that the literary idol of the day is one whose main achievement has been to glorify, in tawdry clap-trap, the gospel of vulgar ostentation, brute force, and palæolithic insensibility to moral principle. Those who maintain that religious belief still lingers may ponder this latest manifestation of civilised æsthetics. In the meantime, the author of *Heresies* will try to provide an antidote for the poison.



# CONTENTS

## CHAPTER I

	PAGE
AN ARCHDEACON AND HIS FAITH . . . . .	I

## CHAPTER II

A BROAD CHURCHMAN AND HIS FAITH . . . . .	57
-------------------------------------------	----

## CHAPTER III

A MONIST AND HIS CREED . . . . .	74
----------------------------------	----

## CHAPTER IV

A CHRISTIAN ALTRUIST . . . . .	116
--------------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER V

A MATERIALISTIC PHILOSOPHER . . . . .	130
---------------------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER VI

A POSITIVIST PHILOSOPHER . . . . .	PAGE 156
------------------------------------	-------------

## CHAPTER VII

A SOCIALIST BY SYMPATHY . . . . .	168
-----------------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER VIII

THE BIBLE AND THE CHILD . . . . .	186
-----------------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER IX

EVOLUTION AND THEOLOGY . . . . .	214
----------------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER X

PERSONALITY FETICHISM . . . . .	233
---------------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XI

THE PRESS . . . . .	269
---------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XII

TRUTH . . . . .	276
-----------------	-----



# HERESIES

## CHAPTER I

### AN ARCHDEACON AND HIS FAITH

ARCHDEACON WILSON has been preaching on "A Democratic Church in a Democratic State." He believes, so I read, that "the laity of every class take very little interest in Church matters." To obviate this, the Archdeacon cries for a prophet. "If," he says, "a prophetic voice could once more be heard in the Church, calling into life the real but latent religious power and enthusiasm of the people, speaking fearlessly, truthfully, 'with authority, and not as the scribes,' firing with the grace of Christianity, and the love of God, and the fellowship of the Spirit, then we should not find the laity hang back from their share of work. There will be interest enough when there is an intensely real thing to be interested in. It is not democratic machinery, it is prophetic men we want." The Archdeacon's words about the "intensely real thing" are so true that they tend to

cast ridicule on his earlier remarks about "the grace of Christianity, and the love of God, and the fellowship of the Spirit." If men want a religion of "real things," sounding phrases will no more yield those "real things" than thistles will yield grapes. Until Archdeacon Wilson can demonstrate reality in what he calls the "grace of Christianity, and the love of God, and fellowship of the Spirit," it is idle for him to invoke "a prophetic voice" on their behalf. Men do not now want prophets until *after they have got demonstrators who show them credible religious theories*. Nowadays, far from honouring prophets, men are inclined to treat them as quacks whose record is what may be termed "shady." The religious leaders now wanted are people who can reveal facts about God, and right and wrong, which every man can test by his own intelligence. Whatever prophecies such religious leaders may ventilate, those prophecies must be testable as inference from intellectually valid premises. No intellectually valid premises are, to-day, consistent with "the grace of Christianity, and the love of God, and the fellowship of the Spirit." Anybody who prophesies from these premises, prophesies from hyperbole, and, so far as arousing serious interest in religion is concerned, he may as well bang a big drum, as prophesy. Men will watch him as they watch the showman, and will be as vitally affected by the showman as by the prophet.

In these days, no prophet can speak "fearlessly, truthfully, 'with authority and not as the scribes,'" who propounds what the human intellect apprehends

## An Archdeacon and His Faith 3

as falsity or fatuity. So long as prophets are shackled by the empty shibboleths of a rationally dead cult, those prophets are bound to speak "as the scribes"; as cravens to themselves and as charlatans to the intelligent public. The prophet able to impress this age must not merely believe that about which he prophesies; he must so reveal to his fellows the incentives to his own belief that his fellows attain *belief*, by his *reasons*, not mere intoxication by his zeal. The method of the "prophet of old" will not do for this age. The authority: emotion, to which the antique prophet appealed, will, in these days, satisfy no educated man, except as sanction for gratifying himself. When he wants to gratify himself—the main object of educated folk, at present—he tacitly accepts emotional authority as infallible, needing no prophet to strengthen his devotion. The rub now is to find a prophet who can turn men away from the wiles of that emotional authority which they only obey for purposes of self-gratification and laugh at when it makes demands in the opposite direction.

Before the Archdeacon propounds the "grace of Christianity, and the love of God," as religious premises to be emphasised by prophets, he should show how the premises are to be reconciled with the scientific demonstration of human determinism and the theological hypothesis of "sin" and its punitory concomitants. If men are determined by God—and no God can exist to rational apprehension, unless that God does determine humanity—how can a

*loving* God hold terrors over men, as penalty for acting according to a determinism outside their own individualities? Why should a *loving* God tell men they can only be "saved" from the consequences of preordained "sin," by accepting a repulsively irrational and mystical doctrine of "atonement" for acts which no sane man can believe to require reparation, as between God and the creature? How can men believe a doctrine of God which stultifies the very essence of God by rendering Him a mere demi-god, as much demanding the postulate of a supreme God as an ordinary physical phenomenon needs that postulate?

Some astute trifler with words may say: Oh, this denial of freewill may be truth as science *now* has it; but what if science has ultimately to renounce this present truth regarding the non-existence of freewill? I answer: Whether science has, or has not, at some future time, to renounce what it once accepted as truth, does not affect the question at issue, which is: (a) *present*, not future truth; (b) shall men be honest, or dishonest—shall they act *as* they believe, or belie their belief by action? The great point is not *what* men believe, but *do* they believe and do they act *as* they believe? No educated and intelligent man can, to-day, believe in freewill any more than he can believe in the geocentric system. If such a man professes to believe in freewill, he demonstrates himself a liar to himself, and if he normally acts according to such pretension, he manifests the essence of every social and individual

## An Archdeacon and His Faith 5

sin possible to humanity. In respect to modern belief, science is the only court of appeal. If science errs, so soon as it discovers its error, science renounces the error. So is science divine, because it is honest, and so is all "final" revelation of truth diabolic, because it is dishonest. When modern men accept the finality of theological revelation, they do not manifest belief, but credulity, or their carnal likes and dislikes. No honest and educated man can, in these days, be credulous, if he has rational evidence opposing the possible conclusion of credulity. The honest and educated man does not deny freewill because he considers science infallible, but because he accepts his intellect as the sole agent enabling him to attain belief, and because he accepts science as the faithful record of what intellect has verified.

Archdeacon Wilson bewails the laity's lack of interest in "Church matters." I surmise that the less interest the laity take in "Church matters" the better it will be, in a worldly sense—to say nothing of heavenly considerations—for him and his fellow ecclesiastics. However, as the Archdeacon seems to desire that the laity shall take a lively interest in "Church matters," I respectfully offer him the following explanation why that interest is absent. The explanation seems to me to be that "Church matters" and religious matters are, to-day, poles asunder; in fact, that the former are the greatest obstruction to the latter. As I said, the contingency need not cause unalloyed anguish to the Archdeacon



and his friends, for when the laity really begin to take interest in religion, I surmise they will also take interest in "Church matters," only the latter interest will hardly be of the sort implied by the Archdeacon. When the laity do take interest in religion, I venture to assert that the interest they take in "Church matters" will be manifested as the abolition of paid ecclesiasticism and the application of the confiscated funds to purposes consistent with nineteenth-century sanity, or intellectual honesty. I maintain that no paid religious exemplar who, in these days, propounds the imbecilities constituting what is called Christianity, will be credited as expounding the "love of God," or love of anything except preferment and lucre. Such commercial Christianity, like a number of other shams, will be tolerated so long as it supports the sordid conventions of an unbelieving society; but it will never again show the world a prophet of the stamp demanded by Archdeacon Wilson. Such "religion" will never again produce aught else than the "sounding brass" of "the scribe" and the cacophony of the mart.

The Archdeacon wants a Church that is "an intensely real thing." I will give him my idea of such a Church. I will tell the Archdeacon of a Church which will bear the ordeal of popular interest in "Church matters." It is called the Church of God, by intellect revealed. It recognises no Devil, but wrong, and no Saviour, but right, principle. It has no truth but what intellect apprehends. It has no end but the victory of intellectually apprehended

## An Archdeacon and His Faith 7

right over intellectually apprehended wrong. It says to no man : believe, to escape the Devil of Theology, Satan ; but it says to every man : follow your intellect, to escape the Devil of Science, dishonesty. Its supreme demand of humanity is not love, but honesty. It has no dogma, except the changing truths attained by normal exercise of intellect. It holds no man guilty before God, but holds every man answerable to his fellows for evading his intellect. It worships God, not in words, but in deeds. The profession of faith of the member of this Church is : "I believe in one God, maker of the universe. I believe that God endowed me with intellect that it might guide my actions. If I follow my intellect, I shall be just to my fellows. If I am unjust to my fellows, I evade my intellect, and am a rogue meriting punishment by my fellows. If I tolerate, by conniving at, injustice by my fellows, I evade my intellect and am equally culpable as though I had personally perpetrated injustice. I believe that my emotions, whatever they may involve, are to be restrained, or indulged, to the best of my ability, conformably with my intellectual perception of justice and truth."

The invocation to his God, if emotion impels my Churchman to verbal expression, is : "God, the One, the All ; First, Last ; Creator of First, Last, Ever, Never ; in the pebble, in the mountain ; in the spark, in the sun ; Life of my soul that sees time, space, sun, stars, yet knows them not—Supreme Mystery ! to ask of Thee were to dishonour Thee ; to praise Thee were to exalt myself ; to blame Thee

were to prove my folly ; to obey Thee is to live and die. Supreme Mystery that makes me know Thee by limitation of faculty ! before I was, as I am, as I shall be, Thou hast willed me. Knowing Thee with my light of reason, I fear Thee not, or do I quail when death, Thy summons to my soul, calls it to new being. Knowing Thee not with more than reason, I know not what shall be, yet I know that no better can exist, now or henceforth than what Thou, oh, God ! hast willed."

Incidentally, I will here indulge myself by a fling at some clever folk who call themselves Rationalists, and deprecate religion because man, perforce, "makes his gods." What man "makes," in the way of gods, according to these clever folk, is contemptible ; but what man "makes," in the way of what the clever people call science, is of tremendous import. Will these clever folk demonstrate that gods "made" by intellect are necessarily less cogent realities than are, say, molecules of carbon similarly "made" by intellect, or is a lump of cheese "made" by sensory experience ? Until these clever folk have published their demonstration, I think it would conduce to their reputation, as sages, if they locked up their objection to "man-made gods" as a secret too precious to divulge to the common herd. I, myself, in moments of eloquent dissipation am given to railing against "man-made gods," but I rail against these gods, not merely because they are "man-made," but because they are "made" by mental processes no longer compelling belief, and consequently, turn the god-



## An Archdeacon and His Faith 9

“makers” into rogues. I do not render myself ridiculous by scouting religion because gods are, necessarily, “man-made,” any more than I render myself ridiculous by scouting science, or sensory experience, because all its conclusions are, necessarily, “man-made.”

Now, let us see how the above argument cuts in the opposite direction. If Archdeacon Wilson and his friends ask me why I should scout their conclusions regarding Christ's divinity, miraculous birth, miracles, atonement, resurrection, etc., any more than I scout “man-made gods” because those who mentally assimilate “man-made” molecules refuse to “swallow” the gods, I reply: The reason I scout the Archdeacon's conclusion is not because his god is “man-made,” but because its acceptance demands my repudiation of all the criteria which afford me conviction. If the Archdeacon's conclusion is diametrically opposed to that of intellect, I can no more believe the former than I can believe sensory experience when it tells me, say, that the earth is bigger than the sun, or that an iron plate and a blanket, under the same external conditions, are at different temperatures. The man who professes to hold the Archdeacon's doctrine regarding Christ, equally with the man who professes to hold that the earth is bigger than the sun, I am constrained to consider either an ignoramus or an impostor. This conclusion is entirely impersonal: outside myself. I can no more resist it than I can resist wincing when dust enters my eye. I am not here implying any absolute

superiority as between my, the Archdeacon's, and the ignorant sensualist's views. All I imply is that, if the Archdeacon and the sensualist appeal to the verifying agent which alone decides truth for educated people, and which, even the Archdeacon and the sensualist consult in the vast majority of their decisions, then these people must either be ignorant or hypocritical if they profess to retain their non-intellectual conclusions. Whatever the Archdeacon may imagine, his conclusion is no better adapted, in these days, to ensure conviction, than is that of the child who says that "marbles" are "colder" than balls of worsted. As rational men, what I and the Archdeacon want to attain is, not any specific conclusion, but *conviction*. As rational men, we cannot feel convinced by emotion, unless intellect confirms the particular conclusion of emotion, which latter we may call impulse, feeling, inclination, but never, in the strict sense, truth. Truth, for us of these days, has entirely emerged from the arena of emotion.

If, at some future time, science finds the Mosaic cosmogony credible, science will renounce what astronomy, physics, biology, and geology now teach. In the meantime, pending the future confirmation of the Mosaic cosmogony, the educated man as firmly denies that "inspired" revelation as he denies that c-a-t spells dog. If the educated man wants, by hook or crook, to "get on the winning side" (as, we shall see, does a certain eminent professor with whom I shall have to deal), he may, of course, hum and ha, and cavil and wriggle in approved dialectical style, to

## An Archdeacon and His Faith 11

show that there *may* be, after all, something in the Mosaic cosmogony ; but, however he may twist and turn, that educated man, in the privacy of self-communion, will say : The Mosaic cosmogony is a fine old fraud, and I am a fine new fraud for dallying with it ! Had not this crusted fraud come to me almost as soon as did my mother's milk, and were the fraud unconnected with getting "on the winning side," I should no more demonstrate myself a humbug about it, than I would emulate the wise-acre who laid a wager he could prove the earth flat, and thereby, demonstrated that he, if not the earth, was flat.

Whether science, or the Mosaic cosmogony be "right," in the conventional and fallacious sense of "right," as an absolute, final, irrevocable "something" outside ourselves, is not the question with which I am now dealing. That question will be decided as satisfactorily, whether the Mosaic cosmogony or science be "right," or, indeed, if neither be "right" in this conventional, final sense. The question now at issue is *present principle*, not the finality of any particular intellectual decision. The question now is : What do men believe, and what do men *do to show they believe* ? Do they believe the Mosaic cosmogony ? No. Do they believe science ? Yes. Then, to act as they believe—the only way to exemplify right principle—they must act according to what science tells them is truth, not according to what the Mosaic cosmogony, or any other non-scientific pronouncement tells them is truth.

If a man believes Mr. Sims to be a great dramatist

and Ibsen to be a bungler, yet attends every Ibsen production ostensibly as an ardent devotee of the Scandinavian author, you would, if you knew the facts, put that man down as a fool and hypocrite. Such a man is typical of the British nation at the present moment. His principle is his crime; he thinks his belief is. The man who so misjudges is a fool. For the sake of supposititious *kudos*, he repudiates, by action, his belief. The man who does this is a hypocrite. Here, there is no question as to whether the man is "right" or "wrong" regarding Ibsen and Sims; the only question now is whether he is "right" or "wrong" about his principle. If he be "right" about his principle, then it is "right" for a man to be a fool and hypocrite. Similarly, if a man believes that Christ was born by the normal procreative method, yet affirms every week that he believes Christ was "born of the Virgin Mary," that man is a fool and hypocrite, *even were Christ born of a virgin*. How many such fools and hypocrites have we in England to-day? Again, if a man adopts the rôles of fool and hypocrite, in connection with transcendent affairs, how can he energise efficiently in the everyday activities of life? What must be the state of that society of which every other unit so degrades his humanity? Better, say I, the ignorance and honesty of the so-called dark ages, than the intellectual perfidy and enlightenment of this age of exact investigation!

What must be the state of that society of which every other unit practically confounds false pretension

## An Archdeacon and His Faith 13

with right principle, and right principle with folly, or crime? What must be the state of that society in which it is a social crime to avow what you believe to be truth, and a social virtue to avow what you believe to be a lie? Is not such a society itself an incarnated lie? That society is what we, who constitute it, offer as a pattern to the world. From the elevated plateau of that society, we who constitute it, point the way, as moral censors, for the rest of humanity. We, the greatest nation of humbugs on the face of this planet, presume to teach honesty to the world. We, whose moral code is "Grundy"; whose propriety is "respectability"; whose religion is "success"; whose press lives by mental prostitution and helotism; whose politics and diplomacy are craft and cunning; whose God is honoured by words and insulted by actions, say to Spain: you are brute; to Russia: you are rogue; to France: you are infidel. This, reader, is the nation that says to the world: copy me, the champion of Christ; the exemplar of integrity; humanity's compendium of all the virtues. Oh, for a "light to lighten" the Christians of this my native land; the land I best love; the land that holds all I call dear; the land whose vast potentiality for good is frozen in the berg of a faith whose fire has turned to ice!

In the *Manchester Guardian* of 3rd May 1898, the Archdeacon's visitation address, at the Manchester Cathedral, is represented to contain the following significant remarks: "We are surrounded by people who are half disposed to believe that the



world can get on without religion : that self-interest as a motive and a little knowledge as a basis of action will suffice to guide the individuals who compose a nation. If England ever acquiesces in this belief, she will find out, in the decay of national morality and national life, and in the class hatreds that will spring up, the terrible mistake she has made. The foundations on which national morality and character rest, are not our knowledge, but our convictions and character, and these convictions and character, the impregnable basis of right conduct, are given by religion. The age of faith is not past. Those who believe in the mission of the Church—the Church not as it is, but as it shall be—are not the men of the past, but the men of to-morrow and the day after, with clearer insight and further outlook than the men of to-day.”

The Christian would scout this utterance as coming from me ; but he must needs be interested, if not alarmed by it, as the expression of one whom he accepts as among the most enlightened and sincere representatives of ecclesiasticism and weighty exponents of religion. “The Church not as it is !” What a world of significance there is in those words, coming from one of the ablest Churchmen this age can show ! Again, if we substitute the word “religion” for “Church,” what a world of significance there is in these words : “Those who believe in the mission of Religion are not the men of the past, but the men of to-morrow and the day after, with clearer insight and further outlook than the men of

## An Archdeacon and His Faith 15

to-day." The "men of the past" are now Archbishops, Bishops, and Archdeacons of the Church of Christ. The "men of to-morrow and the day after" are now heretics whom the "respectable" press of England waves away from its columns, not because it has any solicitude for religion, but because it has deep concern for the coin of a "respectable" public. When the Archdeacon reflects that the "Church" exists only because present men accept those of a long-dead past as the arbiters of final truth (which does not exist, to our apprehension), I think the Archdeacon will agree with me that the word "religion" is a better term than "Church" to employ with the context of his remarks. "The foundations on which national morality and character rest are not our knowledge, but our convictions." Here, again, we have pregnant words. But, I ask the Archdeacon: How can we, of these days, get convictions unless we appeal to knowledge to supply them? And what convictions can a Church that is built on what, to our apprehension, are fallacy and ignorance, afford us? Granted that the *immediate* "foundations on which national morality and character rest are not our knowledge, but our convictions;" still, the foundation on which rest our convictions, is knowledge: organised and accumulated intellectual experience. If this intellectual experience disables us from accepting, as truth, what another (emotional) sort of experience (through then being in the predominantly compulsive position now occupied by intellectual experience) once enabled

us to accept as truth, then, we can only get conviction by accepting the intellectual experience as our guide. We may now as profitably try to get conviction through emotional experience, as try to get the sensation of toothache by tickling our big toe. Of course, somebody may hypnotise us into imagining that emotion and conviction are one and the same thing, just as somebody may hypnotise us into confounding titillation of the big toe with toothache; but when we awake from the trance we shall recognise the illusions.

Root and stock, I believe that the Archdeacon's system must be exterminated before religion can be believed. The Archdeacon seems to think that the system can be rejuvenated by lopping away decayed branches. I say the root is as rotten as is any branch. I say that, if sane and honest men cannot believe the fundamental premises of that religion, it is fatuous to trim away what rests on those premises. I say the whole Christian doctrine, built on the hypothesis of a god that does not determine the universe, but allows creatures to thwart him, is an anomaly which, to-day, corrodes society from root to apex, and that, so long as that doctrine constitutes the *alpha* and *omega* of professed religion, religion will assail social foundations. This I say, so long as collective experience compels men to believe, as it now does, that the free-will doctrine of theology is the most preposterous, God-stultifying, man-degrading fallacy within the imaginative capacity of humanity. Until Archdeacon Wilson and his friends prove to sane and



## An Archdeacon and His Faith 17

educated men that they (the Archdeacon and his friends) believe, as true, the doctrine which collective experience now tells us is false—until the Archdeacon and his friends offer sane and educated men rational evidence in support of such belief—the Archdeacon's Church will be a social plague, and the representatives of that Church will provoke the rightful anathemas of every honest man and woman.

So soon as the Archdeacon enables men to believe the theological doctrine of freewill, he will enable men to rationally repudiate the ultimate consensus of the whole teaching of science. When he has done this, I, for one, will repudiate science and follow the Archdeacon. Until he has done this, I call on the Archdeacon, and every honest cleric *to follow me!* Do they and I act according to belief? is the supreme question; not do they and I believe one rather than another thing? "The Church, not as it is, but as it shall be"—to quote the Archdeacon—must, if there is to be a Church (which I by no means grant as a necessity), be a Church built on truth as it is apprehended by human intellect. Only such a Church will support the Archdeacon's assertion that "conviction and character, the impregnable basis of right conduct, are given by religion." Verily, such a Church is "not as it is." Then, I say, let the Archdeacon forsake the Church, "as it is," as I and thousands of others too self-respecting to profess a blasphemous lie, have done! Then, I say, let the Archdeacon exemplify his principle that "convictions and character are the impregnable basis of right

conduct"! Let him show men *that he believes, and why he believes, what he acts.*

For ecclesiastics merely to assert they believe, will not satisfy educated people. These people want to know the grounds for the professed belief. They say that, assuming the honesty of the professing believer in asserting his supposed belief, such belief is of no account to the rest of humanity until the belief is shown to be conformable with the criteria which educated and honest people perforce apply to attaining their own beliefs. Archdeacon Wilson says that "the age of faith is not past." Whether the assertion be truth or falsity depends on what we mean by faith. Faith in Lord Kelvin or Professor Lodge is a very different matter from faith in a St. Paul, St. Augustine, Spurgeon, Talmage, or an anonymous traditional record of antique ignorance and credulity. The faith that is not dead is only the former. If Archdeacon Wilson means by faith confidence in an authority who, as believer, affords us rational conviction that his belief is based on intellectual demonstration, then, I say, with the Archdeacon, "the age of faith is not past." If by faith the Archdeacon means confidence in believers whose methods of attaining belief diametrically oppose the methods by which only the honest and educated man of to-day finds himself able to attain belief, then, I say, against the Archdeacon, with all the intensity that God has put into me, "the age of faith *is* past"—dead as the mastodon; dead as the mummy.

The man who says he has faith in the truth of

## An Archdeacon and His Faith 19

Christian "revelation," unless he rationally justifies that faith to his fellows, is of no more rational account to educated and intelligent men than is the child who has faith in the truth of "Jack the Giant-Killer." If the Archdeacon has faith in any particular authorities, in order to render his faith of account to his fellows, he must show that the authorities in which he has faith are such as now impose truth on educated people. If the Archdeacon has faith in his authorities, merely because habit and emotion cause him to reject intellectual demonstration rather than renounce his authorities, then, I say, the Archdeacon may as well whistle "God Save the Queen," in order to morally mould others as employ his faith for the purpose.

That I have faith in Lord Kelvin and no faith in St. Paul does not involve that I accept certain propositions merely because one *person* rather than another makes them. When I accept through "faith" certain propositions made by Lord Kelvin and reject others made by St. Paul, I am influenced not by the *personalities* of the respective authorities, but by the *conditions which I believe to influence their pronouncements*. If Lord Kelvin propounds something that offers difficulty to my intellect in reconciling the proposition with credibility, and if I am really concerned to affirm or deny the proposition—in other words, if I am concerned to believe or disbelieve it—I shall no more fail to scrutinise the proposition because Lord Kelvin has made it, than I shall fail so to scrutinise another proposition which I want to believe, or disbelieve, because St. Paul has

made it. If Lord Kelvin excites my doubt regarding what I want to affirm or deny, my "faith" in him no more prevents me from exercising my own judgment than, under analogous conditions, my lack of "faith" in St. Paul prevents me from measuring what the Apostle affirms by fair intellectual scrutiny. I no more deny what I may term credal justice, involving intellectual scrutiny, to St. Paul, because I lack "faith" in him, than I accord credal *injustice*, involving unquestioning credulity, to Lord Kelvin, because I do *not* lack "faith" in him.

My "faith" in Lord Kelvin only extends so far as to enable me to accept his authority for propositions which do not excite my doubt, or which I am not particularly concerned to affirm or deny. If I wanted to affirm or deny every proposition Lord Kelvin had made, I should of course have comparatively little "faith" in him, but should test each of his propositions by my independent intellect. However, as I have enough to do in formulating my own propositions without so scrutinising Lord Kelvin's, I am content to accept, in the main, what Lord Kelvin propounds, because I have "faith" in his intellectual integrity and specialistic knowledge—in other words, because the conditions under which he verifies are such as I apply to verifying, and because I have "faith" in his intellectual efficiency. Notwithstanding those admissions, the reader will later see that I have important objections to Lord Kelvin's views to advance.

Now the conditions under which St. Paul verified

## An Archdeacon and His Faith 21

were totally different from those under which I verify. He verified by emotion and imagination; I verify by intellect and collective experience, embodied as science. Accordingly, I am more prone to question the decisions of St. Paul than, within their limitations, those of Lord Kelvin. As I hope I have made clear to the reader, verification by emotion for present educated people is impossible. We, of this age, can only get the sensation of truth through intellect applied to the organised and accumulated experience we call science. The effort to oppose these unalterable conditions involves all the social calamity now afflicting civilisation. So long as we try to delude ourselves that we have "faith" in emotional authorities, so long will violence, roguery, injustice characterise our individual and collective activities. St. Paul himself, had he lived now, would probably repudiate as emphatically as do I the teaching contained in the Epistles. Christ himself could no more have started Christianity in this age, and under present conditions of verifying possibility, than Archdeacon Wilson and the whole hierarchy can revive that cult. God, as what we call evolution, has killed the Christian cult as truly as God has killed the mastodon. If God ever again brings the Christian cult to life, God will compel men to revert to the verifying methods prevailing when that cult lived. Then God will kill science as He has killed Christianity. At present, as science is very much alive, men must write *hic jacet* over Christianity.



Assuming, when Christ appeared, collective experience and the criteria of truth to have been analogous to our own experience and criteria, had Christ tried to propagate the cult attributed to him, he would have been considered demented, and would have had no more chance of figuring as a god to this generation than I have. Christ was as fully the product of his environment as was Buddha, Mahomet, or am I, or my next door neighbour. In an age when the authorities for truth were visions, legends, myths, miracles, mysticism of all sorts, such an enthusiast as Christ was as likely to appear to "fulfil" prophetic utterances as such an invention as Marconi's wireless telegraphy was likely, in these days, to "fulfil" the demonstrations of Hertz regarding electrical waves. Had Christ been born now and manifested his peculiar hereditary traits, he might have emulated a "Salvation" ecstatic, become a literary rhapsodist, or an eccentric with idealistic visualisation, analogous to that of Tolstoi; but Christianity, as now propagated, could no more have emanated from that Christ than from a Huxley or Spencer. Time, locale, mental atmosphere, material environment were as indispensable conditions for the possibility of the gospel-Christ as were the peculiar hereditary predispositions conditioning Christ's mental, moral, and physical personality. He came at his appointed epoch as what I may term a dynamo of evolution. Now evolution requires a fresh dynamo, and what evolution requires it gets in defiance of its own products: the prejudices,

## An Archdeacon and His Faith 23

prepossessions, ignorances, follies, and sympathies of humanity.

Given the necessary mental atmosphere, there will be prophets to prophesy, and so far as a *man* can fulfil the prophecy, there will ever be a man to fulfil it. Only when prophets prophesy events outside possible human control are the prophecies *not* fulfilled. When a prophet says the world will come to an end on a particular day, he puts his prevision to a test it will not bear. The prophecy is not fulfilled. When he predicts that a "saviour" will appear and do this, that, and the other, he puts his prevision to a test which, given the necessary mental atmosphere, it *will* bear. Given the mental atmosphere, that prophecy will be fulfilled: the "saviour" will appear. So long as the mental atmosphere persists that involves prophets, it will involve people able to accomplish the prophecies—always provided what is to be accomplished enables the one who accomplishes the prophecy, and those who see the accomplishment, to hypnotise themselves into the necessary states respectively of imaginary accomplishment, and of intense expectation and emotional illusion of conviction.

Among the relatively ignorant and emotional to-day, it is as possible, as it was among the ancient Jews, for prophets to arise and their prophecies to be accomplished—(witness the Girling and other similar crazes). However, as truth is now decided by the relatively cultured and unemotional, the prophets who arise in these days make no headway

outside the few followers who bring them transient notoriety. Because truth is now settled by intellect, instead of by emotion, prophets of the genuine stamp, and fulfilment of "prophecies" are no longer possible. This does not involve that there is any *absolute* inferiority, as truth, in the ancient prophet's prediction and its accomplishment, as compared with our modern prophet's (the scientist's) prediction and its accomplishment. The inferiority of the former's prediction and its fulfilment, as truth, exists only relatively to our epoch. The prediction of Adams and Leverrier regarding a body answering to Neptune and the accomplishment of the prediction when the planet was actually seen and mapped were, relatively to their epoch, no better truth than were the Jewish prophecy of a "Messiah" and its accomplishment by Christ. Each prophecy—the Jewish seer's and the modern scientists'—and its accomplishment constituted, for their epoch, equally cogent truth.

As I shall demonstrate in this work, truth is only what we can believe, and the great consideration is, not what we believe, but do we act as we believe. When we now pretend to uphold Christianity, we act as we do *not* believe, because we pretend to accept what, relatively to our epoch, is falsity, though, relatively to a bygone epoch, it was truth. When such men as Galileo and Bruno suffered for our sort of truth, the old sort of truth, though senile, was not dead, and our sort of truth was in what we may term the infantile stage. Now, it is adult and has killed its rival.



## An Archdeacon and His Faith 25

The great difference between modern and ancient Christians is that the latter were honest. The former are dishonest. This point involves no question as to whether we *know* better or worse than did the ancient Christians ; and, were even this question involved, as all human knowledge is merely special feeling, we have no ground for assuming that there is any absolute superiority, as truth, of our feeling over that of the ancient Christians. Our dishonesty arises from the fact that we try (as Christians) to utilise truth which was only adapted to a mental atmosphere such as that of the ancient Christians, and is not at all adapted to our mental atmosphere. In our atmosphere, the truth of the ancient Christians is a veritable fish out of water. Its medium is gone, so it, like the fish, dies. So soon as men began to judge truth by the organised experience which we call science, the medium of Christian truth began to disappear. To-day that medium has vanished, and Christian truth is a corpse, though many people so hypnotise themselves as to imagine the truth is still "alive and kicking."

Humanity has passed through two stages of truth-sensation : sensual and emotional stages. Now, humanity is in the intellectual stage of truth-sensation. Later, we may rationally assume, humanity will be in another stage which we may call intuitional. For the intuitional stage, what we now call truth, may be as much falsity as is now, to us, the emotional truth of the ancient Christians. Still, the same great principle : honesty, will probably decide the "fitness"

of those who constitute that future intuitional age, just as that principle decides our "fitness," and as it once decided the "fitness" of the ancient Christians. I do not know whether any historian or anthropologist has tried to show how far the decline of nations is coincident with the decay of belief, or, say, with merely formal retention of dead creeds. I surmise that investigation of the sort would show that national decay, and the decay of national honesty are coincident events. Corollarily, this applies also to civilisations. I believe that, according to its honesty, or dishonesty, a nation or civilisation is on the up, or down grade.

If the Archdeacon hopes, so resolutely as to feel sanguine, that, at some future day, Christian "revelation" may be proved true, that is his personal affair. Similarly, if another man feels convinced that Christian "revelation" will, henceforth, always be proved false, that is his personal affair. But, what either is sanguine about *has nothing to do with the present truth or untruth of Christian "revelation," and such present truth or untruth is the only question that vitally concerns society, or the individual.* This question must be decided by the canons of present intellectual demonstration. Judged by these canons, if the Christian "revelation" is false, then every honest man must avow the falsity, whatever he may hope or desire. We do not want what *was* true, or *will be* true. Now, we want what *is* true, that is : what we can *now believe.* This we want, because we need to put in practice the Archdeacon's truth

## An Archdeacon and His Faith 27

that "our convictions and character" are "the impregnable basis of right conduct."

Archdeacon Wilson is an enlightened, fair-minded man, with the best of intentions; but he labours under one great disqualification: he is a cleric, and, like all other professional people, he looks at the universe through his particular specialistic spectacles, and thereby attains distorted views in which his profession looms disproportionately large. With all his enthusiasm on behalf of conviction and right principle, the myopia of professionalism renders him insensible to the fact that, when it comes to a question of action, he scatters his logic to the four winds, and is mainly occupied in shouting, "There's nothing like leather": becoming an unconsciously interested partisan, more solicitous for his order than for the integrity of any particular principle.

After telling us that the foundation of morality and character is conviction, the Archdeacon—in another visitation address delivered a day later than that from which I have already quoted—stultifies the gist of what he propounded in the earlier deliverance. I will now quote from, and comment on, a few expressions in the later-delivered address. Says the Archdeacon: "And, just when, after a century of experience, other nations had discovered that not all the philosophy and science and mechanical organisation of education could preserve the life of a nation from fearful demoralisation (*a presse pornographique*" —what does the Frenchman think of our *presse prurigineuse*?)—"and dangerous intestine factions;

just at this moment, ignorant of all this, those who led a section of English opinion, were doing their utmost to strike a deadly blow at those elements of English education" (impregnation of young minds with dogmas, creeds, and traditions which every sane adult sees to be falsity), "which had hitherto saved us to a great extent from the same disasters."

Here we are invited to believe that certain hypotheses, by which the Archdeacon's profession draws millions a year from the country, have saved it from what it pleases the Archdeacon to call fearful demoralisation characterising a neighbouring nation. Here we have an example of that sanctimonious cant which renders Englishmen a byword to foreigners. I am not now concerned to refute this prejudiced implication and assertion of the Archdeacon; but what I am concerned about is, that the Archdeacon is under the strange illusion that there is, to-day, more genuine religious conviction here than in France. What I should like the Archdeacon to do is to point to any important activities, characteristic of Englishmen, and lacking in Frenchmen, showing that the former believe in any particular religious doctrine, and only accountable on the assumption of that belief. Are Englishmen more truthful, sober, just, charitable, honourable, chivalrous than Frenchmen? Will the Archdeacon give us real demonstration that any one of the manifestations is more characteristic of Englishmen than Frenchmen? And if the Archdeacon does give such demonstration, will he show that the Englishman's mani-

## An Archdeacon and His Faith 29

festation is attributable to conviction, regarding what the Archdeacon understands as religion? Again, how, on his hypotheses, can the Archdeacon account for the fact that Spain, the most "religious" country in Europe, is now torn by internal and external dissension, and an object of loathing to humanitarian "Atrocity" committees? Has "all the religion," any more than "all the philosophy and science and mechanical organisation of education," in the case of Spain, proved itself efficient to "preserve the life of a nation from dangerous intestine factions," and what the Archdeacon will consider "fearful demoralisation?" These comments also apply, at the present moment, to Italy, another religious country.

Suppose I revise the Archdeacon's statement, thus:—Just when, after centuries of experience, Spain and Italy discover that not all the religion can preserve a nation from fearful demoralisation and dangerous intestine faction, Archdeacon Wilson wants England to abandon philosophy and science and mechanical organisation of education, in order to regain the ignorance and superstition which were once hers, and which are now imperilling the national existence of Spain and Italy—suppose I offer this statement to the Archdeacon, how will he show that it is not as good truth as he asserts his own to be? Suppose I say that "all the philosophy and science and mechanical organisation of education" have now revealed to Englishmen that the Archdeacon's religion is debasing Englishmen into a nation of pretentious hypocrites! Suppose I say



that "all the philosophy and science and mechanical organisation of education" have now revealed a religion which shall render this an honest nation—will the Archdeacon disprove my propositions, as I disprove his? The Archdeacon tells us that national morality and character depend on convictions. Then he tells us that doctrines which the nation does not believe, will save it from disintegration and demoralisation. For the comfort of thick skulls that cannot see that black is white, will the Archdeacon explain how what is disbelieved can assure convictions, or, if it *cannot* assure convictions, how it is going to preserve this nation from demoralisation?

The Archdeacon's implications regarding French "immorality" as compared with English "morality," impel me to question whether he has studied biological, psychological, and physiological conditions which decide individual temperament and psychosis. Suppose I say that, assuming the manifestation by the "moral" Englishman, but not by the "immoral" Frenchman, of certain qualities, the manifestation does not arise, at this day, from any particular religious convictions now differentiating the "moral" Englishman from the "immoral" Frenchman, but from different racial temperaments, involving different emotional impulses—can the Archdeacon disprove my proposition? Can the Archdeacon rationally demonstrate that his diatribe against French "immorality" and laudation of English "morality" is anything better than the familiar tale of "kettle calling pot?"

## An Archdeacon and His Faith 31

So far as I can see, the facts regarding the states of France and England, in regard to religion, were those facts accurately estimated, would show that Frenchmen, in respect to the one supreme quality : honesty, are superior to Englishmen ; that, while both have lost religious belief, the Frenchman frankly avows his loss, whereas the Englishman tries to conceal his by observance of extrinsics. The facts, I think, would show that Frenchmen have an intelligently vivid perception of the difference between *things* and their mere shells, lacking in Englishmen, and that this comparatively superior intelligence of Frenchmen prevents them from emulating the proverbial ostrich. The Frenchman, unlike the Englishman, does not plunge his head into the sand of formal observance in order to conceal his credal nudity. He has too vividly realised the difference between self-intoxication and belief, to accept forms and ceremonies as religion. He sees essential merit or demerit neither in believing nor disbelieving. He recognises that belief, *per se*, is a matter outside volition : that what he does believe is not what he *wills* to believe, but what he is *compelled* to believe : what he must feel, as truth, as he feels any other response of his sensibility to external excitation.

I wonder whether the Archdeacon, notwithstanding his sage utterances regarding the all-importance of principle, fully recognises the conditions which govern the manifestation of principle. If he were to consider this work, I



think he would grant that I have demonstrated the manifestation of principle to depend on *intellect*, not on emotion, and that I have shown wherein the volition (as impulse) of intellect differs from the volition (as impulse) of emotion. I think the Archdeacon would recognise that the volition of emotion never involves a question of principle (morality or immorality) until intellect modifies the emotional selection (or impulse) with the result that the selection, instead of being what I may term brutishly impulsive, becomes intellectually discriminative. This process of intellectually volitional judgment—as distinguished from the other sort: mechanical, brutishly impulsive, or emotional “judgment”—may be called the line of cleavage between the moral man and the morally neuter emotionalist or human brute.

Now, the Archdeacon's religion tells a man he must do or not do certain things, not because his intellect tells him these things are intrinsically right or wrong, but because he must obey certain emotions imposed on him by a problematical man-god, of whose integrity, as a supreme law-giver, the man's intellect affords him no assurance, but rather decided scepticism. However, assuming the man can really believe the authority of this man-god, inasmuch as what that man-god commands is to be a product of emotional, non-volitional, automatic, mechanical selection, there can be no question of morality—so far as the action is merely inspired by the man-god—in the action.

Whatever the Archdeacon may imagine, *morality*

## An Archdeacon and His Faith 33

*is outside his religion.* Morality only becomes a mental entity so soon as intellect invades the precincts of the Archdeacon's religion, *and vitiates the authority of its founder by subjecting his authority to the authority of man's intellect.* Intellect has now so infringed on the authority of the founder of the Archdeacon's religion, that that religion is now *antagonistic to morality*, because, the acceptance of that religion involves the repudiation of intellectual authority. Intellect now so completely dominates us as the authority for morality that it is a case of "*aut Cæsar aut nullus*" as between intellect and the Archdeacon's religion. The more completely an action is moral, the more completely does intellectual selection involve that action. The less an action is moral, the more it is decided by emotional selection, until, when it becomes purely emotional, it loses, in respect to its motive, all character as moral or immoral, and merely involves what I may term psychical reflexes.

As emotion alone, there is no more morality or immorality involved in loving or hating than in striking or kissing. Or, again, is there any morality involved in loving merely because we are commanded to love, or because we "like" to be loved and "dislike" to be hated. Morality is only involved with love or hate, so soon as emotional (sensual) likes and dislikes are replaced, as motive, by intellectual likes and dislikes. When we apply intellectual likes and dislikes to love and hate, *we change their objects from persons to principles.* Then only does morality become involved with love and hate.

“The elements of English education” which the Archdeacon wants to instil in the minds of children, as the foundation of morality, have, in themselves, no connection with morality. But these “elements” have a very vital connection with morality, *so soon as men are intellectually incapacitated from accepting the credentials of those “elements.”* If we, adults, impose on children what we believe to be false, then, whether we impose religion or irreligion, we act immorally. The Archdeacon implies the nice logical stew that our acting immorally towards children will render them now, and, in the future, moral: that our imposing on them, as children, lies as truth, will cause them, as men, to prefer honesty to dishonesty. We may as well teach those children to torture frogs, mice, and sparrows, as a necessary preliminary to ensuring adult “humanitarians”!

Let us now consider another utterance of the Archdeacon, involving the same fallacy as that with which I have just dealt, but which we will consider from rather a different standpoint. The Archdeacon says: “The root of the whole matter is this, and it should be laid to heart by every man—that there was no stable foundation for social and national life except Christianity, and Christianity was not a system of ethics which could be divorced from its Founder and recommended in our schools; it was a faith, it was a group of beliefs—it was a creed, if they would,—it was above all loyalty to a Person, and it could only be maintained in a nation when it was taught by those who believed in Him.” Archdeacon Wilson here

## An Archdeacon and His Faith 35

tells us that we shall be saved by faith, or what he calls "loyalty to a Person." He might as well tell us we shall be saved by colic. The renunciation of reason which the Archdeacon implies, as faith, is as totally lacking in moral quality as is colic. If the Archdeacon wants us to believe that faith will save us, he must demonstrate that what has no moral quality can save us. He first tells us that conviction and character will save us; then he tells us that faith will save us. One proposition stultifies the other. Faith, as the Archdeacon wants it, is the antithesis of conviction and character. It involves that a man shall suppress every faculty that involves conviction and character: that he shall besot himself with emotion. Faith only involves morality so soon as it is judged by intellect. Faith only involves conviction and character so soon as intellect imports morality into the subject of faith. Faith is moral, so soon as intellect sanctions it. If the subject of faith is denied by intellect, then faith is *im*-moral. In faith, *per se*, there is neither morality nor immorality. What is neither moral nor immoral can, *per se*, neither "make nor mar" us. We can no more believe that faith in Christ will save us, merely because the Archdeacon asserts it will, than we can believe that faith, say, in Mr. Joseph Chamberlain will save us, merely on the testimony of that gentleman himself. Not only can we not believe that any particular faith will save us, on the testimony of Archdeacon Wilson; we cannot believe the proposition even on the testimony of all Christian ecclesiasticism, dead and living. We

cannot believe the proposition even on the testimony of Christ himself.

The Archdeacon makes the astounding proposition that some particular believers are enabled to assure the integrity of national life, merely by imposing on those who are too immature to select their beliefs, what these teachers believe, or say they believe, but what educated adults who are not teachers of the particular beliefs, yet who represent the great majority of educated people, do *not* believe. Now, assuming these teachers—a very large assumption—*do* believe what they teach, that would seem to the ordinarily—or extraordinarily—intelligent man, a very secondary consideration, so far as concerns social stability, as compared with the consideration: do these teachers teach what is consistent with adult conviction? If their pupils, in adult life, have to unlearn what they are taught, as children, it is a sheer waste of time and energy, to say nothing of higher considerations, so to trifle with the immature understanding.

According to the Archdeacon, the children are to be taught "above all, loyalty to a Person." Why? Because certain traditions and unknown individuals living in benighted ages assert that this "Person" is Son of God, coequal with his Father, born of a virgin, performing miracles and saving men from the wrath of the "Father," who is all-merciful, all-just, all-loving, omniscient and omnipotent, and condemns to eternal torments all who do not believe the assertions of these ancient authorities. The teachers are to instil this into their youthful charges, as the subject



## An Archdeacon and His Faith 37

of their adult convictions! Then, why are not these teachers also to instil all the other assertions of these ancient authorities? Why are not the teachers to instil that the earth is flat and the centre of the universe; that heaven is on the other side of the clouds, and hell somewhere inside the earth; that the sun and stars are stuck in the "firmament" to illuminate the earth as a lit chandelier illuminates a room? Why are teachers no longer to instil that hell is a place in which human beings suffer indescribable tortures, by decree of an all-loving, omnipotent, omniscient "Father"? Why are teachers to instil one thing affirmed by these ancient authorities, but not another? Surely, if these ancient authorities are good enough to authenticate the tremendous issue that the Creator of the universe sent His only son to earth to save mankind from His (the Creator's) vengeance, those authorities are good enough to decide such comparatively trivial issues as the shape and cosmical significance of the earth! Why import Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Newton, Darwin, Weismann, with their new-fangled notions, to upset the affirmations of people who can tell us the nature of the Creator and His most personal motives? Why are not these teachers to instil the "science" of Christ himself, as reported by the ancient authorities, instead of the science of the Darwins, Faradays, Tyndalls *et hoc*? Why are these teachers, by instilling the science of such modern folk, to encourage children to laugh contemptuously at the "science" of Christ?

On the other hand, if the fatherhood of God, the sonship of Christ, his atoning mission to earth, as truth testified by the ancient authorities, is to be instilled by the teachers, but what these ancient authorities tell us about the earth, sun, and stars is to be ignominiously scouted—I ask, with all the force I can feel a question: WHY? Because Archdeacon Wilson requires the particular concession? I say: if all the popes, archbishops, bishops, archdeacons, monarchs tried to extort that concession from me, they wouldn't get it! Either these ancient authorities are good enough for me, as deciding the shape of the earth, or I will snap my fingers at them when they tell me, regarding God, what stultifies the authority that convinces me regarding the shape of the earth. If my science is good enough authority, to me, for truth regarding the shape of the earth, it is good enough authority for me, to establish conviction regarding God. If, through science, I discard ancient authority regarding the shape of the earth, then, through science, not through Archdeacon Wilson, I must be driven, if I am to accept ancient authority regarding the "Person" to whom, according to Archdeacon Wilson, I am to be loyal.

Now, I will tell the Archdeacon what results from instilling loyalty to his "Person," or what he considers religious elements, in the minds of children. These charges, when they, later, become affected by the intellectual notions permeating the age, are to preserve their loyalty to the "Person," and their conviction of the validity of those ancient authorities!



## An Archdeacon and His Faith 39

You may as well ask them to stand with one foot in London and another in Aleppo! What are these poor fellows to do, between the Scylla of forsaking the "Person" and being ostracised as among the ungodly, on the one side; and the Charybdis of adamantine conviction, on the other? They all want to be loyal to something. They cannot longer be loyal to the "Person"—happy thought! they will be loyal to "respectability": become "respectable" humbugs! Now, as a "respectable" adult, the product of the Archdeacon's educational system, is ready to hold up his hands in pious deprecation of the *presse pornographique* and to seduce his neighbour's wife. Now, he is ready to lend a hand on behalf of the "impregnable basis of right conduct" by floating bogus companies; selling his "nobility" to hall-mark fraud on the public; forging signatures; penning begging letters; financing high-class brothels; writing what he believes to be lies, for the press; market-rigging; "sweating"; dodging, scheming, lying, crawling, bullying, or any of the thousand and one vocations, "respectable" or the reverse, enabling him to batten at the expense of his fellows.

Of course the Archdeacon stipulates that only believers shall teach his religion. But he who sanctions the teaching, as truth, of what he believes falsity is as morally guilty as he who consciously teaches falsity as truth. Why should society adopt dishonesty to oblige Archdeacon Wilson? Why even should society adopt dishonesty and injure young minds to oblige the ignorant parents of those

who are injured? Why should society impair its future efficiency by inculcation of what society believes to be falsity? Society compels—or did until the other day—unwilling parents, ignorant about what society decides—whether rightly or wrongly, does not affect the present issue—to vaccinate their children. Why should not society compel unwilling parents, analogously ignorant, to prevent their children from being inoculated with what, judged by the criteria society accepts as valid in all other cases, is infinitely more injurious to society than is smallpox? Why should society breed rogues in order to oblige Archdeacon Wilson and gratify the prejudices of ignorant parents? Why should not society render the teaching of Archdeacon Wilson's "elements" penal? That is what society would do were it honest—did it exemplify the Archdeacon's sage proposition that "the foundation on which national morality and character rest are convictions."

Until the Archdeacon's "elements" are verified by the criteria to which Lord Kelvin appeals when he is investigating light or electricity, I would punish more severely the teaching of the Archdeacon's "elements" than the teaching of embezzlement and forgery, inasmuch as the latter teaching would be more readily eradicated than is the former, and would probably infect one child where the former infects thousands. I maintain that State-option to parents to instil embezzlement and forgery would not ensure a small fraction of the rogues ensured by

## An Archdeacon and His Faith 41

the teaching of a professedly divine revelation which adults scout, as representing truth, but which they profess, as service to God. I maintain that if we start by practising fraud on God, we are in the best possible condition for practising fraud on our fellows. No Fagin's teaching ever turned out such adepts in roguery as does, to-day, the teaching of the Archdeacon's "elements"!

Dr. Bilsborrow, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Salford, like Archdeacon Wilson, wants his "faith" imposed on immature minds. The "faith" Dr. Bilsborrow wants instilling, is different from the "faith" required by Archdeacon Wilson. Except in one fundamental respect: that both "faiths" are utterly repulsive to modern intellect, the two "faiths" are as mutually antagonistic as oil and water. Dr. Bilsborrow makes, what he considers—for professional purposes—a strong point of the parent's assumed right to corrode his child's mind with falsity. Says the Bishop: "Catholic principle in education, therefore, invariably proclaimed the rights of conscience, and defended and safeguarded the sacred rights of parents to the complete physical, intellectual, and moral education of their children." Here we have the effluvia of the teetotaller's "local option." So long as it promises to accommodate Dr. Bilsborrow, he is all for parental control. How will he look at the matter when his "local option" says: Honesty before ignorance and duplicity?

The Bishop wants parents to teach their children the Roman Catholic "faith." Archdeacon Wilson

wants parents to teach their children one particular form of a heterogeneous collection of doctrines which he calls the Protestant "faith." The Bishop—as also, I daresay, does the Archdeacon—appeals to what he considers a natural right of parents, however ignorant and enslaved by habit, to impose anything they like to call religion, on their children. If the State recognises this "right," it becomes party to imposing falsity, as truth, on the minds of its rising generation. If the State recognises the parent's right to impose religious falsity on his children, the State cannot logically deny the parent's right to impose *moral* falsity. If the State allows the parent to inculcate religious falsity, the State cannot logically prohibit the parent's inculcation of the virtues of pocket-picking, incendiarism, lying, forgery. If collective experience of truth reveals the fact that, for a parent to teach his children what the Bishop and Archdeacon call religion, is equivalent to his teaching his children falsity, as truth, then, it is arbitrary fatuity to draw a line at any particular parental teaching as being outside the parent's right.

Bishop Bilborrow and Archdeacon Wilson at present appeal to parents as being on their (the Bishop and Archdeacon's) side of the theological fence. They assume their creeds, as religion, to be an object of solicitude to people unable, or unwilling to scrutinise the creeds. The Archdeacon and Bishop appeal to ignorance and indifference where they pretend to appeal to solicitude. The whole strength of the ecclesiastics' position, such as it is, lies in the

## An Archdeacon and His Faith 43

callousness of parents to principle : in their indifference to what they themselves believe or disbelieve. A few days ago, I had a friend at my house, a Government Inspector of Schools, supervising one of the largest districts in England. He tells me that, out of 70,000 children under his supervision, he has only known two cases of withdrawal by parents (secularists) from any religious instruction that happened to be given in the schools, whether the tenets were held by the parents or not. He instances one Roman Catholic school of two hundred children, out of which fifty had non-Catholic parents. These had no objection to the inculcation of Roman doctrine. He believes there is very little real concern on the part of parents, other than Catholic, whether religious instruction be given or not.

My own view is that, in the vast majority of cases, if parents formally desire religious instruction for their children, the desire is merely an empty concession to conventionality : the very antipodes of real concern about religion. These people desire "religion," much as they would desire trigonometry, or Assyriology, if they thought the expression of desire for the latter subjects would put them in good odour with their "betters." At present, it "pays" these people to say their children shall "have religion." Because these parents have no real concern about religion, the Bishop and Archdeacon successfully appeal to their vote. When the parents attain solicitude about religion, the Bishop and Archdeacon will find a very attenuated constituency. My



friend tells me of a Jesuit who, after Manning, said to him: "Give me a child up to seven years old, I don't care what you do with it afterwards." Inoculation of the sort will, no doubt, serve Dr. Bilsborrow longer than it will serve Archdeacon Wilson. Still, the end cannot be long deferred, in this country. Jesuits will discover that here, at any rate, the phagocytes of intellectualism will prove "too many" even for the giant abscess of Romanism. Even Jesuits will discover that rogue-making is a dying industry!

At present, the Bishop and Archdeacon, no doubt, assume that parental ignorance and servility to custom will induce the parent to favour the inculcation of the "faiths" of the respective ecclesiastics. I surmise that a near generation of ecclesiastics will be as eager to restrict parental liberty, by *compelling* parents to instil "faith," as ecclesiastics are now eager to compel the State to maintain parental liberty, on the plea of natural right. I fancy the State is on the way to recognise that ecclesiastical Codlins and Shorts are hardly authorities, for these days, to whom the State can safely depute its interests in the rising generation. I think the State is about to recognise that not even the interest of ignorant parents in their offspring ought to override the State's interest in its coming adults. The State can no longer afford to breed rogues, rascals, and ignoramuses, even to accommodate Bishop Bilsborrow and Archdeacon Wilson.

Why should a man be loyal to a person (with a big or little P) if loyalty to that person involves

## An Archdeacon and His Faith 45

disloyalty to principle? How can a man be loyal to a person, unless the man has the feeling of personal attachment for the object of his loyalty? How can a man feel personal attachment for one whom he knows only through a mass of discredited tradition—about whose very existence as the person recorded, there is doubt? Is the Archdeacon loyal to his “Person”? He gives me no evidence of the fact, except assertion by implication, and professional assiduity. Is the Archbishop of Canterbury loyal to this “Person”? He draws £15,000 a year for his loyalty! I pay for my loyalty in “respectability,” and money, to say nothing of exacting labour and the time I might otherwise devote to getting at the blind side of my fellows.

Personal loyalty can only exist by two incentives: personal interest (intellectual incentive) and personal attachment (sensual incentive). The former incentive, in its intrinsic character, is entirely divorced from—though, of course, it may be combined with—the latter incentive. Does the Archdeacon’s incentive for loyalty to his “Person” come under the former category? Yes: if the Archdeacon believes that “heaven” is the reward for loyalty; “hell” for disloyalty. No: if the Archdeacon applies his intellect to the credentials of the “Person.” Does the Archdeacon believe in the respective rewards of heaven and hell, for loyalty, or disloyalty? If he does not believe in these respective rewards, he has no intellectual incentive for loyalty, except the mere “trade” interest of stipend, etc. If he does



believe in the rewards of heaven and hell, he believes in defiance of rational evidence to the contrary. I say : No man, except through stupidity and ignorance, has ever attained conviction in defiance of evidence. As the Archdeacon is a man of intelligence and culture, I do not believe he is ignorant of the evidence against the doctrine of future rewards and penalties. Accordingly, I do not believe that the Archdeacon believes that doctrine.

Now, as to the other (non-intellectual) incentive : personal attachment. As I am now concerned with it, it is the sensual tie which we commonly call love. This is the only genuine form of personal attachment. It may exist for real or imaginary persons—for instances of the latter, consider various characters in fiction, including the fiction referring to the Archdeacon's "Person." Does the Archdeacon feel this sort of loyalty for his "Person"? Probably, yes ; this loyalty is characteristic of normal humanity. The Archdeacon's "Person," in many respects—though by no means in all—is one of the most lovable characters in fable, romance, myth, or history, and if he really lived, out of fiction, as described in the fiction, he must have been a man very likely to inspire personal loyalty. I do not quarrel with the Archdeacon for loving this "Person," whether the "Person" be merely fictional, or have really existed in the flesh. So far as this form of love is concerned, it does not matter whether this "Person," any more than, say, Little Dorrit, lived in the flesh, or only in human imagination. But it is a matter of supreme

## An Archdeacon and His Faith 47

moment if the Archdeacon's love for his "Person" is successfully utilised to mislead children and to breed adult rascals. Then the Archdeacon's loyalty to a "Person" comes into conflict with loyalty to principle, and evolution has now decided there can only be one end to the conflict: the victory of loyalty to principle over loyalty to the "Person." Love the "Person" as we may, we must now love principle more strongly.

The Archdeacon's mistake is that he tries to make his sensual love for the "Person" usurp the place of intellectual love of principle. He does not recognise that, though both forms of love may be rational incentives, intellectual love of principle must, when a question of precedence arises, be supreme. Especially is this the case in these days when real loyalty to persons hardly exists outside the circle of your nearest kindred—when what passes as personal attachment is mainly a matter of sounding adulation or selfish expectancy of personal advantage. No! I would not give much for the personal loyalty now in circulation, even to the Archdeacon's "Person." I fancy, when it is properly analysed, it will be found to be mainly loyalty to convention, Self, or of that cheap sentimental sort we bestow on our pet characters in fiction.

Some few months ago there was a press howl of indignation against Mr. Keir Hardie, because he made some maladroit references to the late Colonel Dyer. Without in any way endorsing Mr. Hardie's expressions, I certainly vastly prefer the principle

they illustrated, to that of the disingenuous press sentimentalists who howled at Mr. Hardie. The fault of Mr. Hardie, in the connection, from my standpoint, was not in holding his particular views regarding the late leader of the Masters' Federation, but in thrusting those views on the public. Mr. Hardie's views on the subject about which he expressed himself being supremely unimportant, and repugnant to popular sentiment, his expression of those views constituted a gratuitous exhibition of vulgar self-assertiveness and callous indifference, rather than an illustration of the great principle really at their root. On the other hand, I should like to know how many of those press gushers who waxed sentimental regarding the late Colonel, and indignant against Mr. Hardie, would have had their salaries stopped for a week, had they thereby seen, as sole reward for their sacrifice, a prospect of obviating the fatal termination of the Colonel's illness. Similarly, I would ask "Christian" enthusiasts what their loyalty to the "Person" costs them. Does the "Person" count against "salaries" with these "Christians"? Does the "Person" induce these enthusiasts to deal justice, to practise honesty, to love their fellows? Is a single prime demand ostensibly made, according to their own showing, on the followers, by the "Person," better satisfied by those followers than by those who reject the claims advanced on the "Person's" behalf? Is the tiger eliminated, after nineteen centuries, from the followers of "the Lamb"? Let that dispensation

## An Archdeacon and His Faith 49

consummated by these followers answer! Let that dispensation which grinds the weak, exalts the flayer, nurtures the hypocrite, measure the loyalty to the "Person" of his professed followers!

Real, whole-souled loyalty to persons is only possible when sensual love—sexual, or non-sexual—is the bond. In a minor degree, there may be personal loyalty as psychical or sensual experience, involving what is called friendship. This, though less intense, is often more lasting than the other.

Now, when it comes to choosing my belief, or rather feeling it, why should I not be personally disloyal to the Archdeacon's "Person," said to have lived two thousand years ago, but of whose life, work, and death, I have no account which will bear modern investigation; whose reputed affirmations are totally discredited by our accumulated experience; who knew nothing of physics, physiology, psychology, biology, astronomy, geology? Suppose I can and do strangle my deepest convictions to manifest personal loyalty to such a "Person," where is the evidence that I am not a fool, coward, and enemy of my fellows through the achievement?

Where is my manhood if I smother my convictions at the bidding of a number of men whose material interests are bound up with what they call their faith; whose credentials are those of ages dead to all we call knowledge; whose god is: one-third cruel, vindictive bungler; one-third amiable visionary; one-third nondescript abstraction; whose activities belie the prime teaching of their special

divine third ; who, among themselves, differ as to fundamental postulates of their cult ; who have never made even a passable show of meeting a single scientific demonstration, the truth of which demolishes their truth ; whose creed implies that honesty is vice, and dishonesty virtue ; who, knowing they cannot convince men, maintain their pretensions by adult conformity built on deceived childhood—why, I ask, if I pretend to be a man, shall I strangle my intellect at the dictation of these personally-interested, disingenuous, habit-ridden partisans who pose as the exclusive custodians of God's truth?

Whatever the Archdeacon may imagine, he does not want *convictions* ; he hates them. He wants credulity : the old, old emotional betrayer of humanity. Here is the "conviction" the Archdeacon wants : "And he meant by faith those convictions, whether they called them religious or not, which were perhaps incapable of demonstration, and certainly were antecedent to demonstration, but which were either innate in them or came to them through the convictions of others and by the unconscious influence of customs and institutions and persons. All the stability of national character, its weight and trustworthiness, much of our national unity, were due to these convictions and even prejudices." Obviously, conviction, according to the Archdeacon, is not intellectual conclusion derived by logical inference from the organised experience of exact thinkers, but it is a nondescript sensation derived from the emotions, inchoate feelings, ignorances, and deceptions of a dead past. All these



## An Archdeacon and His Faith 51

are to be lumped together to constitute what the Archdeacon calls faith—a nice boiling to offer the “respectable” hypocrite who wants to choose his “belief” as he chooses his tobacco, but hardly satisfactory to the honest man with average supply of brains!

What the Archdeacon confounds with conviction is the form of dishonesty against which I have directed a large part of this work. The Archdeacon’s “conviction” is intellectual superstructure on emotional foundation. It involves the assumption that God has given one section of humanity a monopoly of final truth; that this “truth” must be accepted though our intellect tells us it contradicts all our other truth. Obviously, “conviction” regarding such truth as that advanced by the Archdeacon does not essentially or practically differ from the savage’s “conviction” of the “truth” propounded by his medicine-man. The savage’s “conviction,” like the Archdeacon’s, is “incapable of demonstration,” and “certainly is antecedent to demonstration.” The savage’s, like the Archdeacon’s “convictions,” are “either innate,” or come “through the convictions of others and by the unconscious influence of customs and institutions and persons.”

Logically, the Archdeacon’s “convictions” should be as stationary as are the savage’s. If “loyalty to a Person” is to be an immutable “conviction,” why should not every conviction be immutable? Why should not the Archdeacon hold the “conviction” of Tertullian that—to quote the eminent Churchman—



“I shall have a better opportunity then” (when he gets to heaven) “of hearing the tragedians, louder-voiced in their own calamity; of viewing the play-actors much more ‘dissolute’ in the dissolving flame; of looking upon the charioteer, all glowing in his chariot of fire; of witnessing the wrestlers, not in their gymnasia, but tossing in the fiery billow.” Tertullian had virtually the same reason for his “conviction” as the Archdeacon advances on behalf of his “conviction” regarding the “Person.” Both eminent Churchmen got their convictions by the same mental process: appeal to emotion and benighted tradition. Does the Archdeacon believe he will enjoy the bliss pictured by Tertullian? No? Why not? That really logical representative of Christianity: the Pope, now sanctions, “for the use of children and young persons,” virtually the same blissful “conviction” as that entertained by Tertullian. Christ himself, according to the authorities accepted by Archdeacon Wilson for his “conviction” regarding the “Person,” emphatically endorsed the gist of what Tertullian asserted.

The Archdeacon illustrates the truth that he who, in these days, applies intellect to Christian doctrine, and pretends to retain Christianity, falls between two stools: emotion and intellect. The Archdeacon tries to stand on both and “comes a cropper.” His Church does ditto, and the result is ditto. The “infallibility” of Roman Catholicism will keep it alive so long as there is sufficient mental torpidity and ignorance in the world to render that Church a

## An Archdeacon and His Faith 53

“paying concern.” The Church of Archdeacon Wilson is doomed to early extinction, because it invites its adherents to use their intellects to verify its doctrines, and these adherents are cordially responding to the invitation. The final crash will come when rational theism overwhelms Roman Catholicism. Then, intellect will get its blade to the hilt in the heart of the modern Devil: dishonesty.

The God of Science is no doddering trafficker with His creatures. He does not say : Do this and you shall be petted ; do that and you shall be “ put in the corner.” He does not stultify Himself by fashioning creatures that can flout Him. Accordingly, those who believe in the God of Science do not select right, as a means of bribing Deity, to save them from “ Hell.” They keep no ledger accounts with heaven, as, seemingly, does that eminent scientist to whose eminently unscientific aspiration for “ getting upon the winning side,” I have already referred and shall now devote a little further consideration. I have been vastly entertained, as well as interested, by reading a review in the *University Magazine* for April 1898, by Mr. J. M. Robertson, of a new work by Professor James, of Harvard, entitled “ The Will to Believe.” With his wonted gusto, Mr. Robertson “ chaws up ” the Professor—not, by the bye, a very difficult task, if I may judge by what appears in the critique, of James’s argument. The source of my entertainment was a particular paragraph quoted by Mr. Robertson from the Professor’s work, and my own marginal comments made a year or two ago, on page 258 of another work

of the Professor, *Text-Book of Psychology*. Here are my comments: "The author is full of the almighty dollar. It suffuses this book." I do not know whether what I may term the dollary aroma of Harvard has, unconsciously to himself, perfumed the Professor's *sensorium*, but somehow the "aroma" of his work irresistibly called to my mind the idea of a philosopher with a keen eye to the "main chance."

Well, I had forgotten all about this little matter, until I read, on page 10 of the *University Magazine*, the following passage quoted by Mr. Robertson from the Professor's latest (I presume) work:—"If religion be true, and the evidence for it be still insufficient, I do not wish, by putting your" (the man's who wants evidence before he accepts his religion) "extinguisher upon my nature (which feels to me as if it had after all some business in this matter), *to forfeit my sole chance in life of getting upon the winning side.*" How Mr. Robertson deals with this precious utterance of the philosophic "bookmaker," and how I guffawed when I thought of my earlier diagnosis, I will leave to the reader's imagination. Wherever you have a modern philosophic apologist—they are as hard to find as a pin in a haystack—for theological mysticism, the ultimate essence of his argument is debit and credit, as between the creator and the created, and the stultification of the creator by the implication that what he creates can metaphorically jump into the creator's shoes and tweak his nose. Anything more childishly self-contradictory than such a doctrine; anything more worthless than "morality" built on it,

## An Archdeacon and His Faith 55

cannot in the light of modern evidences, be conceived. Even from Professor James's commercial standpoint, it is the most reckless assumption to suppose that stultifying one's intellect by dishonest conformity offers a better chance of "getting upon the winning side," than does honest intellectual loyalty. Even assuming there is such a thing as the "will to believe" against rational evidence, there is absolutely no ground for the assumption that the exercise of such "will" can involve "getting upon the winning side." Judged even by its own sordid standard, the Professor's dialectical sinuosity is so fatuous that I wonder at his hardihood in publishing it. In these days, we do not look for that sort of thing from a University professor of science.

"The will to believe," in the sense implied by Professor James, is sound without significance, as complete as would be "the will to feel toothache." We feel belief, as we feel toothache, quite apart from "will" (in the metaphysico-psychological sense). Accordingly, to imply merit or demerit in believing, is as nonsensical as to imply merit or demerit in feeling toothache. And if there is neither merit nor demerit in feeling toothache, it is as rational to suggest that "getting upon the winning side," celestially, can be affected by feeling toothache, as by feeling belief. If there be any merit in connection with belief, the merit is not in the subject of belief, but in acting *as* we believe. The subject of belief is outside ourselves. What is, relatively, within ourselves, is the action corresponding to the belief; that constitutes the only

subject of volition. The action, not the belief, distinguishes the rogue from the honest man.

To suggest that a man can believe against evidence is a contradiction in terms. A man can only believe *according to evidence*. If Professor James believes (which I, as a reader of his scientific works, feel impelled to assert he does not) theological mysticism, against rational evidence, then he believes through *some other evidence*. On the assumption of the Professor's belief in theological mysticism, through evidence other than rational, that evidence, to my apprehension, is the Professor's desire to get "upon the winning side"! I wish the Professor joy of this "evidence," but I have strong doubts about its enabling him to play many trumps in the celestial "gamble," and whatever might be the celestial consequences, I personally, if I had my way, would discourage experimenters of the sort by some very drastic measures here on earth! Were I dictator, I would promise that few people would feel inclined to try the Professor's plan of "getting on the winning side," celestially; I would guarantee that getting on the losing side, terrestrially, would involve so acute a scepticism as to the efficacy of the Professor's prescription, that he would not even dare to advertise it.



## CHAPTER II

### A BROAD CHURCHMAN AND HIS FAITH

A FRIEND who takes an objective interest in the trend of current thought lately said to me: The parsons are doing more to knock the Church to pieces than you are. I suggested that perhaps I and others were urging the parsons on their wild career of self-immolation. My friend's remark was, I suppose, immediately extorted by the perusal of a book entitled *The Bible and the Child* (which I shall later examine in detail), to which Deans Freemantle and Farrar, the Rev. R. F. Horton, and other prominent religionists contribute views presumably designed to help the child to reconcile the Bible with the "higher criticism." I do not know whether the child will be helped by the authors, though I am pretty well assured that the intelligent adult, if he is helped, will be helped in a direction contrary to that intended. The work is virtually a symposium of surrender of the vitals of "orthodoxy," well adapted to extort such a remark as that of my friend. I can quite conceive the probability of the



clergy themselves working the downfall of conventional religion. They, at least, as a body, may be credited with some intelligent, cultured, and spiritual concern for the truth of the doctrines they propound, and which the laity are too indifferent to scrutinise. I believe that such men as Momerie and Craufurd, who boldly "show their hands," are but the outward symbols of a profound mental unrest within the Church which must soon result in a Church so "Broad" that it will have no depth as theological mysticism, and, lacking depth, will be absorbed in the sands of Rationalism. Because I give the clergy, as a body, credit for intelligence, culture, and concern for religion, I venture to predict the early predominance of a *very* "Broad Church" party in the Church of England, and I believe that this party will wreck ecclesiasticism, as a State institution, and will, later, starve it out of existence, altogether. I believe Mr. Craufurd is the type of the coming "Broad" Churchman who is going to "knock the Church to pieces," and that the reason he and his party are going to accomplish this is, in the words of his reviewer: "If Mr. Craufurd represents the Broad Church party in the Church of England, assuredly this party represents the decomposition of an old religion, rather than the nascence of a new one."

Until honesty becomes the first rule of life; in other words, until reason rules the major part of action, all concessions to reason and honesty, involving sacrifice of personal prepossessions and selfish interests, must be wrung by compulsion. Just as

capitalism needed the compulsion of trades-unionism before employers recognised the necessity of rendering a show of justice to "labour," so did clericalism need the compulsion of heretics before ecclesiastics recognised the necessity of making a show of honesty, by "knocking the Church to pieces." The bludgeon-method of the ante-philosophical era of free-thought propagandism was the necessary precursor of those keener weapons by which Rationalism is now giving the final *coup* to Emotionalism. As in all similar cases, environment, or external pressure, is now doing for religion what the spontaneity of its professors would never have accomplished. Much as those people rail against what they call the extinction of faith, only through such extinction could belief in God have become revitalised for the present age. Long before the complete rational demolition of Christian theology had been accomplished, Christianity had lost its integrity as a living factor in human affairs, and had become but an object of formal, mechanical observance. Like every other evolutionary product which has done its predetermined work, Christianity must disappear by becoming transmuted into some other product adapted to present evolutionary needs as it (Christianity) was once adapted to past evolutionary needs.

The Rev. Alexander Craufurd calls himself a Broad Churchman. Of him a reviewer writes in *The National Observer and British Review*, March 20, 1897:—"The first step to be taken is, he tells us, to throw overboard everything that has

hitherto been known as Christian dogma and theology. The doctrine of the Trinity, for instance, he relegates to the intellectual limbo which contains the 'vital principle,' 'the four elements,' and 'phlogiston.' The doctrine of Hell shares the same ignominious fate. The Bible is interesting, and in some parts an edifying volume; but its prophecies were as unreal as those of the Delphic oracle; most of its history mythical, and much of its ethics faulty; and if Christ appears to have taken a somewhat different view of it, we must, says Mr. Craufurd, forbear to 'blame' him, and believe that he was practising 'a wise economy of truth,' and 'was speaking to provincialists in their own poor *patois*, not in the language of the immortals.' For his part, he tells us that the teachers from whom he has mainly derived the revised Christianity which he is now offering to the world, are not persons who would be recognised as Christian teachers at all. They are Emerson, Dr. Martineau, and Robert Browning—a sceptical poet, a Unitarian, and a Pantheist. . . . The only vital points are, according to Mr. Craufurd, two—firstly, 'a true faith in the personality and Fatherhood of God'; and, secondly, a belief in Christ as the one human being who has perfectly represented the character of God the Father in such a way that human beings may imitate it. To these beliefs must be added, as implied in, and growing out of them, the indignant denial of any kind of Hell, and the vague but enthusiastic assertion of a certain kind of Heaven. Such, says Mr. Craufurd,

is the religion of the Broad Church party; and if Christians in general, and the Church of England in particular, will reduce Christian teaching to the above modest compass, Christianity, instead of being extinguished by reason and science, will be carried forward by both of them on a new career of triumph. Indeed, Mr. Craufurd tells us with a really engaging modesty, 'the real fact is that the religion of Jesus has never yet been tried on any large adequate scale'; and the rise of the Broad Church party, as now set forward by himself, will be not so much a revival of Christianity as the beginning of it."

At the instigation of this article, in the *National Observer*, I was induced to read one of Mr. Craufurd's works, entitled, *Christian Instincts and Modern Doubt*. While in sympathy with much it contains, I must confess that I cannot conceive how its writer reconciles himself to remaining in the Church. The man who exemplifies his "conscience" in any ordinary walk of life, as does Mr. Craufurd in his walk, I am prone to consider a humbug, and, when he is "found out," he is generally considered a humbug by his fellows. I fail to see why the walk of religion should involve privileges of "conscientious" activity which are, at any rate, theoretically, denied in any other walk. I fail to see why dishonesty should be considered a different thing in the Church from what it is (theoretically) in the mart.

I quite agree with the reviewer's comments as follow, on the peculiar interpretation of honesty involved in the "Broad Church" views of Mr.

Craufurd advanced in his present status as a paid minister of the Church of England:—"Now the questions which Mr. Craufurd raises by the publication of such views as these are two in number, and they are of a far wider character than any which may happen to have a personal application to himself. The first question is, Should the Church of England tolerate the presence amongst her authorised ministers, of clerics who openly acknowledge, as Mr. Craufurd does, that they totally disbelieve in every distinctive doctrine that the Church of England teaches? The second question is, Does the nebulous religion which such clerics put forward as being in harmony with science and reason, really justify any one of the claims made for it? Does it solve any of the difficulties with which modern science confronts us, or does it rest in any way upon any surer basis than the traditional religion of orthodoxy which its advocates design it to supersede? With regard to the first question, Mr. Craufurd himself acknowledges that, so far as concerns the Broad Church clergy themselves, it is in each case a question of conscience. Can a man honestly continue to recite creeds which, if he believes them at all, he does not believe in any sense that was ever intended by their authors, or by those who enjoin their use; and continue to administer sacraments to which he attributes no efficacy? Mr. Craufurd thinks that he and his brother liberals are justified in thus bowing down in the house of Rimmon, because they have a moral weight and position as English clergymen which they



would not have as ministers of a sect organised by themselves, and that they can best undermine the doctrines they regard as obsolete by continuing to recite them in the chancel, whilst attacking them in the pulpit. If such reasoning really commends itself to their consciences, so far as they themselves are concerned, there is no more to be said; but the matter must be regarded also from another point of view altogether. Even supposing that such clerics would be justified in not leaving the Church, is the Church justified in retaining them? The question here raised is entirely a question of degree. Great as is the latitude of opinion which the English Church allows, it is obvious that she must be prepared to draw the line somewhere; and that there are some doctrines, so divergent from traditional Christian teaching, that she could not possibly sanction their being taught by her ordained ministers. Our own opinion is, clergymen like Mr. Craufurd entirely overstep this line, and that though their principles may not deprive them of our respect, they disqualify them for a position in the Anglican priesthood as completely as would a profession of the religion of Brigham Young or of Mahomet."

The day is rapidly nearing when the liberalism of the Church shall have liberalised it into one, or a number of those sects whose ministers are maintained, not to expound the mysteries of a tradition, but to cry up, in good auctioneering style, the commonplace of morality homeopathically tintured by an unintellectual and vague presentment of imaginary theism.



The reviewer forcibly draws attention to the utterly unscientific nature of Mr. Craufurd's creed, in the following passage :—" Mr. Craufurd, no doubt, will think that the point just raised is, after all, one of minor importance, and that his religion will be equally rational by whatever name we call it. It remains for us to ask whether it is really rational at all—whether it has scientifically any stronger position than the forms of Christianity which express themselves in creeds or dogmas. Our answer to this is unhesitating. In no single respect, so far as science is concerned, is its position more rational than, or, indeed, different from theirs. Mr. Craufurd talks a great deal about mind, matter, and evolution ; and he acknowledges that he has himself passed through a painful period during which evolutionary science, whose conclusions he accepts, has appeared to him utterly inconsistent with the fatherhood, or even the existence of a God ; but although he has obviously now regained his theistic faith, he gives no clue to any rational process by which his conversion can be either explained or justified." Speaking for myself, I may say that, to judge from the work I have read, there is not a scintilla of science in Mr. Craufurd's religion ; it is merely a re-hash of the old emotional irrationalities, without the "hall-mark" which antiquity has impressed on those ancient products. As religion, his creed is "neither fish, flesh, fowl, nor good red-herring" ; as morality, it is a pretty statement of commonplace wrapped in the emotional jargon of the pulpit, with which nobody need

quarrel; as science, it does not exist; as the pronouncement of one who elects to remain within the Church, I can characterise it by no other term than dishonest.

We have now done with religious protagonists of the types even of Luther and Wesley, let alone of Christ and Mahomet. In these days, we cannot bow down before "visions" and "revelations." He who, nowadays, reveals effectively, must reveal by assimilating his message with collective experience. The mere whittling away of a few incredibilities which every sane man has long mentally discarded, and, at the same time, stating, in the exuberant eloquence of pulpit-emotionalism, a number of commonplaces which no sane man thinks worth disputing, is ridiculous when advanced as a cult to succeed dogmatic Christianity. To deny the Godhead of Christ is merely to state the obvious. To tax Christ (as did also another ingenious sophist, the late Professor Romanes) with adopting the common quack's method of "a wise economy of truth," is merely to gratuitously offend the susceptibilities of those who revere the idea of Christ. To call a denial of the Godhead of Christ, Christianity, is no more rational than to call a potato a turnip. If Christianity means anything, it means that Christ, the Father, and the Holy Ghost are coequal as God, and that Christ, incarnate as a man born of a virgin, atoned to himself, the Father and the Holy Ghost, for the "sins" of certain creatures which these three Godheads created, by allowing some of these crea-

tures to nail him to a cross. If we deny any one of these propositions, we have no more logical ground for calling ourselves Christians than for calling ourselves Yahoos, or troglodytes. We then style ourselves Christians for, virtually, the same reason as that of the yokel who calls himself Tory when "th' squire's Tory."

To constitute ourselves, on such grounds as those of Mr. Craufurd, the instruments of a new revelation of Christianity, is about as presumptuous a piece of puerility and vain reliance on popular imbecility and indifference as can well be imagined. I wish god-speed to the "Broad Church" of Mr. Craufurd, because I feel assured that, instead of fulfilling Mr. Craufurd's expectations, it is well adapted as one of the most powerful adjuncts to the great Rationalistic "battering rams" now thundering at the foundations of the spurious emotionalism called Christianity.

Who is not for emotion is against it. Who is not for reason is against it. Who tries to stand on both, drops between, and drops ignominiously. Mr. Craufurd tries this feat and, in the words of his reviewer, "It is hard to imagine anything more hopeless and helpless, than the manner in which he leaps backwards and forwards from one standpoint to another, now telling us that love is a surer guide than reason, now that reason is the very eye of the soul. How is this more rational than the dogma which he so much despises?" Mr. Craufurd seems to imagine he has got rid of dogma. Really, his creed is rendered ridiculous by its dogma. To

again quote from his reviewer : "Indeed, when we come to examine his religion carefully, we find it is quite as dogmatic as the Nicene Creed itself, though it does not contain quite so many articles. God is good, he tells us ; and his chief care is man. Though Mr. Craufurd ridicules the dogma of Christ's divinity, he informs us that as human being Christ was 'absolutely unique,' and that 'it has pleased God to beget no second son like him.' Though he ridicules all dogmas concerning the Holy Spirit, he declares that our spiritual life is nourished by what he calls an 'over-soul' ; and he warns us that when we dogmatise, 'we incur the displeasure of the Spirit of Truth,' which is surely itself a dogma, if ever there was one."

That the obvious essence : dogma, is rationally destroyed, so soon as the hidden essence : human indeterminism, is destroyed, is a fact that people, like Mr. Craufurd, seem to ignore. Under the illusion that they can preserve the outward semblance of Christianity, notwithstanding that the inward life, or spirit, is gone, these people make eloquent appeals to sentiment and do not hesitate to debase Jesus into what they imagine to be a perfect human being practising a 'wise economy of truth!' Such procedure would be pitiable, were its disingenuousness and superficiality not so obtrusive. To postulate as a perfect human protagonist of religion one who "economises truth" is, surely, in these days, the last method to be entertained, by sane people, of recommending Christianity. Here is society, rotten to the core, be-

cause every other man—notably, every other professor of religion—constitutes himself a judge of, and practises what he thinks, “a wise economy of truth,” and here we have Mr. Craufurd postulating, as the archetype of human excellence, one whose most prominent activity was on the assumption, practising “a wise economy of truth.” *Quos deus vult perdere prius dementat!*

Such emotive exuberance, or expediential ingenuity as that of Mr. Craufurd’s “Broad Church” party may possibly appeal to hysterical and ignorant sensualists, as transient excitement, but thinking people can only contemplate it as a painful, though instructive illustration of the power of imagination and prepossession to intoxicate the intellect. If Mr. Craufurd really believes that his emotive rhetoric and his Christ who is not to be “blamed” for practising “a wise economy of truth,” constitute a substitute for the traditional dogma of Christianity, he has a woefully inaccurate apprehension of the mental characteristics of modern civilisation. In these days of cynical sophistication, “hard-headedness,” intellectual acuteness, historical and scientific acquisition, men need stronger stuff than religion based on “a wise economy of truth” and eloquent appeals for “love.” If men cannot, nowadays, bow to Christian dogma, they assuredly will not bow to Craufurdian dogma. Emotive appeals, unless they touch his self-interest, now affect the modern man much as a shower affects a duck, or as titillating his head affects a cockatoo. If the modern man feels edified by such appeals, he



generally deutes to his neighbour the office of acting on them. His density in apprehending their compulsion on himself is curious when you come to consider his acuteness in other directions !

Mr. Craufurd's imaginary religion appeals to the modern man's "heart." This is now a very obedient servant of the modern man's "head." Consequently, it is impolitic, putting aside all other considerations, to appeal to this servant to regulate the "household." A religion, to be of service to the modern man, must appeal to his *head*. He must believe in it as he believes in twenty shillings in the pound. When he so believes in his religion, the modern man's head will probably compel him to act up to that religion, as his head now compels him to act up to its other dictates. My object, in this work, is to supply the modern man with such a religion. I want to show him that he *must* believe in God, justice, honesty, as he believes in twenty shillings in the pound. When he has digested my religion, I do not think the modern man will lose much if he takes the emotive ebullitions of the "Broad Church" party, as he often takes, say in his capacity of town-councillor, various formal rigmaroles : "as read." The greater, including the lesser, if the modern man accepts my religion, he will have accepted all the good of the emotionalism of the "Broad Church" party, while saving himself the encumbrance of that party's lumber.

Having written so much in disparagement of Mr. Craufurd, I will now quote a few passages as samples of what I approve in Mr. Craufurd's work. Coming



from an avowed atheist, or materialist, these expressions would be branded by the elect, as inspired by the Devil. Coming from Mr. Craufurd, the sentiments appear, under the auspices of James Clarke and Co., whose speciality, so I am informed, is the publication of Church literature. Mr. Craufurd writes: "They" (Broad Church thinkers) "can bear to gaze on man in his naked simplicity, when not clothed either in the fig-leaves of imputed righteousness; or the aprons of sacramental regeneration. They boldly declare that they much prefer unconsecrated greatness to consecrated mediocrity. They know well that God baptizes with fire many who never receive baptism by water; and they love the fire-born far more than the water-born, the original more than the docile, the warm-hearted more than the correct, the heroic more than the blameless, the erratic pioneers of pity more than the churchy acolytes of formal piety. Liberal Christian thought has really undermined hell. It has destroyed the very basis of that old prison-house by showing that evil is only good in the making. . . . Above all, profound thought has disclosed to some the immense and bewildering complexity of man's discordant nature, the inextricable mingling of good and evil, as it were, devils breeding angels, and angels breeding devils. It is now manifest that, if the old fatuous idea of hell were true, if all who die in unrepented sin went to hell for ever, heaven would be the predestined home principally of mediocrity. . . . On the old theory heaven would, for the most part,

be peopled with those 'finished and finite clods' whom Browning loved not. . . . When God lets loose the Infinite into any soul of man, all merely conventional virtue is at once much imperilled. . . . Thus the rudiments of the fairest heavens are frequently to be found in the lowest hells. The cold-hearted go to heaven, and the affectionate go to hell. The selfish creep and crawl into the conventional paradise, whilst the heroic herd with the irretrievably damned. Wise utilitarian philosophers munch their celestial cakes and sip their spiritual ale, whilst poor erring Burns and Shelley are cast as rubbish to the worms. Truly this is an effective *reductio ad absurdum* of the conventional view of hell. If things were, as the orthodox declare, one fancies that God would soon leave His heavenly throne. Weary of the commonplace, He would gladly betake Himself to the forlorn grandeur of hell. When the splendid roots of much sinfulness were there disclosed, wise observers, turning sceptical as to the finality of sin, might well exclaim with Browning, 'I see the good of evil.' Deep thinkers might admire God's failures and abortions far more than His successes. And if they were anxious to plant a grand new colony in some other portion of the universe, they might be disposed to reject applicants from heaven, and to cry out appreciatingly, as they gazed on the wasted treasures of the other place. 'Oh, that God would give us some of the heroes of hell!' Not many bold pioneers, not many leaders of the world's forlorn hopes, would be numbered amongst the 'plaster

saints' of the conventional heaven" (pp. 320-324).

If Mr. Craufurd's rationalism were as good as his sentiment, his religion would be mine. But, rational religion is not sentiment, however enlightened or sympathetic. The rock on which Mr. Craufurd comes to grief is that his religion is, virtually, nothing but sentiment. His dogma, such as it is, makes not the faintest appeal to intellect as a compulsion for belief; it is merely an expedient which, he seems to imagine, enables him to escape the impossibilities of orthodoxy. Really, it is as intellectually void as anything he has discarded. His Christ and "Father" are just as irreconcilable with intellect as is the triune product of tradition. His Christ is but a sentimental man; his "Father" but a magnified variant of his Christ. He has cut away from the ship of Christianity the sheet-anchor of the Trinity, only to trust the craft to a flimsy bit of "iron" yielding to every ripple of the ocean of Rationalism. He gives men nothing to believe. All he has to offer in place of the Trinity, hell, and heaven of theology is an *olla podrida* of sentimental exhortation and nebulous imagery.

Mr. Craufurd has much good mental stuff in him. It is sad to see men of his stamp rendered intellectually unproductive through enslavement, not by a living tradition, but by its corpse. It is sad to see such men stultifying themselves by the attempt to clothe with the panoply which once rendered imposing a living faith, a ghastly mimicry of that faith.

They are among the most vivid illustrations afforded by modern mental evolution, of the tenacity with which illusion, confirmed by habit, retains its grip on the human mind, rendering the intellect, however acute, hopelessly enmeshed in the sticky filaments of obscurantism.

## CHAPTER III

### A MONIST AND HIS CREED

IN some *prolegomena* introductory to his work, entitled *Comparative Psychology* (Walter Scott, Limited, 1894), Professor C. Lloyd Morgan sets forth his own view of "Monism," as opposed to what he calls dualism. He writes: "Nearly every philosopher contends nowadays that he is a monist. But there are monists and monists. I must therefore endeavour to state clearly the form of monism which I accept. First of all, I accept *a monistic theory of knowledge*. The dualist starts with the conception of a subject introduced into the midst of a separately and independently existent objective world. For him, the problem of knowledge is how these independent existences, subject and object, can be brought into relation. In the monistic theory of knowledge it is maintained that to start with the conception of subject and object as independent existences, is false method, and that the assumed independence and separateness are nowise axiomatic. Starting then from the common ground of *naïve* experience, it

contends that, prior to philosophising, there is neither subject nor object, but just a bit of common practical experience. When a child sees a sweet, or when a dog sees a cat, there is a piece of naïve and eminently real experience upon which more or less energetic action may follow. It is only when we seek to *explain* the experience that we polarise it in our thought into subject and object. But what logical right have we to say that the subject and object, which we can thus distinguish in thought, are separate in existence? No doubt it is a not uncommon, and a not unnatural, fallacy to endow with independent existence the distinguishable products of our abstract, and analytic thought. The distinguishable redness and scent of a rose may thus come to be regarded as not only distinguishable in thought, but also separable in existence. But, until it shall be shown that 'distinguishable in thought,' and 'separate in existence,' are interchangeable expressions, or that whatever is distinguishable is also independent, the conclusion is obviously fallacious. And it is this fallacy which the monist regards as the fundamental error of the dualistic theory of knowledge" (pp. 1-2).

The first point on which I must insist, in connection with the above passage, is that all psychological distinction between products of nervous reaction is a matter of *words*, not of *things*. Thus, I maintain that the so-called "sensory" product of a nervous reaction, involving what psychologists call a simple sensation, say, of hot or cold, is essentially



the same thing, as another nervous reaction involving what psychologists call "psychical compounds," or the most complex results of "association of ideas." In my opinion it is quite futile for anybody to dispute this proposition, until he shows that a mental product can be independent of its physiological substratum. Analogous difficulty confronts the physicist who deals with heat, light, etc. as factors independent of their physical substrata. Heat, light, thought have only existence as manifestations of "matter," whatever achievements we may accomplish in fancifully abstracting them as "things" independent of "matter." What issues as a product of nervous reaction, or interaction, whether the product be called a sensory response, or conceptual thought, is, with reservations I shall later discuss, a *physical manifestation*. All the symbolic hair-splitting by which psychologists elaborate fantastic genealogies of nervous responses transmuted into words, so far as that elaboration ignores, or tries to obscure, the essential identity of all reactions by, and interactions among, nervous constituents—whether the products of this reaction, and this interaction, be called reflex, automatic, volitional, or conceptual—repudiates the fundamental fact that "mind" is a manifestation of "body," and that all truth to be practically serviceable to humanity, as an incentive to action, must be reconcilable with the basical nervous manifestation which we call sensory intuition. Accordingly, from this standpoint, however far we may *transcend* sensory intuition, we must not *contradict* it, and to talk of the

knowledge arising through thought, or introspection, as being something antithetical to, and essentially different from, the knowledge arising from sensory reaction to external stimuli, implies the same fallacy as is involved in talking of heat and light as being forms of "energy." As the physicist implies that "energies" exist as *things*, independent of their physical bases, so does the monistic psychologist imply (on the conditions) that "knowledges" exist as such independent "things." The point lost sight of by psychologists who argue on the lines of Mr. Morgan, is that what Mr. Morgan calls "polarising in thought" is essentially the same thing as what I may call "polarising in sense." Mr. Morgan virtually asserts that by trying to "explain," by "polarising in thought the naïve experience," we have added something (the notion of subject and object) that did not exist in the "naïve experience." I maintain that this view is fallacious: that, inasmuch as the sensory experience is the evolutionary progenitor of the intellectual experience, the former must contain all the *potentialities* of the latter. I maintain that no intellectual experience is possible, unless as what I may term the elaboration of sensory potentialities. Accordingly, if we philosophise to "subject and object," then "subject and object" are potentially present in the "naïve" sensory experience. All normally endowed people do very decisively philosophise to "subject and object." Monistic philosophers are the only people who have yet succeeded in

“polarising in thought,” a notion denying “subject and object.” I venture to suggest, as accounting for their success, that they have become psychological eccentrics in their eagerness to cut out the universe to a pattern of their own invention. We, who are not monistic philosophers, shall, I fear, need much convincing that the common way of “polarising,” involving a clear intellectual perception of self and not-self, is *not* the “offspring” of the common way of sensorising, and is not, accordingly, more normal, and, corollarily, better as truth, than is the *uncommon* way, indicated by Mr. Morgan, of polarising in thought so as to deny subject and object.

Mr. Morgan writes: “There lies before me a crystal of quartz. The very language in which I state the fact implies the differentiation of impression into object (quartz) and subject (me). This impression, as I look at the crystal, is just as real as anything can be. . . . But, *quâ* impression, it is neither subjective nor objective; it is both and neither. Both, inasmuch as it is the raw material, which on analysis may yield the subject and the object; neither, inasmuch as, *quâ* impression, it is not analysed. And, now suppose that we do submit it to analysis in our thought, and by abstraction reach the quartz as object in consciousness on the one hand, and the subjective consciousness thereof on the other hand. It is surely clear that on the score of such analysis, we have no grounds for saying that either the quartz as object, or the subjective con-

sciousness thereof, is capable of independent existence. The object and subject, involved in the sense-impression, are like the colour or the scent of the rose, *distinguishable in thought*, but they are not separable in experience. We distinguish quite clearly the colour from the scent of the rose, but we know they are inseparable in sense-experience. So we distinguish the objective and subjective aspects of the impression, but *in* the impression they are inseparable" (p. 309).

First, let me observe, in connection with the foregoing, that the assumed parallelism between the sense-experiences of colour and scent, and of subject and object, is merely plausible. "Red" and "scent," like "subject" and "object," are not *things*, but symbols representing experiences issuing from sensory intuitions. These latter are the *things*; the former are merely what I may term the ghosts of things. Now, red and scent, in their aspects as sensory intuitions, or things, are what I may term things of limited significance, inasmuch as they exist only as refinements, or specialisations of sense. Thus, we cannot see a scent, or smell a colour. The case is altogether different regarding subject and object, or differentiation between self and not-self. So far as regards the determination of self and not-self, it makes no difference to a normal person whether he sees, touches, hears, tastes, or smells—all together, or any one separately of these sensory tests, will affirm the same fact regarding subject and object. Quite independently of "philosophising," or verbally sym-

bolising, I, at once, verify self and not-self by a glance, or touch; by listening, by tasting, and, least determinately, by smelling. The sensory intuition of self and not-self, accordingly, may be termed the bed-rock of human—indeed, we may say, of organic—experience. All other differentiations, compared with this, are but as alluvial deposits to primary rocks.

Even were such an eventuality to occur as that I suggest, in a later chapter, dealing with Röntgen's discovery, I maintain that the last perceptivity to leave us would be that of self and not-self. Were some future discovery to affect the tactual, as Röntgen's "rays" affect the visual, sense, and were we, as it were, immersed in an environment of such sense-nullifying factors, I maintain that common sensibility would still tell us what was self and what was not-self. Of course, I here assume merely a disturbance of external conditions, the nervous mechanism remaining normal, and I thus exclude all such effects as those involved in hypnotic suggestion and various neuroses, some of which, I may parenthetically remark, would seem to me to account for much that passes current as philosophy, but is really auto-suggestion through symbols.

Now, let us turn to the quartz illustration. Mr. Morgan's contention is here virtually that, as he likes to call a certain sensory intuition an "impression," he may ignore the essential quality of the experience which, he confesses, on analysis yields subject and object, and, as involving subject and object, "is just



as real as anything can be"—that he may repudiate this very real experience, because at the instant it occurs, he does not apply symbols to it. Moreover, not only does Mr. Morgan repudiate the experience because it was originally unsymbolised, he quite gratuitously applies some special symbols to this unsymbolised experience, for the purpose of repudiating the very reality which Mr. Morgan himself indicates as the first symbolised issue of the unsymbolised experience. Mr. Morgan, as special pleader for Monism, first tells us we must not trust primary experience and analysis, inasmuch as the primary experience does not, though analysis does involve the symbols, "subject and object"; then, he tells us we must trust him, because Monism has intoxicated him with the notions that "the objective and subjective aspects of the impression" are inseparable "*in the impression,*" and that sense-differentiation "distinguishable in thought" is "not separable in experience." I am too obtuse to apprehend how "objective and subjective aspects of an impression" can be demonstrated inseparable *in the impression.* Again, I do not quite grip the cogency of, though I think I discern a mirage of profundity in, the proposition that subject and object, though "distinguishable in thought," are "not separable in experience." First, under Mr. Morgan's leadership, we are invited to reject experience, because it is not thought about. Then, we are told that thought itself is not experience; in Mr. Morgan's words, that what "is distinguishable in thought is not separable in experience."



It seems to me that "what is distinguishable in thought," involves an experience of difference, and consequently of something which *is* "separable in experience." However, on Mr. Morgan's assumption that what is distinguishable in thought, is *not* separable in experience, I should like to be informed what is the use of thinking about what is experience. On such an hypothesis as that of Mr. Morgan, it seems to me sheer futility to apply thinking to define experience or anything else. Mr. Morgan, in the above passage, asserts that the "basal impression" is subjective and objective, so soon as it is analysed; but is neither, *until* analysed. I maintain that, in view of the earlier, the later proposition is irrational. If analysis yields subject and object, I deny a jot of rational ground for asserting that, prior to analysis, the impression yields neither subject nor object, and I venture to assert that Mr. Morgan would not have thought of advancing such a proposition, had he not been hypnotised by "Monism." I maintain that neither Mr. Morgan nor anybody else can offer a scintilla of evidence, that unanalysed sensory intuition does not yield subject and object, and judging by my own experience, I affirm that sensory intuition, as what I will term unsymbolisable sensation, *per se*, prior to any analysis, yields experience, tantamount to the later product of analysis.

From my standpoint, all knowledge is primarily but what we "sensorise" through the interaction of "matter" with "matter," just as is all energy (in the physicist's sense) what unvitalised "matter" (see my

definitions of "vitalised" and "unvitalised" matter, in later chapters) "sensorises" by its own interactions. Accordingly, from my standpoint, my "knowledge" (as unsymbolised sensory intuition of *difference*) of, say, hot and cold, is just as real as is my "knowledge," say, that man is a vertebrate; and, to write, as does Mr. Morgan, that "to start with the conception of subject and object as independent existences is false method," is, from my standpoint, itself "false method," unless, of course, Mr. Morgan can show (which, so far as I am aware, he cannot) that we have no sensory "knowledge" of "subject and object," as we have sensory "knowledge" of hot and cold. Personally, I can vouch that I have equal "sensory" "knowledge" of object and subject, as I have of hot and cold. In other words, I can "sensorise" "me" and "not-me" as effectively as I can "sensorise" hot and cold, and I can do this quite independently of symbols arising through introspection.

The Professor calls such sensory experience of "me" and "not-me" "just a bit of common practical experience," and he asserts that "prior to philosophising, there is neither subject nor object." The root of the Professor's contention here seems to lie in the fact that he assumes that, for "knowledge" to exist, it must be *verbally symbolised*. I maintain, as corollary of the demonstration, that thought is a manifestation, or function, of matter, that knowledge may exist quite independently of the condition whether it is, or is not, verbally symbolised. Just as

I can sensorially cognise hot and cold as *difference*, without symbolising them as percepts, so I can sensorially cognise "self" and "not-self," without so symbolising them. In fact, when I *do* so symbolise them, I am not really dealing with my *original* knowledge of hot, cold, self, and not-self, but with *secondary* knowledge (of words) issuing from what I may term a secondary nervous stratum, deriving its stimulus from that which afforded me the un-symbolised knowledge of hot, cold, self, and not-self.

Professor Morgan implies that sensory intuition is less reliable as a criterion of truth, than is a certain verifying process of his own which contends *against* sensory intuition. Moreover, he tacitly assumes that human truth, instead of being merely varying mental sensation, may be something final and unchangeable. This final "truth," he implies that he has attained in the above exposition, telling us that one "something" is real which we imagine by introspection dealing with symbols; but that another "something" is unreal which we perceive by sensory intuition.

Thus, Mr. Morgan writes: "Now here it is essential quite clearly to grasp the fact that all that we know must, in the act of becoming known, be an object of knowledge. The object of knowledge is not merely the object of sense, but includes also the object of thought. All that we know of the subject, all that we attribute to the self, must, in becoming known, be the object of thought. It is only in reflection, or introspection, which is also retrospection, that this is possible. You cannot analyse any bit of

experience at the moment when it is being experienced, you can only look back upon it in a subsequent moment of reflection. In that subsequent moment it may be polarised into object and subject, and either the objective aspect or the subjective aspect may then be the object of thought" (p. 6). Here all depends on what is knowledge. We scarcely need telling that the "object of knowledge is not merely the object of sense"; but, we want to know: is the object of sense knowledge, *before* it becomes object of thought? And, if it is knowledge, why should we deny the sensory knowledge of subject and object? If we deny thought to be essentially equivalent to sensory experience (which I assert, and shall rationally establish, it essentially *is*), I maintain that knowledge is not necessarily "object of thought." Especially I maintain this respecting knowledge "of the subject." I maintain that the most obtrusive knowledge we have of ourselves never becomes object of thought, for the simple reason that the knowledge cannot be verbally symbolised. I am assured that I might as well try to grasp a shadow as try to express all I know about myself, and that what I can express about myself does not represent a tithe of what I know about that entity.

I maintain that nothing is "known," whether of subject or object, unless with sense-experience as given *knowledge*. All our symbolism, in its ultimate aspect, is resolvable into a comparatively few sense-experiences affording us verbally inexpressible knowledge of what they involve, and arising through what

we call touch, taste, sight, hearing, smell, and common sensibility. When we seem to deal with this sensory knowledge, by verbally symbolising it, we really elaborate it into a secondary form of knowledge. Each of these sensory processes involves knowledge, before the issue is "philosophised" about through introspection. Moreover, I maintain that no introspection affords us further knowledge of the particular sensory issue than we attained when we felt it. What introspection *does* afford is *other* knowledge, emanating from the sensory knowledge which is appropriated and elaborated in its own way, by what I may term another stratum of nervous factors. This secondary stratum affords us a corresponding difference in sensation, involving what we call perception, or ideas, about the originating sensory product. On these ideas we base another series of really sensory processes which we arbitrarily distinguish as intellectual. However remote from sensory experience may be a particular intellectual sensation, as the product of introspection, it must be a derivative, no more independent of its sensory basis, than the apex of a tower can be independent of its foundation.

Thus, when ideas *directly* emanate from a sensory impression, they do not afford us fresh knowledge of the impression itself: they merely afford us knowledge of *secondary*, and essentially sensory, impressions. Corollarily, this secondary knowledge, like the primary, is sensation. When I handle a ball, I have sensory knowledge of the ball, as object, before I experience the secondary knowledge, which I verbally symbolise,



through introspection. If this secondary knowledge causes me to deny that the ball is something not myself, the secondary knowledge must justify itself as completely as did the primary knowledge. Now, the primary knowledge justified itself by merely existing, as sensation, or "naïve experience." The secondary knowledge cannot so justify itself. To justify itself, it must conform with what we call collective experience, or the accumulated sensation of truth, preserved in symbols. Accordingly, when secondary knowledge, as monistic theory, denies the existence of subject and object, or selfness and otherness, we dualists make stringent demands for proofs. I say that, in regard to subject and object, and as repudiating their existence, Monism has no proofs. Not only is the monistic theory inconsistent with common experience, but the interpretation of the universe which it builds on the repudiation of sensory experience of subject and object, besides stultifying itself, is inherently irreconcilable with the accumulated experience embodied as natural science and based on causality.

Mr. Morgan writes: "Never can the subject of experience in any moment be the object of knowledge in the same moment. Hence it follows that without reflection there can be no knowledge of the subjective aspect of experience." This is mere assumption depending on verbal inspissation in regard to subject as distinct from object, and on our conception of what we call knowledge. I maintain that *any* experience is necessarily also knowledge, so far as regards the

individual. The intellectual process, involving what Mr. Morgan calls an "object of knowledge," is itself just such a simultaneous realisation of "knowledge" and "experience," as is the sensory process. Because the one deals with verbal symbols, as object, while the other has no concern with such symbols, does not affect the status of either process as affording simultaneous knowledge and experience. Truth being but sensation affording what we call conviction, whether this "conviction" is about words, as in intellectual intuition, or about "things," as in sensory intuition, only affects "knowledge" to the extent of distinguishing it as of two types, one (intellectual) dealing with words, the other (sensory) dealing with things. I grant that "knowledge" of words cannot simultaneously occur with "knowledge" of things; but this is another matter from granting that "never can the subject of experience in any moment be the object of knowledge in the same moment." This secondary knowledge (of words) is far less determinate than is the primary knowledge (of things). The latter is invariably conclusive; the former is perpetually fluctuating. Why? Because the secondary knowledge is, as it were, "put to the vote," while the primary knowledge is never "voted" about, but is tacitly accepted as unquestionable. It is assumed that everybody gets the same truth from sensory intuition, while intellectual intuition offers numberless openings for dissension, and these openings become proportionately more conspicuous the remoter is the product of intellectual, from that of sensory, intuition. The

question of subject and object, self and not-self, is decided, by sensory intuition, quite independently of what is "distinguishable in thought." Monists affect to believe that "what is distinguishable in thought," in regard to subject and object, involves repudiation of the conclusion of sensory intuition affirming differentiated existences. If Monists can render their contention more acceptable than is the conclusion of sensory intuition, they are cleverer than I take them to be. When we employ intuition about words to upset intuition about things, we are on desperately ticklish ground. When we employ this verbal intuition to upsetting the *fundamental* intuition about things, our daring looks like folly.

When a "dog sees a cat" (to take the Professor's illustration), experience of dogs and ourselves tells us that the dog has sensory intuitions of different sorts from the intuition occurring when he sees a mutton-chop. Professor Morgan would have it that the dog's intuitions do not establish the fact of different "material" as between the dog, cat, and chop; but that Professor Morgan's own "intuitions," in seeking to "explain" the phenomena, establish the fact that there is no difference as to "material," between the dog, cat, and chop. The Professor maintains that, before the dog can realise the cat and the chop and itself, as objects and subject, the dog must "explain" the relationships by "polarising" them in thought, and that, should the dog thus "polarise" to the conclusion that the cat and chop are not identical with itself, as "material," the dog

would not attain as just a conclusion as does the Professor when he "polarises" to the conclusion that he, the dog, cat, and chop are one and the same "material." This implies that the Professor considers that the process of abstracting symbols from a sensory intuition, and "polarising" round about those symbols is more reliable as a method of demonstration than is accepting the sensory intuition as, itself, demonstration, and that, accordingly, the Professor prefers, as demonstration of "truth," "explaining" symbols, to experiencing sensory intuition. I don't.

The Professor's "philosophising" is really as much a "naïve experience" as is sensory intuition, and it is futile to assert that one more than another of these "naïve experiences" settles the question of "object and subject." The Professor evolves from his "inner consciousness" two "naïve experiences" which he calls sense-impression and "philosophising," or "polarising in thought." Then, he says one of his excogitated symbolic will-o'-the-wisps can tell nothing about subject and object, but the other can. So be it, and I ask: What does it matter if we grant that the Professor's symbolic tweedledum is more efficient than his tweedledee, to decide about subject and object? He tells us that confusion of tweedledum with tweedledee involves what is regarded by the Monist "as the fundamental error of the dualistic theory of knowledge." If such be the case, I think the Monist may consider the dualistic theory of knowledge as impeccable, and may save

himself the trouble of controverting its minor "errors."

Assuming, as the Professor contends, that the "naïve experience," "prior to philosophising," involves no intellectual conclusion for or against "subject and object," I should like to know how "philosophising," unless it accepts the "naïve experience" of sensory intuition as conclusive one way or the other, is going to reach a conclusion, except by inferring from symbolic phantasies which may mean anything or nothing, according to the mental twist of their inventor. It may be comforting to scout inference from sensory intuition as being "obviously fallacious," but if the Monist (who professes to deal only with naturalistic interpretations) takes this comfort, he virtually scouts natural science, which is nothing unless sensory intuition be accepted as the given basis of inference. We may, of course, reach any conclusion if we invent suitable premises, and we sometimes find ourselves in asylums through exercising this sort of ingenuity!

When I bump my head, in the dark, against the wall, the experience may be "naïve," but it is very conclusive that I have not bumped against my own head. I do not at all need to "philosophise" to the fact that there is something outside myself involved. This, I "intuite" concurrently with the collision between my head and the wall. The objectivity of the wall is perceived quite independently of any symbols I may later employ in "philosophising" about it. So soon as I begin "polarising" about it,



I am really outside the original demonstration of objectivity in regard to the wall. Though I did not, concurrently with the bump, translate the intuition of objectivity into symbols, the demonstration of objectivity was complete as subconscious conclusion when I bumped. The ensuing symbolism by which I "philosophise" about the wall, is merely the product of another sensational process (called intellectual), which really assumes as given what it ostensibly demonstrates. Intellectual elaboration of the sort, applied to sensory intuition, can exist only by appropriating the intuition, and translating it into arbitrary symbols. The translation involves no factor giving a new complexion to the originating sensory intuition. It merely defines that intuition in the terms of a secondary form of intuition.

In the realm of the inorganic, there is "perception" of subject and object, just as determinate as in the realm of the organic. Every chemical reaction, so far as our apprehension can interpret it, shows that the interacting substances "perceive" difference, and this chemical "perception," in regard to subject and object, is analogous to, and corroborative of, the organic sensory perception. Something not itself is as manifestly realised, respectively by, say, a lump of chalk and an acid when they are brought together, as something not myself is realised when I bump my head against the wall. No mere verbal anatomy can reverse such fundamental and universal thing-experiences as these. To deny them is to repudiate any experiential anchorage, and to

surrender ourselves to the vagaries of imagination, pure and simple. Of course, if we like to build on nebulous premises, there is nothing to prevent our erecting a perfectly logical structure, which will be as fatuous as it is logical.

We have one sort of purely symbolic dialectics (mathematics) which, in my opinion, is enough for humanity. A few eccentrics have tried to apply this system of dialectics to upsetting some geometrical conclusions based on sensory intuition. However, orthodox scientists look askance at the exuberance of these mathematical eccentrics, and are content to apply mathematics to formulating conclusions conformable with sensory intuition. Therein, I think, orthodox scientists exercise a wise restraint on their speculative ambitions.

Mr. Morgan writes : "They " (subject and object) "are distinct from each other, and, the *distinction is fundamental, but they are nowise independent and separate in existence*" (italics mine). How things can be at once fundamentally distinct, yet "nowise independent and separate in existence," is a mystery as deep as the theologian's Trinity. Of course, the Professor means that, though "forms" are fundamentally distinct, there is "material" which is identical under all "forms." I shall show that this proposition will not "hold water"; that unless we posit *specific* "material" or "existence," as underlying *specific* "form," we involve ourselves in endless self-stultifications. The Professor continues : "Of that which is not known, and not experienced, it" (Mon-

ism) "neither asserts nor denies anything." I think Monism would be very clever if "it" *could* "assert" or "deny" anything of what is "not known and not experienced." However, the Professor seems to me to get creditably near the achievement, by informing us that he, as "material," is one and the same as you, reader, or I. That seems to involve as near an approach to asserting about what "is not known and not experienced," as can be reasonably expected of poor humanity! I can vouch that the Professor's experience of his cosmical identity with myself, far transcends anything of the sort within my capacity as an experiencing entity. Moreover, the Professor tells us that he knows that the universe is self-existent. Thus he writes: "If in the wide region of the known and the knowable there be any modes of existence, which not only are not explicable, but from their very nature never can be explicable as parts of one self-consistent whole, our Monism falls to the ground." I shall show that we cannot rationally postulate such a self-consistent whole as the Professor's universe.

The Professor tells us that the Monist "assumes that far, very far, as we may be at present from anything like a complete or adequate explanation of nature, yet still this nature is explicable, and that by one method, the method of scientific procedure. . . . We contend that it is this to which science, philosophy, poetry, aye, and religion, too, have been tending throughout the centuries of human progress." "A big contention," one feels inclined to exclaim.

For billions of years, "nature" has been trying to "explain" itself, and now, at last, comes Monism to do the trick! And it does this by "evolution." Now, if the cosmos represents *everything*, and "evolution" is its method of getting to know itself, either it had the *potentiality* of knowing itself when it started in the evolutionary business, or it got that potentiality as, shall we say?—"news from nowhere." If it had the potentiality of knowing itself when it first emerged from "ewigkeit," as "nature," on what grounds are we to decide that it never knew itself until Mr. Lloyd Morgan and his fellow monistic "forms" appeared on the cosmic arena? Excuse this pleasantry. When I think of the unnumbered generations which have all "known and explained" this "nature"—each generation in its own way—and I hear my contemporaries prattling about knowing and explaining it, an involuntary smile dimples my normally serious countenance. I venture to suggest for the Professor's consideration, the demonstration I shall later offer regarding the nature of truth. I assure him that I find it salutary to keep this demonstration well in mind during my rather frequent sensations of "knowing."

Mr. Morgan advances the rational demonstration that "mind" and "body" are one and the same, as analogy to his dialectical contention to show that "object and subject" are one and the same. Analogy is a treacherous tool to play with; but Mr. Morgan is only here playing with imaginary analogy. The demonstration regarding mind and body, as being

one and the same, has an intellectual "pedigree," clearly going back to sensory experience, and explicitly affirmed by natural science. The speculation to identity, as between subject and object, is diametrically opposed to sensory experience, and has no warrant from natural science. The one involves a process of ratiocination, based on words divorced from things; the other erects a structure of words on a foundation of things.

Mr. Morgan believes in system-making. Thus, he writes: "A monistic interpretation of nature, so long as it holds true to the main principle of being *throughout self-consistent*" (italics mine), "allows any amount of individual freedom in the treatment of details. It is characterised, not by the possession of a common scientific or philosophic creed, *but by a common aim*" (italics mine). After ventilating a few of his own monistic notions, the Professor continues: "Now, I daresay there are not half a dozen independent monists who will agree with me in singling out these three traits for special prominence. But what does it matter? *My aim is monistic*" (italics mine), "as is also theirs. And there is plenty of room for many differences, and even divergences of opinion *among those who are in search of a self-consistent theory of thought and things*" (italics mine). The italicised statements, in the above quotation, will, I think, lead the reader, as they have led me, to suppose that Professor Morgan has a high opinion of self-consistent theories. I have no wish to disparage self-consistency in a theory or in anything else; but



I maintain that it is quite possible to become so enamoured of the self-consistency of a theory, as to become blind to its inconsistency with what lies outside that theory, as, we may say, its environment.

In his zeal for self-consistency, the Professor seems to me to have attained this state of intellectual *myopia*. Hence, he has come to look on his theory as the standard, instead of the issue, of experience, and tries to adapt experience to his theory, instead of that to experience. Whenever a writer shows such devotion to his theory, I am inclined to look on him as I look on the agreeable person who has always a pack of cards handy for a game at "Nap," and likes high stakes. Euclid's elements are very self-consistent, as theory, but, in themselves, they have no practical effect on humanity, *as incentive to belief imposing action*. This incentive, in my opinion, is the prime essential of any profitable philosophy, and no theory, unless it be clearly based on sensory experience, can involve such incentive. However self-consistent Monism may be in the eyes of its adherents, it is utterly inconsistent with the fundamentals of human experience, and implies, as its primary assumption, the huge fallacy that human truth, as sensation, can be immutable: that the perfect self-consistency at which Monists aim, is not, in itself, a virtual repudiation of the fact that serviceable theories must so lack *perfect* self-consistency as to be amenable to the inevitable invasion of new truths modifying the theories, and hence modifying their self-consistency. Perfect self-consistency in-

volves what I may term a closed circuit of knowledge, impervious by new truths.

Through his zeal for self-consistency, Mr. Morgan seems to me to cut himself adrift from collective experience and thereby to constitute his philosophy a mere system of abstract reasoning analogous to pure mathematics, and with no more bearing on human action than has mathematics. The most sophisticated thought, equally with the most primitive "reflex," is sensation. Consequently, any product of sensation, whether we call it knowledge, or "naïve experience," is essentially the same thing, and to base the fundamental postulate of a philosophical system on dialectical attenuations such as those of Professor Morgan, in regard to knowledge of subject and object, involves as gratuitous a pother about words as can well be imagined.

There should be no dallying with mere words as knowledge opposing sensory experience. Whatever we can sensorially feel *as* external to ourselves, *is* external. No knowledge arising from introspection can upset this sensory knowledge. This point of view is well indicated by Professor James in his *Text-Book of Psychology* (Macmillan, 1892). Professor James writes: "An opinion which has had much currency in psychology is that sensible qualities are first apprehended, as *in the mind itself*, and then 'projected' from it, or 'extradited,' by a secondary intellectual, or super-sensational, mental act. There is no ground whatever for this opinion. The only facts which even seem to make for it can be much

better explained in another way, as we shall see later on. The very first sensation which an infant gets is for him the outer universe. And the universe which he comes to know in later life is nothing but an amplification of that first simple germ, which, by accretion on the one hand, and intussusception on the other, has grown so big and complex and articulate, that its first estate is unrememberable. In his dumb awakening to the consciousness of *something there*, a mere *this* as yet (or something for which even the term *this* would perhaps be too discriminative, and the intellectual acknowledgment of which would be better expressed by the bare interjection 'lo!'), the infant encounters an object in which (though it be given in a pure sensation) *all the 'categories of the understanding' are contained*" (italics here are mine). "It has externality, objectivity, unity, substantiality, causality, in the full sense in which any later object, or system of objects, has these things. Here the young knower meets and greets his world; and the miracle of knowledge bursts forth, as Voltaire says, *as much in the infant's lowest sensation as in the highest achievement of a Newton's brain*" (italics mine), (pp. 15-16).

In the above passage Professor James affirms what I have earlier propounded regarding the evolutionary potentiality of all thought in sensory intuition. This is concisely embodied in Professor James's statement that the infant's earliest intuitions contain "all the categories of the understanding." The Monistic hypothesis, as expounded by Professor Morgan, is

based on assumption diametrically opposed to the above. Mr. Morgan virtually propounds that intellectual introspection is something self-created, absolutely distinct from sensory intuition. According to him, there are no "categories of the understanding," and accordingly there can be no "knowledge" in sensory intuition; in fact, to get "knowledge" we must, according to Mr. Morgan, virtually repudiate sensory intuition, inasmuch as we must repudiate the first effect of sensory intuition on the next "stratum" of intuition which we call thought, by repudiating the analytical demonstration of subject and object. If all the "categories of the understanding" are contained (as James tells us they are, and as we cannot deny them to be without stultifying "evolution") in the infant's sensory intuition, then to deny subject and object is to repudiate sensory intuition. Mr. Morgan effects this repudiation through tricking himself by such phrases as "naïve experience," "bit of common practical experience," and so on. He evolves these verbal ghosts from his "inner consciousness" as realities. Then he deals with the "ghosts" as the microscopist deals with his specimens, and seems to me to reach as fatuous a conclusion as one of my esteemed atheistic adversaries has reached through his microscopic investigations.

In dealing with scientific intuition, Professor Morgan himself seems to me to have well indicated the character of this primary knowledge, sensory or subconscious intuition—call it what we like—of subject and object. He writes (*op. cit.* p. 307):

## A Monist and His Creed 101

“The man of science, like the artist, is largely dependent on flashes of insight in moments when the wave of consciousness is peculiarly full, rich, and intense. How they come he may not be able to say, but *he cannot often conscientiously attribute them to schematic logic*” (italics mine). “It is idle, therefore, to expect through the application of rules of scientific procedure to attain scientific insight; for the man of science, in so far as he is creative, is an artist. One can only say to him, as one would say to other artists:—Saturate yourself through and through with your subject, and with all that bears, or may bear upon it, and *wait*. If the flash of insight comes, treasure it.” Now, all this applies to the sensory “artist.” His “flashes of insight” are brilliant and innumerable. As a “creative artist” he is even greater than his scientific brother, inasmuch as what he “creates” is inherently unquestionable, whether by “schematic logic,” or by flights of metaphysical speculation *in nubibus!*

Let us now glance at another aspect of Mr. Morgan’s application of his monistic doctrine. He writes: “The Monist contends that, alike in its biological and its psychological aspects, the organism is the product of evolution; that mind is not extra-natural or supranatural, but one of the aspects of natural existence.” This is roughly the view I advocate here, because it issues through logical inference from collective experience. However, on the monistic hypothesis, “evolution” is an untenable factor, inasmuch as, if there is nothing outside the



universe, all *potentiality* of evolutionary development must, at one time (infinity being an inadmissible pseudo-concept), have existed (1) in an undifferentiated universe, which involves a self-stultifying proposition; (2) in a self-existent and corollarily undetermined universe which, as I shall show, is inadmissible.

Let us look a little more closely into the meaning of the monistic doctrine of a self-existent universe. Professor Morgan tells us that "we trace the evolution" (of an organism) "backwards and find, in our interpretation thereof, simpler and simpler organisms until the organic passes into the inorganic. We find the energy less and less complex as we look back through the vista of the past." Professor Morgan then argues on the same lines to simpler and simpler consciousnesses. The logic of it all is the proposition of an originating "simplest possible" entity in two aspects, mind and matter. This entity is self-existent. Thus Mr. Morgan writes: "Monism regards nature and experience as one and indivisible, and all apparent dualism as a dualism of aspect, distinguishable in thought but indissoluble in existence. It contends, as I have endeavoured to show, that the individual mind on the one hand, and the cosmos on the other hand, are alike products of an evolution which is one and continuous. In both the products which we thus distinguish, we find a synthesis which is selective and determinate. Empirically that is as far as we are justified in going. Empirically we must just accept this continuous and progressive synthesis as the ultimate conclusion of

science. But it is characteristic of man as a thinker that he is seldom able to stop here. He is constrained to take one further step in his analysis; and it only remains for me to indicate the nature of this final step as viewed in the light of a monistic philosophy. The selective synthesis of the cosmos, which we call evolution, is regarded as the manifestation, under the conditions of time and space, of an underlying activity which is the ultimate cause thereof. This underlying activity is not a product of evolution; it is that in and through which evolution is rendered possible. In like manner the selective synthesis of my mind, which we term its natural development, is regarded as the manifestation, under the conditions of time and space, of an underlying activity, one in existence with and yet distinct in analysis from that of the cosmos at large. This underlying activity, which is the ultimate essence of my individual personality, is not a product of evolution; it is that in and through which the evolution of my consciousness is rendered possible. Object and subject are thus the correlative modes of manifestation of an underlying activity, one in existence, but none the less fundamentally distinct in aspect" (pp. 9-10). Whatever Mr. Morgan may believe about his Monism, I venture to assert that it is really dualism, blurred by incomprehensibility, and that argument to mind and body (cosmic and individual) being two "aspects" of the same "existence," is a mere piece of dialectical bluff. I maintain that this "aspect" and this "existence"

are no more real experience than is a mathematical point. Again, mind as one "aspect," body as another, implies that "aspect" in the connection is something real. If it is real, then bodily aspect is something really different from mental aspect, and to postulate these two aspects as the same existence implies that the existence is dual: composed of two realities. It is no use importing theological "incomprehensibles" in these days into philosophical systems. I maintain that the Monistic two-in-one is as incomprehensible as is the theological three-in-one.

I maintain that the word aspect, as a real concept, can only be applied to real objectivity, and that to apply it to spurious objectivity is false method. I maintain that the word existence, in the Monistic application, is spurious as a concept; that the Monist has no mental sensation from the word representing a derivative of sensory experience, and that, in the application of the term, it is nonsense. Further, I maintain that knowledge of subject and object, as sensorially intuited difference, originates entirely independently of introspective processes, and that, consequently, subject and object are not two aspects of the same existence, but are distinct existences. What is mind, as an object of knowledge, but a function of matter analogous to the physicist's "energy"? Nobody, so far as I am aware, has ever identified mind, except as a number of experiences which he symbolises by arbitrary definitions arising from the experiences themselves. Psychology, so far as it is divorced from physiology, is nothing but

a natural history of symbols, a dissection of symbols by symbols. Monism is but a fancy picture constructed of the products of psychological dissection of symbols: a ghost issuing from ghosts.

Monism as a system is based on the huge fallacy (in the light of collective experience) that truth (unless as a "*closed* circuit," based on fixed, arbitrary, symbolic premises, as in mathematics) can exist as a final, constant, clear-cut compulsion to belief; whereas truth is a product of ever-changing sensory and intellectual reactions to ever-changing impressions from without. By unifying the cosmos as self-existent and excluding the supernatural, Monism involves a repudiation of the basical experience on which is built natural science. The great induction to "cause and effect" is thereby repudiated, and the absurdity (according to collective experience) is assumed that what starts as unconditioned can disintegrate itself so as to lose its self-determinism; or can preserve that self-determinism, notwithstanding that it is disintegrated into conditioned parts. The Monist posits a supposititious reality which he calls "aspect" only to repudiate it as reality by another supposititious reality which he calls "existence." For neither of these mutually destructive "realities" can he offer a tittle of rational evidence, except by dealing with mind as an existence apart from body, and thus stultifying his doctrine which rests on the assumption that mind and body are one and the same existence.

The Monist divides knowledge into two "aspects": subjective and objective. This division is essentially

fanciful. So soon as we apply introspection to ourselves, we deal with self as an *object outside self*. Whatever psychologists may say, true subjective knowledge is never a product of introspection, because such knowledge cannot be symbolised. It is really made up of unanalysable sensations. Accordingly, there is really no subjective knowledge, in the psychological sense; but subjective knowledge is a continuum of sensation equivalent to sensory experience. When we verbally symbolise a state of consciousness, we have virtually done with that state as subjective knowledge, and we deal with *another* state, as subjective knowledge, just as when one sensory experience supplants another, we get subjective knowledge of the later, in place of the earlier, sensory experience. For instance, when I "philosophise" about my state, say, of repugnance to logic-chopping, I am not dealing with my *experience* of repugnance; but with my experience of certain symbols affording me other sensations quite distinct from repugnance. The very symbolism of my experience, by the word "repugnance," involves another "knowledge" quite distinct from the particular "knowledge" of which it is assumed to be the equivalent. Similarly, when I "philosophise" about "hot," I am not dealing with my experience of "hot," but with my experience of a word affording me no sensation of hot. Psychology, so far as it is divorced from physiology, is mainly a process of thought dealing with symbols and losing sight of the real foundation of those symbols, and, Monism,



as the first-born of psychology has inherited and added to the defects of its parent.

Use the word function, as expressing the connection between mind and body, away topples Monism, like a card-castle when we try to substitute a larger or smaller card for one at the bottom. Of course, it is not fair to ask philosophers who make bricks of gas, to exchange their terms. However, for those plain people who can only make bricks with clay, I venture to commend the "aspect" of the word function as a term well adapted to express what collective experience tells us is the relationship between body and mind. In adopting this term, plain people will avoid the perplexities attendant on verbal attenuation *in infinitum*, and will keep their intellectual anchors well embedded in the primordial clay of sensory intuition.

When I talk about the aspects of a mountain, I know what I am talking about, because I apply the term, aspects, to another term, mountain, the latter being the accepted symbolism of something I can sensorise, as outside myself. Again, when I talk about the aspects of a question, I know what I am talking about, because I can trace the experiential pedigree of the word, question, finding it to originate through a particular symbolised experience of an anterior unsymbolised sensory intuition, or sensation. Now, when I talk of mind and body, as being two "aspects" of one and the same "existence," the terms, "aspects," "existence" have no such sensory "pedigree," and, so far as getting any genuine meaning

from the collocation of the terms, I might just as well assert that mind and body are two aspects of one and the same aspect. The root of the matter here is that I only know "existence," *objectively*, that is, as *not-me*. Even when I deal with myself, as existing, I really only know that existence as *not-me*. Accordingly, when I deal with mind and body as symbolised representations of *me*, I am not dealing with *me* at all, but with two externalised symbols: one of which, "body," I assume to represent something I can see and touch; the other, "mind," I assume to represent certain experiences of that "body." Now, I know nothing of "mind" apart from "body" (externality), but I know "body" apart from "mind." Through knowing "body" I know "mind." Hence, "mind" is a derivative of "body," as experience, and there can be no question of coequal "aspects" of "existence" underlying both body and mind. For "body," experientially underlying "mind," and consequently being the only "existence" of which we have first-hand knowledge, we cannot rationally postulate such an object of first-hand knowledge as being an "aspect" of anything; we can only postulate it, *as itself appearing in different aspects*. If we postulate "body" as itself being an "aspect," the question arises: Aspect of what? The Monist answers: Of "existence." But as "mind" is an experiential offshoot from "body," and "existence" is an experiential offshoot from "mind," then "existence" itself is nothing but an "aspect" of "body," instead of "body" being an "aspect" of "existence." The Monistic

“existence” is mere “ding-dong”: sound without meaning.

It will be seen that Professor Morgan deals very gingerly with the “underlying activity” which “is not a product of evolution.” He does not tell us categorically that it is the ultimate attenuation of his “simpler and simpler” evolutionary hypothesis regarding mind and body. However, another eminent Monist, Professor Haeckel, is not so reticent on the subject. With gay irresponsibility he tells us: “An unbroken series of natural events, following an orderly course of evolution according to fixed laws, now leads the reflecting human spirit through long æons from a primeval chaos to the present ‘order of the cosmos.’ At the outset there is nothing in infinite space but mobile elastic ether, and innumerable similar separate particles—the primitive atoms—scattered throughout it in the form of dust; perhaps these are themselves originally ‘points of condensation’ of the vibrating ‘substance,’ the remainder of which constitutes the ether. The atoms of our elements arise from the grouping together in definite numbers of the primitive atoms, or atoms of mass” (*Monism*. English translation, Adam and Charles Black, London, 1894).

After cudgelling our wits about “aspects,” “existences,” “naïve experiences,” it is refreshing as a breath of the “briny,” in August, to read the above. We then feel like a vigorous lad after he has done with parsing and fractions and taken to leather-hunting, or devouring the adventures of the Lone Scout. Certainly Professor Haeckel seems to lack those fine

shades of symbolic sensibility which we must suppose to be characteristic of the advanced Monist, to whom Haeckel seems to bear the same relation as a mechanic bears to an engineer. I must confess I prefer Professor Haeckel's unabashed and frank move to self-obfuscation, to the method of his more sophisticated friend who attenuates to verbal rather than atomic primordial ethers. The only fault I have to find with Professor Haeckel as an authority regarding atoms, molecules, and ethers is, that he will not transcend them by invoking the supernatural. However, the Monist likes the supernatural no more than a cat likes a terrier, though he unconsciously invokes it.

In connection with the above extract from Haeckel, I may quote a passage from my own work, *Rhythmic Heredity* (Williams and Norgate, 1894): "We have now reached two fundamental assumptions: a super-mechanical energy and an immaterial ether as its first issue. The first product of cosmic evolution we assume as points of ponderable (in contradistinction to immaterial) matter, each endowed with rhythmic motions which it will preserve so long as the universe coheres. These material points we call ether-atoms. The next analogue of immaterial potentiality to appear is reciprocity in rhythm between differentiated ether-atoms. The issue we call a matter-atom. A similar reciprocity between differentiated matter-atoms (equivalents of the atoms of chemistry) results in compound matter-atoms (equivalents of the molecules of chemistry). Proceeding on this principle an ever-increasing

## A Monist and His Creed 111

complexity of co-operating rhythms results in all phenomenal integrations, each of which must have its analogue in the primordial energy. This is in accordance with Mr. Herbert Spencer's formula with regard to evolution: 'Evolution is an integration of matter . . . during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity.' The primary incoherent homogeneous matter is the ether of points, of which the rhythms, representing potentialities of the immaterial energy, are commingled so as to constitute this matter-ether a chaotic whole. We may compare this with the 'resting stage' in the process of nuclear division of germ-cells. Here, the constituent loops containing ordered arrangements of 'ids,' or hereditary elements, break up, and the 'ids' appear to be indiscriminately mixed. After this, the loops re-form and a new stage of metamorphosis ensues. The primary 'coherent heterogeneity' of matter is represented by the reciprocal affinities of these ether-atoms, causing their rhythms to co-operate and form systems. Each new system involves a greater coherent heterogeneity of rhythms" (pp. 37-38).

It will be seen that there is virtually only one difference—though this is an all-important difference—between the above hypotheses. The great difference is, that I postulate the supernatural as "behind" the processes, whereas Haeckel rejects the supernatural, and, in rejecting it, renders his hypothesis self-stultifying. He might just as well assume 'an apple cutting itself up for the pie, as assume the self-



created "mobile elastic ether" in "infinite space." Of the "infinite space" he has no real notion, hence the words are but empty jingle; and a "mobile elastic ether" needs creating "mobile and elastic" as fully as a picture needs painting. Grant the Creator, I am ready to accept as logical conceptualism Haeckel's speculations in the realm of phenomena. Exclude the Creator, I no more accept Haeckel's logic about origins than I accept (notwithstanding his remarkable prognostication corresponding with the recent calamity in Paris) Old Moore's predictions.

The Monist implies that his empirical method of identifying progressive complexity of *forms* also involves the assumption of corresponding original "simplicity" in "material." For, did not the "material" originate from "simplicity" corresponding to that of the "form," we should be driven to the seemingly illogical assumption of inconceivably complex "material" manifesting itself as the simplest "form." In other words, we are driven to assume (on the conditions) that all the complexities of "form," now apprehensible to us, existed in some embryonate state, in the originating cosmic "material." Now, if we apply the "law" of causation to "forms," we must also apply it to "material"; if there is "sequence" of "forms," there must also be sequence of "material," inasmuch as "form," without "material," is "nothing." Then, on the assumption of a self-existent cosmos, originally containing all the "material," or potentiality, for its later "forms," the empirical verification of backwards-increasing

simplicity in "forms," invalidates the assumption of originating "material" with complex potentialities. Accordingly, we must assume, by invoking the empirical verification of backwards-increasing simplicity of "forms," the universe, as "material" becoming correspondingly "simple" with its "forms," so that "forms" and "material" were primarily what we may term absolutely simple, or unity. Corollarily, this originating "unity" must have disintegrated, or differentiated, itself, *pari passu* with the increasing complexity of its "forms." For, had it not so differentiated itself, it would remain outside "forms," and be equivalent to the Deity which I have demonstrated, as outside the universe.

Assuming the monistic doctrine to be that of an originally "absolutely simple" cosmic "material," the question arises: What *naturalistic* interpretation can the Monist give of the increasing complexity of cosmic "material"? If the universe ("material" and "form") was originally "absolutely simple," how did it become infinitely complex? It is no use for the Monist here to invoke biological and physical verifications. We do not want merely to be reminded of empirical "facts" affording us instances of the occurrences to be interpreted. We want the Monist to tell us, in the terms of "natural" explanation, how "form" and "material" which, on his assumption, did not once exist, came to exist. In other words, we want him to tell us how "evolution" could be conceived to energise, on the assumption of a self-existent cosmos. Either all the products of this

“evolution” must have coexisted as the originating cosmos, or they must have been *supernaturally created*. The Monist rejects the latter contingency; then, he must “naturalistically” account for the former. Moreover, as the Monist is bound to afford a *natural* authentication for all his assumptions, he must not only “naturally” account for “evolution,” he must also “naturally” account for a self-existent cosmos. As the Monist accepts nothing outside the cosmos, any monistic doctrine of evolution must postulate all products of evolution as being once embryonate together as the cosmos, and, as the Monist is bound to account for everything “naturally,” he must not invoke infinity for his “evolution,” inasmuch as the term, besides being unthinkable, implies the supernatural, and can consequently, in the connection, only be considered a trick for avoiding an intellectual *cul-de-sac*.

I think I have logically established, on the basis of collective experience, the “fact” that, if consciousnesses and, corollarily, organisms, as two aspects of the same “material,” have been evolved from simpler consciousnesses and organisms, there must be a Power outside cosmic “material” which has caused consciousnesses and organisms, and, corollarily, the universe as a whole, to evolve. Granting this Power, I am ready to accept, in the main, what the Monist postulates about mind and body, and about evolution generally. This “evolution” thus becomes an ordered sequence of events, conditioned by God, and what we “know” about it constitutes

## A Monist and His Creed 115

our present sensation of truth. Unless he advances some new truth equally consistent with collective experience as is the current doctrine of evolution, and subversive of that doctrine, anybody who denies the truth of "evolution" must be ignorant, inept, or intellectually dishonest.

## CHAPTER IV

### A CHRISTIAN ALTRUIST

IN the Church, to-day, there are, no doubt, many apparently self-sacrificing emotionalists (really, these people are self-seekers gratifying their own inclinations) who confidently appeal to their lives as witness of the saving grace of Christianity. One of these men—I just read—the Rev. A. J. Stanton, a strong Ritualist, in noticing Sir William Harcourt's recent charge of dishonesty against the Romanising party in the Church of England, says: "Sir William Harcourt's attitude is simply monstrous. To describe any class of men as dishonest would be bad enough without adducing proof; but here we are, we clergymen, our works and our ways open for inspection by all the world, and we claim to be at least as honest as Sir William Harcourt."

Mr. Stanton seems to consistently exemplify the Christian ideal, and so to offer a notable exception from average clerical procedure. I read in the *Daily Chronicle* of June 28, 1897, that "he has been curate there (at St. Alban's, Holborn) for



thirty-six years. Other positions of dignity and emolument have, as every one declares, been offered to him during those years, but he has elected to remain in and to dignify the position of 'an unbene-ficed clerk' with little, if any, emolument. He is popularly known as Father Stanton." I quite agree that such men as "Father" Stanton need not fear comparison, as honest folk, with the Harcourts, and I am ready to grant that, *to an age which could believe through emotion*, such a personality as that of Mr. Stanton would represent the highest human excellence, and tend to inspire his fellows to action conducive to their own and the public welfare. However, under present conditions of verifying possibility, I must avow that the incentive of Mr. Stanton constitutes him a factor adverse to the best interests of the community. His sincerity and zeal, emanating from an intellectual superstructure built on emotional prepossession, tend to morally corrupt those to whom he ministers, by beguiling these people to shun truth, and so court dishonesty through tacitly accepting, as credentials for the truth of the reverend gentleman's incentive, what is merely an issue of Mr. Stanton's personal impulse, inspired by what will not bear intellectual scrutiny, and, consequently, can, at the best, merely intoxicate, with futile and transient enthusiasm, people whose permanent incentives emanate from intellectual criteria of truth.

These people, lacking the vivid credulity and acquired habit of emotional self-indulgence involving the appearance of self-renunciation, which enable Mr.

Stanton to "renounce the world," need a more compulsive incentive than mere personal example to ensure effective resistance to corroding inducements. Through his very earnestness and intensity, this admirable priest—but anti-social unit—tends to turn those who follow him into self-betrayers prone to renounce, when selfish interest demands, the only guide to conviction, and so devoid of moral anchorage. Mr. Stanton's calling, training, mental habit, and hereditary predisposition enable him to escape the grosser common incentives to self-indulgence, and to simulate—no doubt, in perfect good faith—the ideal of self-renunciation. But conditions ensuring these results, as regards Mr. Stanton, are utterly foreign to ordinary people. No emotional intoxication, no professional ideal is available to these people, as counterpoise to the thousand lures besetting them in their everyday affairs. Here and there Mr. Stanton may win a few dilettante imitators, but of what moment are these compared with the multitudes whom such an enthusiast as Mr. Stanton beguiles away from that conviction, which, Archdeacon Wilson tells us, is the basis of right conduct? If Mr. Stanton's truth is not truth to the intellect of the public, then, the greater the sincerity, zeal, and ostensible self-sacrifice of the reverend gentleman, the more he is likely to perniciously affect his fellows.

We do not now want a few saints. We want a nation of honest men. People like Mr. Stanton may provide us with a few saints, but I deny they can produce us a man whose actions are governed by his

intellectual apprehension of right, and I feel sure they do produce us many more knaves than saints. In the present state of society, I grant that Mr. Stanton and his like alleviate much suffering. On the other hand, the alleviation tends to prevent rectification of the cause—dishonesty—at the root of the suffering. I maintain that intellectual honesty will render superfluous philanthropists, or, rather, will turn every man into a philanthropist by rendering him servant of his fellows. Faculty nationalisation, the first issue, collectively, of intellectual honesty, will do more for individual wellbeing in a month than all the Stantons could do in a century. Emotional altruism is only necessary to a corrupt society. In an intellectually honest society there could be no destitution, and the ties of kindred would ensure those spontaneous services of love for which, under present conditions, so many have to depend on the emotive impulses of enthusiasts like Mr. Stanton. I am morally sure that, in these days, society can well exchange every Stanton for an intellectually honest man, and that the sooner social environment eliminates sincere emotionalists who palliate, and impede rectification of, the causes of social evils, the better it will be for this nation.

Mr. Stanton appeals to his life as testimony to his honesty. From my standpoint, his activities are no real test of his honesty, but merely illustrate his prepossessions. He is hypnotised by emotional illusion regarding an intellectually discredited divine personality into gratifying his personal predisposi-

tions. His resulting zeal obscures, for him, the criteria through which only men of to-day can obtain conviction, and so practise honesty. By alluring average people, through the spurious virtues of his own personality, Mr. Stanton distracts these people from the only standards ensuring effective resistance to the anti-social inducements besetting average folk, but not obviously affecting a few zealots like himself. How few, among his fellow-clerics, ostensibly motived by the same incentives as Mr. Stanton's, are able to resist the common inducements, and so to indulge themselves by the spurious, yet academically admired altruism of Mr. Stanton, let clerical zeal for preferment, emoluments and *dolce far niente*, decide! If Mr. Stanton, from his standpoint, is honest, he indulges in a stretch of imagination in invoking the lives of his fellow-clerics, generally, as illustrating his own form of honesty. He is simply a "sport" showing the incompatibility with modern environment of the conditions imposed by the Church on its professional adherents. They, at any rate, as a class, manifest no obtrusive emulation of Mr. Stanton's form of honesty. They, at any rate, cordially acquiesce practically—whatever they do theoretically—in the decree of evolution, that he who is motived by emotion, is necessarily dishonest. Through acting according to his *abnormal* environment, Mr. Stanton prevents ordinary people from adapting themselves to what is, for these days, a *normal* environment decreed by God, as evolution, to compel men to accept their intellects, in place of

their emotions, as the only guide to right conduct. Accordingly, I say: Mr. Stanton, with all his virtues—in fact, by reason of those virtues—is an eminently anti-social product.

Mr. Stanton excites the most pernicious form of personality-worship, involving the intoxication of his followers by specious falsity regarding the question: religion, at the root of human conduct. If you make rogues in regard to God, you will make rogues in regard to all lesser issues. Compared with a religion that turns men into self-deceivers regarding God, blank atheism, if honest, is godly. If men are not rendered honest regarding God, all your mechanical appliances, all your scientific revelations, all your philosophy—everything you consider to denote progress—is “Dead Sea fruit.” However, in regard to material issues, we may flatter ourselves that we are progressing, if we are dishonest regarding God, we are entering the pit of national dissolution. Evolution has now decreed that, by the honesty or dishonesty of the social organism, from root upwards, *not merely according to desultory, empirical tinkering here and there about the trunk*, modern societies are destined to stand or fall. Money, men, and arms, without honesty, mean but national suicide. If saints now delude to dishonesty regarding religion, they are but tools of any devil that exists, to lure a nation to its ruin. Compared with such saints, rascals are divine means of salvation!

There is no more intrinsic merit in virtue through mere emotional incentive than there is intrinsic



merit in selecting a special food through gustatory preference, or than there is intrinsic *demerit* in vice through emotional predisposition. Intrinsic merit or demerit is only involved in any line of conduct so soon as emotional disposition is conditioned, as motive, by intellectual conviction. It is obviously easier for an emotionally virtuous, than for an emotionally vicious, man to thus subject his action to intellectual government. However, I venture to think that the vast majority of people are not emotionally vicious: that, given an honest social environment, the vast majority of people will find small difficulty in subjecting their emotional preferences to intellectual governance. I believe that, so soon as society adopts honesty as the criterion of legislation, there will be few people whose innate tendency to vice disables them from conforming with the general incentive. The vast majority of our knaves are made by society, not by hereditary predisposition.

Before we can have individuals honest, we must have society honest. In this respect, a society differs from a physiological organism. In the latter, the parts condition the whole. In the former, the whole conditions the parts. The reason for the difference is that, in a physiological organism, the parts are *not relatively free*, whereas, in a society, the parts *are* relatively free. This relative freedom of parts, in a social organism, involves the necessity that society, as a whole, shall restrain the freedom of its parts in order to ensure their collective efficiency: that the social "conscience" shall override the individual

“conscience.” Such restraint, by the coming “fit” society, involves the application of intellectual criteria of right to repressing individual tendencies contravening that right.

Before we can have society honest, a sufficient number of its members *must act according to their convictions*, and so leaven the general public that a popular vote will sweep away the present dispensation and establish its successor, on intellectually honest lines. If a sufficient number of folk do not promptly act according to my creed; if the intelligence of the country merely academically accepts the demonstration of right which I afford in this work, then I believe that what these people should achieve, as peaceful transition, will be accomplished cataclysmically by social upheaval.

It is obvious that, so long as the public is hypnotised by emotionally virtuous people like Mr. Stanton into misapprehending the true conditions, to this age, of virtue, the less probability there will be of a sufficient constituency to secure the peaceful transition from the old to the new dispensation, and the greater will be the probability of the change being accomplished through the blind impulses of the masses who look no further than to the mere subversal of present conditions. The great point which it now behoves every person who desires to act honestly to ponder is that, *if he, personally, tolerates injustice, he is as morally culpable as though he perpetrated injustice*, and that, by allowing himself to be intoxicated by the emotional virtues of people like Mr. Stanton, he

tempts himself, to the utmost, to ignore the only incentives which will drive him to intolerance of injustice. Through such intoxication, he loses grip of the only anchorage which will hold him to intellectual right. Failing this anchorage, he cannot even identify, let alone realise, justice. The Christian standard of honesty is of no avail to him who would exemplify intellectual honesty. Indeed, the Christian standard of honesty is the greatest impediment he can encounter. Therefore, I repeat, however admirable such a man as Mr. Stanton may be, according to conventional standards, he is an eminently "unfit" social product. The more zeal and sincerity he exhibits, the more he helps to retard the advent of social honesty.

Mr. Stanton takes unction to himself for obeying, according to his own view, the Prayer-Book. He writes to the *Daily Chronicle* of June 29, 1898: "On a hundred days in every year for the last thirty-six years we have dined off fish and rice pudding. Do we like this kind of food? No; we have done it out of obedience to the Book of Common Prayer." The reverend gentleman gives other instances of a like kind to show his sincerity. Well, I say, "fish and rice pudding" sincerity wont do for these days, and I can find some thousands of people, within a radius of a few miles of Mr. Stanton's church, who would be delighted to "mortify" "off fish and rice pudding," not on a hundred, but on 365 days in the year! Mr. Stanton takes as a virtue that he obeys the Prayer-Book. So the Moslem may extol himself

for obeying the Koran. What I want to know, before I concede merit to Mr. Stanton for obeying the Prayer-Book, is: Does he believe what the Prayer-Book inculcates, and, if so, can he give intellectually satisfactory reasons for his belief? If he cannot give these reasons, then I say: There is no more merit involved in Mr. Stanton's obeying the Prayer-Book than there would be in my dining "off fish and rice pudding one hundred days in the year." What Mr. Stanton dines off is a matter of supreme indifference to everybody but himself. On the other hand, if Mr. Stanton imposes on the public his "fish and rice pudding" proclivities, as authentication of his belief in the Prayer-Book, it is high time the public was enlightened as to the flimsy nature of Mr. Stanton's authentication. It is high time that people like Mr. Stanton were brought to recognise that, in these days there is only one sort of intrinsically valuable sincerity, the sort that is born of *intellectual conviction*.

Let me ask Mr. Stanton a question. If God created the universe, how could any part of the universe so escape God's dominion as to be free to thwart God, and, if it were free enough to thwart God, how could it not be free enough to possibly escape God when He wished to punish that part? Another question: What sort of a god is that which creates creatures free enough to thwart him, but will not allow them sufficient freedom so to thwart him as to escape his vengeance? What sort of a god is that which, of his own omnipotent, omniscient impulse, creates

creatures which he knows he will ultimately punish with unspeakable vindictiveness and torture, merely because those creatures exercise predispositions imposed on them by that god? Again, let me inquire of Mr. Stanton. In the face of the consensus of science that human volition is a product of bodily conformation (determined before the individual is born) responding to an environment also determined before the individual is born, what does Mr. Stanton mean when he asserts, as a Christian, that Jesus Christ came to earth to compound with God (of which He, Christ, is a third part) for human "sins," and that only through the intercession of Christ men can escape God's tortures for their doing what it is impossible for them to avoid doing? If the "sins" of mankind are the product of the "sin" of one man and one woman, why are we to revere a god who tortures untold millions of the posterity of that original man and that original woman, and enables a minute fraction of such posterity to escape torture only through the torture of the god's son? What *convictions* can the men of these days attain regarding a real god and religion from the imbecilities which Mr. Stanton tells us inspire him with devotion to the "Book of Common Prayer?" Again, let me ask Mr. Stanton what he, as a Christian believer, has to say to modern literary criticism of biblical records, corroborating, to the fullest extent, science and common-sense in their rejection, root and stump, of the theological growth which Mr. Stanton calls the Christian religion? Against such consensus of testimony, of



what more significance to mankind is it that Mr. Stanton shows his sincerity by "dining off fish and rice pudding on one hundred days in every year, out of obedience to the Book of Common Prayer," than that an asylum-inmate shows his sincerity by holding state as an emperor, out of obedience to his own hallucinations? If, as Archdeacon Wilson tells us, convictions are the basis of right conduct, how are normal men to practise right through the incentive of Mr. Stanton?

Obviously, a man who is merely emotionally virtuous, has no claim to be an accurate guide to his fellows. If they, like him, are emotionally virtuous, they do not need him as exemplar. If they are emotionally vicious, they will, as emotionalists, no more exchange their incentive for his than he will exchange his for theirs. Neither he nor they being impelled by intellect, there is no court available to them as authority: they are laws to themselves. The case is quite different when a man is *intellectually* virtuous: that is, when he has eliminated his personal predispositions, as deciding factors. Then he invokes an authority *which every normal man will measure by the same criteria, and which no normal man can resist without debasing himself to himself*. No man likes to be a rascal in his own estimation, so every man is innately prone to defer to the intellectually virtuous. So soon as you assail an emotional rogue through his intellect, however he may kick against the new authority, he hurts himself more effectively than he resists the authority. If he con-

tinues a rogue, he is one disgusted with his vocation. Imagine the effect on the emotional rogue when social environment adds its authority to that of the intellectually virtuous guide—when society itself becomes intellectually virtuous!

I am all for freedom in belief, and all for rigid constraint on action in conformity with belief. The calamities of modern society do not proceed from wrong belief, but from non-practice of belief. I say to the man who can believe by emotion: You are necessarily ignorant; it is your business to learn. If, to retain your emotional belief, you refuse to test it by facing opposing evidence, you are dishonest. If you are not thus deliberately ignorant, your belief involves no moral defection. On the other hand, I maintain that it is the duty of society to prevent emotional believers from inoculating others with their own infirmity. Freedom in belief is one thing. Freedom to propagate falsity is another. If you enjoy the aroma of sulphuretted hydrogen, you have the right to inhale as much as you like; but you have no right to carry a bag of it into a public room and open the valve. Society represents that room. The Stantons represent the man with the gas.

However, notwithstanding his infirmity, the emotional believer in falsity, as propagandist, is impotent for mischief, as compared with the intellectual believer in truth who does not act his belief. Fallacy is not the modern devil. That devil is unacted truth. Where one man is beguiled by the emotional believer into wrong belief, a thousand, proof against the

emotional believer, are damned by their failure to act what they believe through intellect. Give me practice conforming with belief, I will answer that belief in falsity shall be impotent to work social ill. On the other hand, give me but belief in truth without corresponding action, then shall more social calamity issue than by any belief in falsity, with corresponding action.

## CHAPTER V

### A MATERIALISTIC PHILOSOPHER

THAT cold-blooded philosopher, Mr. J. F. Nisbet, has recently been glorifying the "independent gentleman," in his capacity of spendthrift heir. His virtues, according to Mr. Nisbet, consist in dissipating among whores and blacklegs the too congested accumulations of his ancestors. If there were no spendthrift heirs and their coadjutors (the latter Mr. Nisbet compares to the supposed "noxious vermin which the farmer ignorantly destroys until he learns by experience his mistake") we should eventually see a "small privileged class owning most of the wealth of the country." Says Mr. Nisbet: "it would then certainly be a case of the rich getting richer and the poor poorer every day, and the last state of society would be worse than the first." I think these results show a fair probability of occurring, if they have not already occurred, notwithstanding the efforts of the spendthrift heir and his allies. But, let us take Mr. Nisbet on his own ground, which, I readily grant, has some stability, so long as

## A Materialistic Philosopher 131

we are concerned to uphold the present system. According to Mr. Nisbet, the law of entail and all similar facilities and inducements for money-accumulation are rendered tolerable by the "independent gentleman" with a penchant for sharps and courtesans. Failing this delectable product which, we are told, the wealthy family, with almost unfailing regularity, throws up "every second or third generation, society would be bound, in self-defence, to pass laws confiscating property on the death of its owner." Parenthetically, Mr. Nisbet's placid contemplation of confiscatory possibilities and their easy justification by the convenience of Society, gratifies me with the surmise that his antagonism to Socialism may be less implacable than would appear: that he may chide only to conceal his love! At any rate, it is consoling to learn from such a logical thinker and such a sympathiser with the *status quo* as is Mr. Nisbet, that there *may* be justification for wholesale confiscation. Personally, while I admit the force of Mr. Nisbet's "vermin" argument, as applicable to present conditions, I think we can evolve conditions which will obviate the necessity of nurturing the "vermin." Vermin are all very well in agriculture; I think we can manage without them in sociology. In fact, I should say that the society unable to get along without the assistance of vermin was itself vermin! I think that, by preventing the private accumulation of money, we shall adopt a socially more economical expedient for escaping the evils of plutocratic congestion than are the spendthrift heir and his allies.



We want a society that is too healthy to "throw up spendthrift heirs every second or third generation." We can only get such a society by preventing it from throwing up gigantic private accumulations of unjustly acquired wealth.

Mr. Nisbet discusses a recently published work by Mr. Mallock, entitled *Aristocracy and Evolution*. The book seems to ventilate what various reviewers call a "new" theory which, however, so far as I can glean from the critiques, is substantially what I—to say nothing of others—have been emphasising for the last four or five years, in magazine-articles and books, and what Mr. Nisbet tells us he himself virtually advanced in his work, *The Insanity of Genius*. In dealing with Mr. Mallock's work, Mr. Nisbet makes the transparently misleading assertions that this "new" theory of Mr. Mallock is "entirely opposed to modern Socialism," "that it knocks the bottom out of Socialism, which claims all that is great and good for the masses, and which aims at crushing and levelling down all personal and individual initiative." Had these gross libels on Socialism emanated from one of the hirelings who write anything they are paid to write, I should not have been surprised, but I am surprised that Mr. Nisbet, at this time o' day, should allow his pen so to run riot.

Now, what is this "new" theory that has come on the critics like a bolt from the blue and has impelled Mr. Nisbet to glaringly deny about Socialism what it involves, and to impute to it what it does not involve? This "new" theory of Mr. Mallock is that

## A Materialistic Philosopher 133

humanity does not evolve from the masses, but from exceptionally endowed units whom Mr. Mallock calls the "aristocracy," constituted by the supreme men of achievement. Well, whatever may be the effect of this "new" theory on the critics, readers of my work, *Ideal Justice*, to say nothing of the present work, will not be likely to suffer undue shock through its novelty. To those who have not read *Ideal Justice* I may be pardoned for offering an extract to make good my assertion and show that one socialist, at any rate, is not likely to cry *peccavi* on account of the revelation of Mr. Mallock. "I think I have demonstrated that evolution has never energized under the conditions defined by these leaders" (demagogues) "as essential to 'real democracy.' I think I have clearly proved that social evolution, throughout all time, has so far proceeded, not from the masses, but from individuals" (p. 33).

However, it is not with the novelty of Mr. Mallock's theory that I am now concerned, but with the antiquity and fatuity of Mr. Nisbet's inferences—nay, I will rather say wild assertions than inferences—that the theory is "entirely opposed to modern Socialism"; that "it knocks the bottom out of Socialism"; that Socialism "claims all that is great and good for the masses," and "aims at crushing and levelling down all personal and individual initiative." These sounding nothings as accurately define the issue of genuine Socialism as, say, the archbishops and bishops of the Established Church represent the Christianity of its founder. The assertions

of Mr. Nisbet are mere sops to ignorance and prejudice which, I hope, can impose on nobody who has read this work. When he wants to see the logical nail, Mr. Nisbet can hit it as squarely as most folk ; so his casual pronouncements, as a rule, are not far off truth. However, he sometimes does not want to see the logical nail, but brings his hammer down with such a convincing thud that those who watch the exhibition are likely to confound the awkward timber-splintering of the bungler with the deft stroke of the finished craftsman.

I hope Mr. Nisbet will not spoil himself, as an objective thinker, by the vulgar attractions of special pleading. We have so many advocates retained against Socialism that those who *can* think may well consider whether the "game" of descending into the partisan arena, during the brief hour it "pays" to pander to ignorance, is "worth the candle." However such irresponsible assertions as those of Mr. Nisbet regarding Socialism may suit partisan expediency, they will merely excite the contempt of people who know what genuine Socialism means. The "great man" theory, so far from being opposed to Socialism, is a point in its favour, inasmuch as Socialism, by freely offering inducement to every individual to manifest "greatness," instead of, as does the present system, preventing all but an infinitesimal few of the potentially "great" from manifesting their capabilities, would ensure more realised "greatness" than the world has yet known.

Nobody but a superficialist, or partisan, would

## A Materialistic Philosopher 135

maintain that the men who come to "the top" (as really great, not as merely "successful"), under present conditions, represent more than a minute fraction of the potential "greatness" which is wasted to the community, through the present handicapping of the vast majority of the population by the mere effort to obtain food and clothing. Nobody but a blind leader of the blind would dare to publicly assert that the "aristocrats" who have hitherto sufficed to urge humanity to the changes constituting evolution, are fairly representative of the "aristocratic" potentiality of society: that the socialist's plan of offering equal scope to intellect, of requiring service from every man, and rewarding only according to service, would diminish the "supply of great men." Does your great poet, thinker, inventor, scientist, reveal himself by virtue of, or in defiance of the present social conditions? Does he get such material reward as he obtains by virtue of his "greatness," or by virtue of such cunning and craft as he may be endowed with, enabling him to foil the commercial vultures ever on the look-out to appropriate the material fruits of "greatness?" Ask the records of the lives of your "great men." There you will learn what inducement the present conditions offer to the manifestation of "greatness."

As I have Mr. Nisbet as a valued reader of my work, I really think he must have a few arguments in his memory which he ought to discount before poisoning himself on the rainbow of rhetoric to disparage Socialism. I think Mr. Nisbet might now realise

that, if the bottom is to be "knocked out" of Socialism, the punches will need to be harder than any the "new" theory of Mr. Mallock can administer. I can assure Mr. Nisbet and Mr. Mallock that the "new" theory is as likely to demolish Socialism as the dialectics of Mr. Crawford and the "Broad Church party" (of which Mr. Mallock, as a devout champion of Orthodoxy, has made mincemeat) are likely to demolish Rationalism. I can assure Mr. Nisbet and Mr. Mallock that, were it even rationally demonstrable that we could have no "great men" under Socialism, we should do without the "great men" rather than without Socialism! Socialism is no longer a question of expediency. It is now a question whether God-revealed Right shall prevail over God-revealed Wrong.

At one time, I supposed that Mr. Nisbet was prepared to think out morality from the basis of scientific demonstration regarding human volition and supreme determinism by God. Some years ago Mr. Nisbet wrote a book, the main implication of which was that the free-will doctrine, on which is grounded the whole of our present theological and social systems, was rationally annihilated. After reading this book, I suggested to Mr. Nisbet that he was the man to drive home to the public mind the corollaries of the scientific demonstration of determinism. Mr. Nisbet did not fall in with my suggestion, so I undertook the work myself. During the last six or seven years, I have built up a scientific series of proofs—not one of which, to my knowledge, has, in the remotest degree, been invalidated—that our social system is morally



rotten. I have, moreover, propounded a social system which would be morally sound. Through the medium of journals of the widest popularity, Mr. Nisbet has been persistently ridiculing and deprecating the social system I advocate. Yet, he has never afforded a scintilla of proof that my premises (which he also accepts) permit an honest thinker to reach any other conclusion than that I formulate, as a social system.

What am I to infer from Mr. Nisbet's method? Does he consider honesty of no account? Then why does he trouble himself to assail the theological superstition built on the exploded free-will hypothesis? Does Mr. Nisbet consider honesty of account? Then why does he assail, by the most obvious sophistry and partisan rhetoric, my promulgation of a social system built on the very demonstrations by warrant of which he assails theology—demonstrations as manifestly annihilating the present social system as they annihilate theology? Mr. Nisbet professedly repudiates the charge that he is an apologist for Mammon-worship. So far as I know, no journalist in England has done so much to glorify the pursuit of money as has Mr. Nisbet. However, that by the way—Mr. Nisbet now asserts he is no apologist for Mammon. Mr. Nisbet tells us he is a philosopher. A philosopher, according to him, is one who has ideals, but dares not avow them. Mr. Nisbet is such a "philosopher." He dares not avow what he believes; for what are ideals if they are not beliefs?

In these words, Mr. Nisbet professes himself a philosopher who dares not avow what he believes.

"I am no apologist, as some of my correspondents seem to suppose, for that 'vulgar, undiscerning, grovelling worship of Mammon which is rapidly corrupting the body politic, notwithstanding the general enlightenment of the age in other directions.' No; to recognise facts is not necessarily to approve of them. I have my own social ideals. But what is the use of asserting them? If you persist in travelling in one direction while the world goes in another, the only result is that, in the American phrase, 'you get left.' The wise man makes the best of the world as he finds it." This is the "philosophical" position which Mr. Nisbet fathers. I wish him joy of the child of his adoption. It is the "philosophical" position of the greatest rascals now adorning society.

But, is Mr. Nisbet sure about his "philosophical position?" Has he not various "philosophical positions," according to emergency? Has he not one "philosophical position" when he is trying to follow his intellect; another when he is trying to dodge his intellect? If "the wise man makes the best of the world as he finds it," why does Mr. Nisbet as such a "wise man" go out of his way to upset "the world's" comfortable assurance of escaping torrid rewards by casting its "sins" on Christ? Why could he not leave the "world" in possession of this comforting illusion? No! Mr. Nisbet is not "wise man" *pur sang*. He is a mongrel. Mr. Nisbet is "wise man" regarding Mammon; "foolish man" regarding theology. Why does he adopt one

## A Materialistic Philosopher 139

*rôle* with Mammon, another with theology? This he does for the same "reason"—likes and dislikes—as impels certain people to champion Socialism! He champions Mammon by denouncing Socialism, and he assails theology, because he "likes" Mammon and "dislikes" theology. I once congratulated myself that, in Mr. Nisbet I had a brother intellectual—one ready to follow his intellect if it led him bang against Satan himself. Alas, I am getting disillusioned. I begin to think Mr. Nisbet is only a philosopher of the "garden"-sort that jibs when intellect rubs the wrong way.

Mr. Nisbet, I fear, is hypnotising himself into mental catalepsy by a word: evolution. It seems to affect him much as church-going affects the average Christian as authentication of his loyalty to Christ. He has carnalised "evolution" and rigged it out in a new dress-suit made to measure. Thus, he tells us: "Every now and again a new set of ideals is preached by fanatical reformers"—what about fanatical stick-in-the-muds?—"who would like to take the box-seat on the car of Evolution (if I may be permitted the metaphor) and drive to some goal of their imagining." From this we may conclude that the "fanatical reformers" have no seats at all—let alone box-seats—"on the car of Evolution." Good old "evolution"—how thou dost bemuddle the philosophers! How thou dost coddle the "wise man" by never doing anything he does not want thee to do! Would you were not a "wise man," friend Nisbet!

Now, let us see what "evolution" is up to, according to the Nisbetian philosophy. "Unfortunately, we have no notion at all as to whither evolution is tending, whether up or down or round-about; so that Right and Wrong are not absolute principles but mere conventional terms employed with regard to our little necessities as a community. As these necessities vary from time to time, so do our conceptions of Right and Wrong vary. Hence the morality of one age, or even of one country, is not that of another." When I read Mr. Nisbet about morality, I think of Kant and his "practical" and "transcendental" reasons, and I murmur a gentle imprecation against wordmongers. "Right and Wrong merely conventional terms employed with regard to our little necessities as a community!" As much are hatred and love "merely conventional terms." As much is the torture of *angina pectoris* "merely a conventional term."

What concerns humanity, practically, is not the fact that right and wrong have changed and are changing, but the fact that present right must prevail over present wrong. Present right is no more unreal because it is not past right than I am unreal because I am not one of my ancestors. What lives necessarily changes. That right and wrong change attests their living reality. The pedigree of to-day's morality no more affects its reality than Mr. Nisbet's pedigree affects his. What we are concerned about is the right alive to-day. Is it now right to lie? No. Then it is right to eliminate liars. Is it now

## A Materialistic Philosopher 141

right to thief? No. Then it is right to eliminate those who filch the product of their faculty from society. Is it now right to practise justice? Yes. Then it is right to extirpate injustice. Is it now right to obey our intellects? Yes. Then it is wrong to ignore them by tolerating injustice. Is it now right to believe our intellects? Yes; because we cannot believe through any other means. Then it is right to exact what our intellects tell us is justice.

Mr. Nisbet talks of society as being an organism. What sort of "organism" would it be were every man imbued with Mr. Nisbet's notions of morality? An "organism" functions for its own advantage. Mr. Nisbet's "organism" would be a community of hyenas. In view of his own knowledge and scientific beliefs, his assertion, without the faintest proof, that there is no principle of right or wrong, and his reckless belittling of morality constitute, in my eyes, grave responsibility, very lightly undertaken. Anybody who published such statements as his—with the same protection against dissentients as has the parson in the pulpit—should, in my opinion, be compelled to intellectually substantiate them. The essence of right is honesty: action in conformity with belief. The essence of wrong is dishonesty: action contrary to belief. Here we have clearly defined *principles*, as cogent as those of mathematics. As we can only believe through intellect, when we act contrarily to intellect, we lie by action. We then avow, as truth, by action, what we believe to be falsity. All social



calamity and individual iniquity emanates from this repudiation of intellect. Society will be disintegrated if it dallies much longer with this "original sin."

Mr. Nisbet writes: "In the universe at large there is no more Right or Wrong than there is Up or Down or North or South; everything is relative. The promoters of ideals, religious, social or political, are constantly laying down lines on which they would like the world to travel, but the world is constantly going its own way obedient to some destiny which the mind of man has not yet grasped. Probably no ethical system can appeal more strongly to our sense of fitness than that of Christianity, but all the churches admit by their actions that that system has become in a large measure unworkable." Here we are treated to a number of half-truths, hazy generalisations, and sounding nothings, for the purpose of discrediting ethics. What is the rational significance of asserting that "in the universe at large there is no more Right or Wrong than there is Up and Down, etc.?" What does Mr. Nisbet, or anybody else, know of the "universe at large" except what his brain tells him; and what does his brain tell him more conclusively than that there is "Right and Wrong" in that part of the universe with which he is most intimately concerned and acquainted?

The logic of Mr. Nisbet's propositions regarding morality, is that he is striving to alter the obvious course of evolution: that he wants to make it right to lie, steal, and repudiate justice. For what other end does he minimise the reality of morality? If it

## A Materialistic Philosopher 143

is not *really* right to be honest, then, it is not *really* wrong to cut our neighbour's throat and rifle his cash-box. Is Mr. Nisbet prepared to abide by the logic of his argument? If so, he is one of those "promoters of ideals . . . laying down lines on which they would like the world to travel," and I surmise he has a tougher job before him than the one which confronts "promoters" of the other sort, against whom he waxes sarcastic. I would lay long sporting odds on his rival "promoters"!

Again: what is Mr. Nisbet's "great man" hypothesis but an avowal that the "promoters of ideals and religions" are the machinery by which Mr. Nisbet's part of the "universe at large" is compelled to adopt specific "Right and Wrong?" If, as Mr. Nisbet contends, humanity has only "evolved" through "great men," what is the good of writing stuff about the "universe at large," such as Mr. Nisbet writes? If "the world is constantly going its own way obedient to some destiny which the mind of man has not yet grasped," are not these "promoters of ideals and religions" part of "the world," obeying their "destiny?" And, if the world has only evolved from "great men," why is not the world "destined" to go "the way" pointed by these "promoters?"

Mr. Nisbet instances Christianity as illustrating the futile labours of "promoters of ideals." Well, Christianity has dominated the world for nearly two thousand years, and has thereby demonstrated the futility of his illustration. Mr. Nisbet confounds the

theogonic part of Christianity with its ethics. Because, after two thousand years, the "promoters" of a mystical theogony have to vacate the arena for occupation by the "promoters" of scientific theism, Mr. Nisbet implies that the ethical ideals have succumbed with the theogony. Nothing could be further from truth. The ethics of Christianity is quite distinct from its theogonic dogmas.

Mr. Nisbet, in deriding ethics, confounds specific rights and wrongs with the intuitional substratum constituting the essence of ethics. The point is not as put by Mr. Nisbet: "In the universe at large there is no more right or wrong than there is up or down or north or south," but is: normal people have intuition impelling them to accept as right what intellect tells them is right. Whether right or wrong exist or do not exist in the "universe at large" is of no more ethical significance than is the question whether there are cats and dogs on Mars. Nevertheless, ethics is as fully an entity within the "universe at large" as is Mars. Like Mars, ethics has passed through various metamorphoses, and its latest stage is what mainly concerns us. We may as well say that there is no Mars "in the universe at large" as make the assertion regarding ethics, and we may as reasonably belittle the right and wrong of to-day because they are not the right and wrong of a century ago as we may decline our dinner to-day because it is not last week's or to-morrow's dinner.

Mr. Nisbet seems to glory in indifference as to what occurs to society. As posterity cannot do him

any favours, he says: let posterity go hang! He makes the best of things as they are, knowing they might be better, but having no incentive to help to make them better. Obviously if all were mentally built on the Nisbet plan society would stagnate, and as what does not change is evolutionally dead, a society of Nisbets would be a social corpse produced by the dry-rot of cynical indifference. And yet, as an evolutionist, Mr. Nisbet never tires of telling Socialists that they would kill society by suppressing the "great men," who alone cause social evolution. Mr. Nisbet's indifference seems to me quite irreconcilable with his solicitude for the "great men," who only cause evolution by acting as that very ferment which Mr. Nisbet, through his insouciance regarding society, virtually denounces as undue interference with "nature." Mr. Nisbet's principle of "come day go day, God send Sunday" will not comport with his anxiety to preserve "great men." Logically, his anxiety should be to extinguish "great men," and, as he supposes that Socialism would ensure the extinction, he should be a Socialist!

Mr. Nisbet repudiates "free-will." Will he show how his repudiation is ethically consistent with upholding the present system of faculty-monopoly by the individual? Mr. Nisbet leads us to assume that he believes in a Creator. Will he tell us why we shall not infer the Creator has endowed men with intellect to guide their actions, and why that intellect shall be repudiated when it tells us the meaning of justice any more than when it tells us the meaning

of rascality? Why—putting aside expediency and contemplating from the standpoint of principle—shall we punish forgery any more than tolerate faculty-monopoly by the individual? Why does not the individual equally rob his fellows by usurping what, as faculty, he has not initiated, as by breaking into their houses? On what ethical—never mind expediential—grounds does one man's fortuitous mental endowment better warrant him in exploiting his fellows than another man's muscular endowment warrants him in knocking insensible every weaker individual he may feel inclined to rob?

Mr. Nisbet writes:—"For my part I confess I have no great belief in the down-trodden geniuses who are unable to manifest themselves under present conditions—the Shakespeares who cannot write their 'Hamlets' and 'Othellos' because they have to earn a livelihood by holding horses' heads outside the theatre," and so on. Suppose a Shakespeare has not to earn a livelihood, as Mr. Nisbet suggests, does he imply the Shakespeare would be thereby impeded in manifesting his genius? I cannot believe Mr. Nisbet implies any such absurdity, but recognises that when one potential genius manifests himself under such disadvantage, a score will have their potentiality strangled out of being through their mean necessities. Then, I ask, what are Mr. Nisbet's "steam-roller" assertions but "sounding nothings" and "sops to ignorance and prejudice"? What proof has Mr. Nisbet that Socialism, by obviating the extreme rigour of the mere animal struggle for food, will



## A Materialistic Philosopher 147

diminish the supply of "great" men and pass the steam-roller over society?

Mr. Nisbet tells us that "genius, or simple 'greatness,' proves itself to be such by triumphing over its initial difficulties." He then instances the "James Watts who have no kettles, the Bernard Pallsiseys who have no domestic furniture wherewith to fire their furnaces." What does this imply but the puerility that the genius of a Watt or Pallsisey manifests itself in procuring a kettle or fuel, and that to save them the worry of obtaining these things is equivalent to preventing the manifestation of their genius?

I did not dub Mr. Nisbet, as he asserts I did, "a reckless superficialist," etc. But if reckless superficialism is not involved in assertions based on assumption counter to the most obvious probability, I do not know to what to apply the terms. Mr. Nisbet has just written a most admirable article on the recent Church Congress. I vividly felt the tie of brotherhood between me and Mr. Nisbet as I read this article. His verdict on the bishops' utterances was "words, words, words." That is my verdict on the sophistry by which Mr. Nisbet tries to render plausible his "steam-roller" contention. Let me assure him that my Socialism does not involve the "steam-roller," and that the Trades Union system has no more necessary connection with Socialism than with astronomy. What Socialism "objects to in the present organisation of society" is that it affronts the basis of morality, stultifies science,

exalts dishonesty, and belies God. I maintain there is no more honesty in professing to believe in the present dispensation than in professing to believe in theology.

Mr. Nisbet writes:—"That I should be totally opposed to Mr. Hiller respecting the workability of Socialism is, I would remind him, a fact that would make for the downfall of his system as soon as he set it up, for I cannot flatter myself that I am alone in my way of thinking." Just so; and I would remind Mr. Nisbet that a number of folk, myself among them, are now "totally opposed to" Mr. Nisbet "respecting the workability" of the present system, and are consequently "making for its downfall." Evolution will decide which "downfall" will occur. In the meantime I may indicate a vital difference between Mr. Nisbet and us. While we appeal to intellect for a decision he appeals to emotion: likes and dislikes. I want Mr. Nisbet to apply his wits to Socialism as he applies them, say, to vaccination, or "the insanity of genius." Then, I feel assured, we shall enlist a valuable recruit. Then, I feel assured that, as a "great" man, Mr. Nisbet will not proclaim unholy solicitude to grab perquisites for the "fluke" he has made in the game of heredity, and will recognise that, if the Watts and Palliseys triumph over the scarcity of kettles and fuel, such folk will triumph over the difficulty of being honest.

Mr. Nisbet writes:—"If my socialistic adversary wishes to imply that before his ideas can be carried

out there will have to be a new heaven and a new earth, I quite agree with him." I am not so exigent as Mr. Nisbet suggests. I merely imply that so soon as we can turn a few million rogues into honest men—not, I think, an insuperable task if we can induce them to apply their wits to our demonstrations—my ideas not only can but will be carried out. At any rate I venture to assure Mr. Nisbet that if my ideas are not carried out something else will be : chaotic upheaval.

Mr. Nisbet writes :—“But, allowing my denouncer’s contention, granting that under Socialism a new set of great men would crop up . . . what the better, I should like to know, would society be? It would have exchanged one set of masters for another ; for Mr. Hiller is surely not so ignorant of human nature as to suppose that the new great man would not endeavour to profit by his advantages!” No ; Mr. Hiller is not ignorant of “human nature,” and on that account he denies that the “great” man under Socialism would emulate the “great” man under Individualism. The reason for the denial is that “human nature” is controlled by environment, and the environment of Socialism would ensure honest men in place of rogues. Why does Mr. Nisbet so maunder about “human nature?” Has it not been changing ever since the primitive honest man vacated the arena to saints who preach Christianity, and to philosophers who cackle vainly through mistaking the saints as representing “human nature” instead of recognising them as a highly

sophisticated parody of "human nature?" In its native state "human nature" is honest. That we have so "civilised" it as to evolve the Church Congress bishops should hearten Mr. Nisbet to the possibility of causing "human nature" to revert to its native pattern, involving that belief and action are normally in the relation of cause and effect.

Mr. Nisbet repeats his old jingle about "so many men, so many opinions," which I shall analyse in this work, and show to be inconsistent with modern methods of verification. To a person who held the earth to be flat, Mr. Nisbet would say: prove it, and if the "flat" invoked some half-digested fact ignoring, say, the effects of refraction and apparently showing a plane earth, Mr. Nisbet would murmur: "crank." Mr. Nisbet offers not a jot better verification for his opinions about Socialism. Of course there are, as Mr. Nisbet remarks, "a good many views in the world, all as honestly held as Mr. Hiller's." For instance, there are, no doubt, a number of people who hold, as truth, the garden of Eden incident, witchcraft, ghosts; but, we do not hear of them as leader-writers in up-to-date journals. I shall demonstrate that no opinions are *honestly* held, unless through ignorance or through intellectual demonstration. The last man to attempt to obscure this fact should be Mr. Nisbet. He should be the last man to dally with opinions held against such demonstration.

The Infinitesimal Calculus is true, whatever the million may think about it. What should we say of a mathematician who awaited the verdict of the

million before affirming the truth of his demonstrations? Mr. Nisbet as an expert must intellectually disprove my demonstrations or own them true. The million wont make them true or untrue. The million will simply accept them, if the million like them. And the million will like them! If they are wrong, now is the time for Mr. Nisbet to give them quietus. When' he has intellectually dismembered them, I'll bury the fragments.

Like some other people, Mr. Nisbet seems not yet to have realised the scope of my theses. He assails me on one isolated issue: Socialism. He agrees with me on other isolated issues: determinism and the demolition of theology. He ignores, that, in my system, all these issues are shown to be interdependent and that what I strive for is not especially Socialism, or the downfall of the free-will, or of the theological fallacy, but the establishment of simple, demonstrable *honesty*: principle. To upset what I propound, Mr. Nisbet must extend his horizon far beyond such triviality as guesses at the effect of Socialism on the supply of "great" or "little" men; at the "workability" of Socialism; at its application of the "steam-roller." Such speculation is, from my standpoint, inconsequent futility. It has no more relevancy to the gist of what I propound than a hawker's judgment, from his dealings in hot-collops, would have to high finance. Mr. Nisbet's attitude is altogether too parochial and materialistic to enable him to apprehend, let alone effectively assail, what I am concerned about. Let Mr. Nisbet ethically and



scientifically demolish these propositions : there is no free-will ; *ergo* theology is defunct, and faculty belongs to the community. If he cannot demolish the propositions, let him cease ink-slinking at Socialism !

But Mr. Nisbet apparently thinks that he *can* demolish the above propositions. As a final clincher to confound me, Mr. Nisbet invokes personal advantages—"stature, strength, health," and so on. With convincing ingenuity Mr. Nisbet even brings courtship into the arena. "Would Mr. Hiller," he asks, "in his youth, have foregone any personal advantages he possessed to make the running for a rival?" No, I don't think Mr. Hiller would. Why should he? His personal advantages, in those halcyon days, were the rightful property of the community, so far he could benefit by the community's appreciation of those advantages. But this does not involve that they were his rival's property. So it is in regard to Mr. Nisbet's other inconsequent applications—stature, etc. As between one individual and another, they are the advantage of him endowed with them. As between the individual and the community, they belong to the latter. It shows the straits to which Mr. Nisbet is put to maintain his position, when he has to resort to such obvious sophistry as the above.

Were we not a community of moles, each selfishly and blindly ensconced in his little burrow—did we systematically, if but for one hour out of the twenty-four, project ourselves beyond our petty personal concerns, we should soon discover that the cynical indifference preventing us from giving a thought to

## A Materialistic Philosopher 153

posterity was, even according to the commercial standard of desirability, a poor game. Then, you, toiling millions, would see that your narrow selfishness only turned you into the tools of a rapacious minority, and left you stewing in drab, hopeless drudgery. You, millions, whose few years are one weary round of dehumanising effort to keep the wolf at bay, how long will your eyes be closed to the God-sent light now dispersing the foul vapour of superstition which has rendered you sodden belly-worshippers and stolid slaves? How long, toiling millions, will you be the wet clay to be moulded by charlatans, hucksters, and freebooters? How long will you permit these "potters" to smile as you puff and flounder after the will-o'-the-wisps set before you by teachers who worship at that same shrine of belly, devotion to which for untold ages, has involved your present predicament? How long, my friends, will you snore in the pig's slumber? How long will you ignore that the science, which illuminates your houses and streets by gas and electricity, must illuminate your minds before you can emerge from your ages-barred prison? Science, my friends, besides filling your bellies, will keep them filled and turn you into folk whose bellies are worth filling. At present, I am not sure that you do not get as much belly-pabulum as you deserve. Science will enable you to deserve more and to get it!

The Nisbetian philosophy is a product of effete conditions born of unintellectualised empiricism. Its end is to intensify and render permanent bestial selfishness, cynical craft, and insensibility to all we

apprehend as noble motive. A nation motivated by such philosophy is dying by the poison of its own pus. The antidote for the Nisbetian philosophy is the revelation which science offers in place of the dead Christianity. Believe, or perish! is the decree of "evolution." Whatever sneers the Nisbets may lavish on the "promoters of ideals and religions," I can assure those scoffers that the "promoters" are rendered, more than ever before, a crying need, by "wise men" afraid of "getting left," who accordingly, "make the best of the world as they find it," and, in doing so, advocate the doctrine of diabolism in popular journals.

It is the publicist's business to expound idealism ; to drive the masses and the "classes" out of their stolid insensibility to what is now revealed as moral evil, but which, to those masses and "classes," is not, at present, evil, because they cannot recognise it as evil. The cynic will retort : why render these people uncomfortable by letting them know they are evil, when they only become evil through your information? Why not let them remain good by thinking themselves good? Why seek to raise humanity? Why disturb things in this "best of all possible worlds?" Why be a moral dynamite-bomb? Thus speaks the narrow pedant wrapped up in the cocoon of his selfishness : he whose "will" and intellect are poorly correlated, leading him to treat the world as contrived for his special comfort. Though he probably vividly realises the evil, his "will" does not respond to his intellect, but to his animality. So he tootles on the

## A Materialistic Philosopher 155

tin whistle of cynicism and smug philosophy. Let him tootle to his heart's content! Evolution now means Idealism. The days of cynical indifference are numbered. The "fittest" is now he who raises turmoil in the dovecotes of smug contentment and callous materialism. The "fittest" must trumpet discords until society responds by the "resolving concords."

Since the above was printed, I learn, with the deepest pain, that Mr. Nisbet is dead. He was one of the most amiable, considerate, and unassuming men I have ever known, and among the very few whom I have been able to value as friends. I knew him to the marrow, and I think he so knew me; yet we only met once, and that a few months ago. We met as old intimates in spirit. For many years we had bared our souls to one another in constant private correspondence on matters of deepest moment to us both. Where we mutually dissented the public was made aware in various periodicals in which we advocated our respective views. Our differences did not, so far as I am aware, for one moment weaken the personal tie. Almost the last words I said to him, as we shook hands in anticipation of many future meetings, were: "now Nisbet, whatever we write about one another's views does not affect us two." He smiled, in his peculiar sardonic yet kindly way, and replied: "I know. We understand each other by now." Our convictions corresponded to a remarkable degree. The divergence arose in regard to those ultimate inferences which have been dealt with in this work. What appears in this chapter, as the reader will probably surmise, had already appeared in journals, as controversy between us.

Again, quite apart from matters of deep import, and long before we were more than strangers to one another, Mr. Nisbet lavished on me a world of kindness in reading and re-reading and commenting on the products of my aspirations at play-writing. The valuable time and attention he must have devoted to this utterly trivial and thankless task will ever endear him to me as, within my experience, a unique example of kindness and patience.

I consider that my late friend was the ablest exponent of practically applied materialism, and I believe that the sociological conclusions he advocated are vastly inimical to the interests of the community. Accordingly, it has always been a hard struggle for me to prevent my feelings towards the man from interfering with what I conceived to be my duty towards his doctrines. In such conflict between inclination and principle lies the severest trial for him who has to follow his intellect. My friend has gone, but his doctrines live and must be killed, or they will kill society.

## CHAPTER VI

### A POSITIVIST PHILOSOPHER

WHAT its devotees call the religion of humanity is a comforting form of illusion for a few favoured folk who possess what the majority of their fellows want to possess. The favoured few who find consolation in this "religion" constitute what I may term a mutual admiration society "on the cheap." Like sitting under Dean Farrar, sitting under Mr. Frederic Harrison renders us devotees on the most economical terms. There is that tranquillising vagueness about the respective cults which enabled a certain old lady to derive spiritual balm from "that blessed word Mesopotamia." Mr. Harrison has been telling us (on a New Year's Day—called, in the Positivist calendar, "the Day of Humanity") that "the essential scheme of Positivism was to make appeal to human happiness and progress not casual, subordinate and vague, but continual, systematic and religious; and by religious he meant an appeal which rested not only on the profoundest



truths we knew, but also on the dominant conscience we felt."

Now, the profoundest truth we experience is that the individual owes all his faculties to a power outside his personality. Another almost equally profound truth is that "the dominant conscience" is a product of outside pressures on the individual and corollarily on society. Let us see what sort of "appeal, not casual, subordinate and vague, but continual, systematic and religious" Mr. Harrison makes, from the above fundamental premises. (If Mr. Harrison rejects these premises, let him tell us why, and what others he substitutes.) The first practical "appeal" of Mr. Harrison is for the repression of Socialism involving collective ownership and individual status as servant of the state. These conditions conform with the fundamental truth of human determinism. Mr. Harrison accordingly starts by repudiating his "religious appeal," through his practical "appeal." The next practical "appeal" is to uphold trade-unionism and capitalism. Both involve private ownership of faculty-products, and accordingly involve equal practical repudiation of "profoundest truths," to which Mr. Harrison, according to his own profession, adheres. The next "appeal" is to a vague abstraction: "sense of public duty." This, if it signifies anything of moment to society, must be the product of a "dominant conscience" impelling the individual in conformity with logical inference from the basical truths of objective science. But, if instead of so impelling the in-

dividual, the "dominant conscience" impels him, on the lines of Mr. Harrison, to repudiate private duty by repudiating the issue apparent to the logical "sense," of the objective demonstration of human determinism, whence is to emanate a serviceable "sense of public duty"? If the "dominant conscience" treats as naught the most obvious logical issue of the demonstration of human determinism, then the "sense of public duty" resolves itself into mere concern for the preservation of a demonstrably dishonest dispensation, becoming what we may term the sense of private interest of a company of filibusters. That, I grant, is a "sense of public duty" very prevalent in these days; but, from my standpoint, we want another sort. The next "appeal" is in the guise of a warning to Socialism that, if it does not cease brawling, capitalism has a handy argument at call in the shape of *force majeure*. Says Mr. Harrison: "If socialists thought the time had come to proclaim a crusade against capital and deliver themselves by war, they would bring on their order a rout far larger and more terrible than that inflicted on the Greeks in the late war." You see, the Positivist cult, like its fellow "of love," does not disdain the *argumentum baculinum*! When socialists "deliver themselves," I venture to surmise that they will not do so "by war," but by the votes of the intelligent majority of the nation.

Having glanced at Mr. Harrison's "appeals," let us now turn to his reasons. The reason capitalism should not bear too hardly on "labour" is that

capitalism may thereby drive "labour" into the arms of Socialism. This is, expedientially, an admirable reason which capitalism may profitably ponder. Mr. Harrison's reason for advocating reduction of hours of labour is that such reduction conduces to "a condition of moral and physical progress for the whole working-class." This seems rather a shaky reason, from Mr. Harrison's standpoint. For, the "moral and physical progress of the whole working class" is just such an influence as will render the workers sensible of the injustice of private exploitation, and thereby facilitate the advent of the monster, Socialism. The working-classes are now beginning to recognise some advantage in filling their brains as well as their bellies. The more leisure you allow them for the occupations, the sooner you will have them looking beyond their own noses! The hater of Socialism should keep those noses at the grindstone!

At present, I can assure Mr. Harrison that one great cause of the comparative remoteness of socialism is that the "working man," by lacking "condition of moral and physical progress," is rendered too obtuse or too careless to apprehend much more than the merits of a football contest, or to take intelligent interest in more important issues than "sporting results" and betting lists. A proof that the "working man" still lacks the wits or intelligent concern which will smash the contents of Mr. Harrison's china shop is at hand, as I write these lines, in the recent York election. Evidently the "working

man," if York fairly represents him, takes merely what I may term the interest of a belly in what concerns him most nearly: the integrity of trade-union. He will starve for it, when he is told that starving will involve three hours' less work a week; but, he will not, or cannot, think for trade-union. To ask the "working man," at his present evolutionary stage, to think for Socialism, when he will not even think for trade-union, is to appeal to the air. Mr. Harrison need not be alarmed as to the advent of Socialism, so long as the "working man" lacks Mr. Harrison's panacea: "condition of moral and physical progress." Moreover, to my friends of the socialist propaganda, now industriously wooing the "working man," I say: be very patient. If Socialism solely depends on the "working man," your great-grandchildren may possibly see it. And I say more to my socialist friends: be also *impatient*. If you want your children to see Socialism, devote your energies to enlisting that section of the public able to assimilate truth not entirely dependent on what I may term belly-demonstration.

The reason Mr. Harrison abhors Socialism is that it would "cut at the root of industrial efficiency and industrial morality, and must end in industrial tyranny." Mr. Harrison seems to know much more, or much less about Socialism than do socialists themselves. Why a system supplanting private exploitation by universal service to the community should involve what Mr. Harrison prognosticates is a "widdle" apt to bother a higher than the

Dundreary order of intellect. Perhaps Mr. Harrison will explain. In the meantime, assuming his warrant for the rôle of oracle, I would ask why Mr. Harrison should allow an expediential and quite problematical hypothesis to annul, in the scheme of positivism, the "religious appeals" and "profoundest truths," which, to ordinary apprehension, and by the implication of Mr. Harrison himself, should not be repudiated even though Mr. Harrison thinks he has ground for predicting dire expediential contingencies as the result of the practical exemplification of those "religious appeals" and "profoundest truths." To say the least, one is, in these days, apt to sniff at a religion which is cut according to the demands of industrial expediency, or what seems that expediency to prophets of positivism. Personally, I must avow the conviction that a religion which swims about in the current of expediency is not worth the trouble of professing. Besides, we have already an old established one of the sort which seems to suit the popular demand.

I should like Mr. Harrison to answer this question: Why, Mr. Harrison, should I accept, as authority, you and your religion of expediency anchored in the drift of your subjective imaginings, rather than ask you to accept me and my religion of fixed principle anchored in the bed-rock of accumulated science? What do you offer beyond the authority of your personal prepossessions towards one or another line of action, for what you propound as religion and ethics? How can you expect such



a card-castle of emotion as yours to resist the animalistic instincts of the two industrial armies which, according to your theory, must ever confront one another? You say that Socialism would be a curse. Socialism involves rational co-operation in place of blind struggle. Why should Socialism be a curse? You say that capitalism is a blessing. We have had some centuries' experience of capitalism. Can we say that it has made men wiser, more honourable, happier? Can we not rather say that it has made them more miserable, more deceitful, more reckless? Does the capitalistic system involve the exemplification of a single ennobling human attribute? Does it not rather foster the vilest human passions?

As a sample of the "benefits" accruing from the capitalistic system, read the following from the *Daily Chronicle* of January 29, 1898: "Mr. Joseph Leiter, the head of the big wheat corner, in an interview, claims that his clique owns every bushel of surplus wheat in this country" (United States). . . . "In other words, the country has sent abroad more than its exportable surplus, which justifies Leiter in believing there will be an actual shortage of wheat in this country before long, enabling him to get a substantial advance on present prices." Now, I ask Mr. Harrison, what has this Joseph Leiter done which, according to "the essential scheme of positivism" above defined by Mr. Harrison, or according to any equitable social system, would allow Mr. Leiter to control a staple food of humanity? The

case of Joseph Leiter represents the case of private capitalism, stamping it as the most iniquitous form of parasitism now afflicting humanity. By it, the necessity of the producers, instead of involving its own satisfaction, fills the paunches of those who do not produce: the more needs the producers create through their industry, the harder they must toil, not to purchase the legitimate reward of their industry, but to be mulcted by the social lumber we call monarchs of finance. I do not blame Mr. Leiter any more than I blame a stink for emanating from a cesspool. But, I do say this: the society which permits the existence of such poison-germs as the wheat-cornerer, cries aloud for annihilation, and, in my opinion, will get it. (Since the above was written, the escapade has rendered the Mr. Leiter by name also Mr. Lighter in pocket. But the particular eventuality does not affect the principle involved, with which this discussion is concerned.)

If it be urged that the wheat-cornerer does not fairly represent the merits of private capitalism, I reply that any form of private capitalism is, essentially, the same evil. The principle is equally wrong, whether it be represented by the factory-owner, the landlord, or the financial schemer. I maintain that the reason is equally valid for exterminating the industrial, as for exterminating the land, or financial capitalist. The "unearned increment" of the industrial plutocrat is just as obvious and noxious as that of the landowner or financier. The manufac-

turer, *qua* proprietor, is no more a producer than is the landowner or financier. In respect to industry, the only real producers are the people who manipulate the machines, and the factory-owner, not in his capacity of owner, but as an organiser of labour, or, say, a manager of the manufactory. I rendered this point clear in a letter appearing in *The New Age* of Sept. 23, 1897, which opened its columns to a discussion on land-taxation as being a promising bait by which the Liberal party might hope to tempt the electorate. The "party" is apparently oblivious, to judge from the letters which appeared, of the fact that what applies to the landowner goose is equally applicable to the industrial gander, and that no tinkering at a radically wrong principle will alter its inherent defect.

I say private capitalism is a curse to be exorcised by all honest men. Mr. Harrison says it is a blessing, but offers no proofs. Mine are in this work, built on objective demonstrations of right, wrong, and God. Unless Mr. Harrison can invalidate these proofs, he may spare himself the trouble of railing at Socialism. It is now past the stage of sensibility to the oracular explosions of theorists who measure an intellectual future by an emotional past, and by personal predilection for the continuance of an effete *status quo*. Socialism is not a matter of expediency. It is the first issue of the greatest religion yet revealed to humanity: the first religion to ensure the practical manifestation, by the community, of demonstrable right. We have had religions swaying

the individual. Socialism is born of religion to sway humanity.

The hedonistic incentive of Positivism is too indefinite even to be recognised, let alone practically adopted by average humanity. What is the "human happiness" set forth by Mr. Harrison as a standard of collective incentive? Can it be anything more, essentially, to average humanity, than the sensual contentment which, if universally attained, would be the apotheosis of individual selfishness and general torpidity? Unless a collective incentive be determined by some clear-cut principle, compulsive to human intellect and outside idiosyncratic states determining individual gratification, what is to prevent every individual construing the incentive according to his prepossessions? Who has the right to say that the villain cannot be as happy as the saint? By what authority does Positivism, or any other "ism," presume to tell one individual that his happiness is inferior to another's? You may just as profitably tell a man he would be happier if he could fly as tell a villain he would be happier as a saint. Moreover, if your ultimate incentive is mere happiness, and your society is, itself, villainous, are you more likely to impress society than to impress the individual villain with the importance of your standard of happiness? To talk about human happiness as the collective ideal is the emptiest Falstaffian babble "o' green fields." A really compulsive religious and ethical cult is quite indifferent to standards of happiness or unhappiness. Such a cult has only one

concern : the imposition of objectively demonstrated right. Moreover, such a cult recognises that there can be no such objectively demonstrated right, until we demonstrate an authority for the right, above and superior to that right itself.

In this work I show, not merely that ethics involves right, but that this right is decreed by God to be practised by the individual. I feel convinced that this objectively demonstrated right will involve increased human happiness, but that effect, for me, is a mere incidental triviality compared with the demonstration of the right and of the authority for that right. That this right and its authority are revealed involves that humanity will have to practically exemplify the right, irrespective of imaginings regarding human happiness. The decay of our industrial supremacy, of our imperial prestige—all the prognostications of purblind and selfish champions of the existing system—are, to me, bogeys with no more significance, in view of my demonstrations, than have the fancy pictures of a child's book of fairy tales.

I may here remark that the demonstration of a supernaturally imposed ethics, advanced in this work, does not accord with what I have written elsewhere. I cannot help this. My conclusions are as severely criticised by myself as by other people. When I find them faulty, they go. As I follow my intellect, I want truth; not to bolster my own hypotheses. If anybody can show me I am propounding false doctrine in this work, I shall consider him a bene-



factor. When I wrote, *Against Dogma and Freewill*, in which work I advocated a materialistic doctrine of ethics, I had not completely emancipated myself from the Spencerian "Inscrutable" and atomic philosophies, generally, and, corollarily, had not identified the soul as the determining entity, subject to God, defined in the present work. Accordingly, I had to base my ethics on expediency, revealed, as the final incentive, by conventional evolutionary hypotheses dealing with observed effects as though they constituted ultimate causes.

## CHAPTER VII

### A SOCIALIST BY SYMPATHY

IN the *Clarion* of December 24, 1897, Mr. Robert Blatchford offers his readers some wholesome opinion regarding truth. Thus, he writes: "Truth is before all. There is nothing worthy, nothing holy, nothing desirable that is not *true*. And I say, let us have truth at any cost. Even though it destroy our gods, our faith, our hope; even though it consume us like a fire; even though it shame us—let us know what is, or, failing to discover that, let us refuse all make-believes and pretences."

Naturally, holding these views, Mr. Blatchford cannot assimilate the god of theology. That a person should say he believes there is, or hopes there may be, this god is tolerable to Mr. Blatchford. On the other hand, when a person says he *knows* there is this god, "his assumption," according to Mr. Blatchford, "becomes presumption." Here Mr. Blatchford is plausible, if not convincing. The point I now wish to render clear is that Mr. Blatch-

ford exempts himself from the application of the principle he lays down, and that he courts error through adopting an emotional basis.

I shall later show that the fact of believing involves the fact of humanly knowing. Accordingly, if a man believes there is a particular god, he knows there is that god. When we decide his belief, we decide his knowledge. Of course, *his* knowledge may be erroneous. Its error will be exposed so soon as the knowledge is shown to be irreconcilable with the collective knowledge. Then, if the erring knower is able to apprehend the demonstration of his error, he will, if sane (honest), renounce his faulty knowledge. Mr. Blatchford adopts, by implication, the fallacious conventional view that human knowledge is something absolute, fixed. This fallacy I shall expose in later chapters. Here, it will suffice to say that I agree with Mr. Blatchford's proposition, with the proviso involving a practically non-existing contingency, that the person who says he knows there is God, has no intellectual credentials to show for his professed knowledge. Moreover, though, in regard to my own contentions for God, I shall afford such credentials, I can appreciate, in view of the common testimony offered as demonstration of God, Mr. Blatchford's assertion that nobody has yet demonstrated the existence of God. I need not pursue this point further, as I am not now concerned with Mr. Blatchford's belief, or disbelief, regarding God (which I shall dispose of in the general consideration of such belief, or disbelief), but am dealing

with Mr. Blatchford as an illustration of illusion begotten of emotion.

Mr. Blatchford rejects the emotional testimony of those who profess to have "found God," and he says he cares for nothing but truth. We may assume that truth, for Mr. Blatchford, must be (theoretically) intellectual truth. Let us now see how Mr. Blatchford exemplifies his own precept. Like Descartes, he professes to have found an ultimate fact. This fact is, that pain is a bad thing. The reason it is a bad thing is that nobody likes it. So, according to Mr. Blatchford, the reason which impels the average man to say he knows there is God, involves presumption; but the reason which impels Mr. Blatchford to say he knows pain is a bad thing does not involve presumption. Let us see how Mr. Blatchford's reason "pans out." Because Mr. Blatchford and most other people do not like pain, it is a bad thing. But there are many things we do not like that we consider good things. Here is one that will probably appeal to Mr. Blatchford: many of us, perhaps the majority, do not like to be honest; *ergo*, according to Mr. Blatchford, to be honest is a bad thing. Again, there are many things that some of us like and that Mr. Blatchford would call bad things. Here is one, again interesting to Mr. Blatchford: many of us—perhaps even Mr. Blatchford himself among the number—would like to be astute and successful schemers like Mr. Armour and Mr. Leiter, who, between themselves, have been playing "ducks and drakes" with the food supply

of the world, and I am not aware that those who attain that aspiration are anxious to change their conditions. But, *ex hypothesi*, what we do not like is bad. Then, why is being a millionaire, which many of us like, not good? Again, it is intellectually demonstrable that pain may be a good thing. It enables doctors to diagnose disease; it warns us of a multitude of perils and evils—physical, mental, and social—which we should otherwise court, or stolidly endure. Enthusiasts, like Mr. Blatchford himself, who urge humanity in the decreed path of evolution, are, we may say, the direct products of pain. In fact, we may say that the noblest effort of humanity has only been possible through pain; that humanity would still be in the brute stage of evolution, had not pain spurred it to alter its immediate surroundings. To say that pain is evil, is to imply that what we apprehend as the most enduring pleasure should not exist, for this pleasure is mainly the issue of pain urging the rebellious genius—Mr. Blatchford, for instance—to battle for the ideal.

In controverting the conventional theism, Mr. Blatchford imports the well-worn "argument" of nature "red in beak and claw," to discredit the idea that God is what we call loving and merciful. Here Mr. Blatchford belabours a sack of sawdust so far as the rational theist is concerned. (As stated, he is not dealing with such a theist.) Nobody, except the ignorant emotionalist, posits that God is loving or merciful, or that God has any limitations implying human emotions. What the rational



theist does posit about God is that God exists, and determines the universe. This the rational theist *knows* about God, and, if Mr. Blatchford wants the evidence on which the rational theist bases his pretension to this knowledge, Mr. Blatchford will find that evidence in this work. Knowing that God determines the universe, the rational theist attains a further demonstration: of the principle of justice. This is also set forth in the present work. Having attained this intellectual demonstration of justice, the rational theist is equipped to do battle against the social evils so vigorously assailed by Mr. Blatchford. However, the rational theist does not assail these evils because he dislikes pain, but because he experiences compulsion to trust organised intellectual truth. He recognises that there is more stability in the accumulated intellectual experience of humanity than in what I may term the anarchic eccentricity of his personal predispositions.

Obviously, Mr. Blatchford spoils for a fight with pain, through essentially the same excitation as impels the theological emotionalist to provide Biblical "curl-papers" for the Chinaman. "Ha, ha!" he exclaims, "I see some one to succour and something to fight. Thou accursed monster, Pain, thou art a cruel dragon, and I am in case to play St. George and joust at thee." "And then," says Mr. Blatchford, "I rise up and get to business; and there is much hacking and hewing, and sweating and panting, and breathing of fire and venom. But it is a great fight. It is now about five years since I turned my lance

against the dragon. And, on the whole, I have enjoyed myself right royally." But what about those poor millionaires and other contented folk who must "knock under," as the ultimate result of affording Mr. Blatchford and his like their enjoyable bouts! Are not these unfortunates "in for" a taste of the "cruel dragon"? Perhaps Mr. Blatchford will contend that these victims are of no account, taking into consideration the grand sum-total of future bliss. On the other hand, Mr. Blatchford is very severe on deities who impose present suffering to be compensated by future happiness. If deities should not exercise their whims as to the imposition of pain, why should Mr. Blatchford so exercise his whim?

Like many other people who realise, in the abstract, the virtues of intellectual truth, Mr. Blatchford fails in the practical application of his principle. He has been a force in social evolution. If he could kick away his emotional foundation and its intellectual superstructure, and commence a new structure on an intellectual basis, his future achievement, in my opinion, would dwarf what he has already accomplished.

If pain is a bad thing, because it is *not* liked, we may posit that pleasure is a good thing, because it *is* liked. But, the whole scheme of social development contradicts this thesis. Society has obviously evolved, not through facilitating pleasure, but through restricting it. All the "ethical" notions restraining the individual are, essentially, restrictions on pleasure. They are not imposed on behalf of pleasure, but

(generally unconsciously) on behalf of intellectual (essentially spiritual) "*principle*," which is, ultimately, antagonistic to emotional (essentially sensual) "pleasure." It is easy to say that "principle" is the outcome of an enlightened apprehension of what constitutes pleasure, and that, accordingly, principle is favourable to pleasure. Then, we may ask, about pleasure and pain, what Mr. Blatchford asks about faith, hope and spirituality: "What do these words mean?" Whose criterion is to decide about pleasure and pain?

Of course, principle involving enlightened apprehension of pleasure is favourable to pleasure; but whose pleasure? That of the enlightened. But what about the unenlightened who represent the vast majority? Why should the minority—especially I may ask the question of Mr. Democrat—get pleasure through imposing pain on the majority? Why should our "St. George" tilt at other peoples' pleasure? Because it is pain—to him! Just so, but he is then not tilting at pain because nobody likes it, but because he does not like some other peoples' pleasure: because he likes to impose pain himself. This is obvious when Mr. Blatchford tells us the sort of "pains" he is going to exterminate. They are "poverty, ignorance, vice, bad drains, robbery, cant, lies, greed, stupidity." Let us consider.

Poverty is pain to those who experience it, and to some, a few, who do not. It is intellectually demonstrable that poverty mainly arises through public wrong. Intellectualists here plump with emotionalist

Blatchford; not because they "like" or "dislike" poverty—somewhat akin to "spirituality," etc., in regard to nebulosity—but because they do not like intellectually demonstrated wrong. Such liking constitutes *their* emotional dissipation. When they cannot get it, they get their pain.

Bad drains involve pain to people whom they help to catch typhoid fever and diphtheria. They involve pleasure to prosperous jerry-builders who save the outlay for good work, and sell the property before it is condemned. Intellectualists do not assail bad drains (unless they, the intellectualists, happen to live over the drains. Then they curse them!) any more than they assail lamp-posts. Nor does Mr. Blatchford. He assails the layer of bad drains, because Mr. Jerry causes pain through, not adopting, say, Mr. Blatchford's sort of pleasure. The intellectualist assails Jerry because he is a product and exponent of demonstrable dishonesty.

Robbery affords pleasure to those who rob, and pain to those who get robbed. Query: which are the more numerous? Answer: probably the robbed. Balance of pain in favour of robbed. By rule of majorities, down with robbery! Again: robbery is wrong, according to intellectual truth. Accidental conformity between Mr. Blatchford's emotionally based and intellectually based truth. Validation of Mr. Blatchford's distinction between liking and disliking, if we grant rule of majorities, which I do not.

Vice, cant, lies, greed, presumably offer pleasure to

those (the vast majority) who indulge in the diversions. Moreover, as about faith, hope, spirituality, we may ask Mr. Blatchford's question: "What do these words mean?" They are hard to get in a tight corner. Mr. Blatchford condemns them because they cause pain. The intellectualist condemns them because they involve emotional bases and intellectual superstructures: insanity or dishonesty.

Ignorance involves pleasure and pain; probably more of the former than latter. Mr. Blatchford condemns it because it involves pain. Rule of majorities would seem to be against Mr. Blatchford. The intellectualist condemns ignorance, because it affords scope for dishonesty, vice, cant, parasitism, robbery, etc.

Stupidity is one of those things difficult to demarcate, and hardly remediable when we can identify it. Whether it involves more pleasure, or pain, to be stupid than acute; whether more people are stupid than acute, are points so difficult and unimportant to determine that I may dismiss stupidity from further reference.

I think the reader will now be disposed to grant that, if we condemn the above things on the score of the pain they involve, we have little beyond crude prepossession to authenticate our decisions. The "personal equation" is then the all-potent factor in moving us, and only when it happens to conform with the intellectual, objective factor, does any collective advantage arise from the particular exercise of prejudice.

The proposition that pain is bad because we do



not like it, or that pleasure is good because we like it, is logically fatuous and is practically contradicted by the facts of evolutionary development. Liking or disliking, in the conventional sense of the term, has nothing to do with the essential good or evil of pain or pleasure. Our socialistic St. George is more rational, unconsciously than consciously. His argument is flimsy, while his action is rationally valid. That this occurs in the particular case, merely shows that Mr. Blatchford's emotion happens to conform with the issues of intellectual truth. All zealots have not been so happily emotioned as he; some have played dire pranks through emotion strongly opposed to intellectual truth. There is nothing to show that Mr. Blatchford, in his next bout *à la* St. George—say, when he becomes President of the British Republic—may not emulate one of these emotional unfortunates—Torquemada, or Napoleon, for instance. Personally, I should rebel against the pleasure of that brand of emotionalist, as I daresay, in his present phase of emotion, would Mr. Blatchford. But, when it is a case of emotion holding the whip—to adopt the expressive phraseology of *Clarion* writers—one never knows! As beacons, give me people who build on intellectual foundations, rather than enthusiasts who occasionally happen to make lucky casts with the dice-box of emotion. We cannot afford to “run up” Socialism after the method of Mr. Jerry. We need our bastions to be of the Gibraltar, not royal-procession, lath-and-plaster order. Accordingly, our foundations must be in the bed-

rock of objective demonstration, not on the street pavement of likes and dislikes. If we cannot get Socialism on these terms, we do not want it, and, if we get it, shall soon see it crumble away in chaos, as preliminary to a fresh start on the old animalistic lines. I suggest to Mr. Blatchford that he shall renounce emotional gambling, and invest his propagandist capital in the perhaps less exhilarating, but ultimately more profitable business of providing a good foundation for Socialism. That he can do this is shown by his work, *Merrie England*.

The insanity, or dishonesty, with which I am now dealing, permeates and corrodes our social system. Those who, otherwise, are best endowed to help forward the coming reorganisation, it turns into gropers who, while they fan the flame of discontent, do nothing to provide a substitute for what they seek to overthrow. Enough for them to see the evil; what care they about the remedy? Conditions that have arisen through chiliads of emotional predominance, they assail through the self-same emotion, failing to see that if emotion, after thousands of years' predominance, has nothing to show, to-day, as social dispensation, but the rule of brute, the mere upsetting of present material conditions, without upsetting the present emotional conditions, must be futile to effect permanent change. Does Mr. Blatchford, or any other prominent socialist, suppose that, were there communism to-morrow, the masses would adapt themselves to the ideals now being emotionally propounded? I hardly credit Mr.

Blatchford or any other prominent socialist with such facile conviction. "Brotherhood," on emotional lines, is theoretically admirable—so long as the "brothers" are on the look-out for plunder! But, "brotherhood" when the plunder is theirs! Ugh!

The economic revolution involved by Socialism, without revolution in individual incentive, involving practical exemplification of the objective demonstration of honesty and justice, would call up a demon more hateful than that now straddling over society. The *spirit* of Socialism is what it behoves the propagandist to create. Mere namby-pamby gush about love and brotherhood; mere passionate denunciation of inequalities and cruelties, will no more ensure the spirit of Socialism than a penny whistle will silence a thunder-clap. So far as I can judge by what I read in the accredited press-organs of Socialism, in this country, there is not, to my apprehension, even a semblance of perception of the only rational warrant for the confiscation essential to a first real advance to Socialistic redistribution. Accordingly, in my eyes, the present propagandism is fundamentally dishonest. Its demands emanate from emotional bases and intellectual superstructures, instead of from intellectual bases. Had Socialism no better warrant than that enunciated, with surpassing ability, in such an organ as the *Clarion*, I should be among the bitterest opponents of Socialism. I think I am as capable as are most people of sympathising with suffering, and I have a clear apprehension of the immediate amelioration of hardship which would

arise through a practically efficient scheme of redistribution ; but I should no more be a party, on the strength of my sentiments and expedient notions, alone, to repudiating the existing conditions of private ownership, than I should torture a lunatic for not conducting himself rationally. If I cannot intellectually demonstrate that private ownership is wrong, I am no more justified, from my standpoint, in attacking the private owner than in torturing the lunatic. In my eyes, the rights of property are sacred, so long as emotion and an intellectual superstructure alone oppose these rights. Similarly, private exploitation is justifiable on the conditions. In a word, the rule of might is the rule of right, so long as there is only such opposition. Socialism is neither a matter of sentiment nor of expediency. Its alpha and omega is *principle*. Until there is a constituency able to digest this prime fact, there will be no genuine Socialism.

Where are the strong who are going to yield to the weak, if the "reason" you offer for the self-restraint is, essentially that same "reason"—emotion—which involves the licence? What anchorage is there to prevent emotion from drifting with every play of the current of circumstance? You do not convince a man by his feelings, but by his wits. You may certainly talk an emotion into him ; but, somebody else will, as readily, talk it out of him. But, who can talk a man out of believing that two is not one? Who can talk him out of believing that the earth is round? Pity for the impoverished and

oppressed! Rancour against the affluent! What are these but your own indulgence, your likes and dislikes, your pet selfishnesses? But, submission to your intellect! Ah, that's "a horse of another colour." The sorry jade, emotion, has no chance with that flyer. On its back you soon reach a court which the jade will never even approach. The judges of that court are *demonstrations*. Their verdicts are irrevocable, except by themselves. *You*, the mite, have nothing to do with those verdicts except bow to them, and obey them. I want Mr. Blatchford to get off that groggy old Emotion and mount the flyer Intellect.

The emotional socialist assails the existing industrial and capitalistic systems because they involve remediable suffering. But, in his attack on the systems, the socialist necessarily attacks persons. To practically and effectually manifest his pre-possession against suffering, the socialist must ultimately confiscate the property of the land, mine, machinery, etc., owners. Let there be no mistake on this point: whatever socialists may say, through a natural desire to tread as lightly as possible on the corns of prospective converts, there can be no Socialism without confiscation. To talk of purchasing land, mines, and machinery is to talk words, not things. To effect such "purchase," there must be extra taxation which must ultimately come (either directly, or through forcibly, and, on the conditions of emotionalism, arbitrarily depreciating their property) mainly out of the pockets of those who own the land, mines, and



machinery. To call such a process purchase is to dishonestly trifle with words. I, for one, will be no party to advancing Socialism under false pretences. I say that, if Socialism cannot justify confiscation, Socialism is either impossible or noxious; that is, it is either intolerable to honest people, who will prevent it; or it will be consummated by dishonest people, who will constitute it merely another form of corruption. As an emotionalist, the socialist's warrant for this confiscation is (however he may gloze over the issue by an intellectual superstructure involving expediential arguments), fundamentally his private likes and dislikes. His motive for dispossession is, accordingly, as essentially selfish and dishonest as is the land and machinery owners' motive for retention. Granting all that he urges against the capitalistic and industrial systems, on the score of involved suffering, the emotional socialist has not advanced a scintilla of ethical reason for his spoliative programme, without which his creed is empty vapouring. Indeed, from the standpoint of the emotional socialist, ethics is more favourable to the capitalist than to him. As between the two sides, there is, on the conditions, nothing but antagonism of injustices: the injustice of ownership and that of dispossession. Still, the injustice of ownership has, obviously, the better rational warrant, inasmuch as it can invoke the custom of ages on behalf of its pretensions. For thousands of years, men have never questioned the right of private aggrandisement and appropriation. Now, the emotional socialist wants to upset this right.

On what grounds? Because he objects to its effects. Why does he object to the effects? Because they involve suffering. Why should not the capitalist urge the same reason for perpetuating his ownership? Why should he not also dislike suffering?

But, it may be urged, the socialist wants to obviate other people's suffering, while the capitalist is merely concerned for his own. I reply: the socialist's desire, *qua* desire, has no better rational warrant than has the capitalist's. Moreover, as the socialist assails, while the capitalist merely protects, the socialist is bound to show a preponderance of warrant for attack over that for resistance. The socialist's dislike for suffering is no warrant at all for such attack. On the condition of "struggle," every man has the rational right to serve himself within certain limitations defined by the laws of his country. Hence, trade-union and master-union, on the conditions, are rationally justifiable. In the one case, the interest protected is labour; in the other, capital. That involves time-sanctioned struggle. But Socialism is quite another matter. It does not involve protection of existing interests, but the creation of new interests by forcibly exterminating others. In other words, it involves a subversal of right as sanctioned by ages of experiment. The emotional socialist wants to achieve this subversal merely because it accords with his likes and dislikes. I am "not having any" of this sort of Socialism!

Genuine Socialism is a much greater issue than it is conceived to be by the majority of its professed exponents and advocates. It marks an era of mental

evolution such as has not, hitherto, been known to history. This evolutionary era involves the adoption of the objective, and the downfall of the subjective standpoints, in relation to the most intimate practical concerns of the individual. For the first time, is now being brought into the arena of private concern, the vast issue of the predominance of rationalism over emotionalism. The same intellectual predominance over emotion which is now destroying conventional religions is also destroying the economic conditions corresponding to those religions. As in respect to those religions, so also in respect to Socialism, what involves the change is, fundamentally, one supreme objective demonstration of the fallacy of the theological doctrine of free-will. Emotion has produced many social crashes; now, it is the turn of intellect to pull down and replace the props of society. Failing this readjustment by intellect, there will be, in my opinion, another emotional "missfire" involving upheaval, and another evolutionary "try again." In other words, failing the intellectual readjustment, society, in my opinion, has reached that stage of luxurious senility which heralded the annihilation of anterior civilisations, and only the intellectual dominance which I advocate can prevent the like annihilation of modern civilisation.

Sympathy with suffering is thus quite foreign to the real credentials for Socialism. I daresay I feel this sympathy as acutely as does Mr. Blatchford, or any other socialist, and, were I to allow that sympathy to override me, I daresay my inclinations would lead

## A Socialist by Sympathy 185

me to any extremes of violence likely to result in the overthrow of existing conditions of distribution. On the other hand, through a comparatively wide purview arising from close consideration of the main issues of scientific investigation, I see the overwhelming necessity of testing my sympathies in the crucible of intellect, before I allow those sympathies to involve corresponding action. I see that a man can fuddle himself with sympathy as effectually as with whisky. Accordingly, however fervently I may love or hate—and I can do both as efficiently as most people—I am generally able to restrain these self-indulgences, so far as regards their manifestation, within the ring-fence of intellectual limitation. So soon as there is a constituency for Socialism ready, on my lines, to overthrow private ownership and all its concomitants, I shall, if the event occur in my time, be in the van of the confiscators. So long as Socialism is merely sympathetic and rapacious lust, my position is that of the classic bard who is “not having any.”

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE BIBLE AND THE CHILD

THIS is the title of a small work (James Clark and Co., London, 1897) professing to "teach the young idea how to shoot" in an orthodox manner at Biblical untruths revealed by what is called the "higher criticism." The "young idea," by shooting at those untruths in the way pointed by the writers of the work, will, so those writers hope, preserve the customary juvenile reverence for the Bible, as a supernaturally inspired work different in essence from any human product of literary activity, and, at the same time, escape the perplexity of having to reconcile the religious teaching of childhood with the teaching of the common mental experiences of adolescence and manhood. I purpose very cursorily examining the claims and aspirations of the writers of this work, who are the following more or less eminent theologians: F. W. Farrar, D.D.; R. F. Horton, M.A., D.D.; Arthur S. Peake, M.A.; W. H. Freemantle, D.D.; Frank C. Porter, Ph.D.; Lyman Abbot, D.D. My purpose will be served by extracting a few



salient utterances of the writers and commenting thereon.

Dr. Farrar writes : "Parents and teachers may go on inculcating dogmas about the Bible and methods of dealing with it, which have long become impossible to those who have really tried to follow the manifold discoveries of modern inquiry with perfectly open and unbiassed minds. There are a certain number of persons who, when their minds have become stereotyped in foregone conclusions, are simply *incapable* of grasping new truths. They become obstructives, and not infrequently bigoted obstructives. As convinced as the Pope of their own personal infallibility, their attitude towards those who see that the old views are no longer tenable is an attitude of anger and alarm. This is the usual temper of the *odium theologicum*. It would, if it could, grasp the thumb-screw and the rack of medieval inquisitors, and would, in the last resource, hand over all opponents to the scaffold or the stake." This is admirable. I can only hope that the Dean of Canterbury will read my work and deal with it by the sage methods he commends, by implication, to his readers.

The next statement of the Dean, with which I am concerned, runs thus : "Off-hand dogmatists of this stamp, who usually abound among professional religionists, think that they can refute any number of scholars, however profound and however pious, if only they shout 'Infidel' with sufficient loudness. . . . If there were *no* opposition to critical inquiry, except what is of this crude kind, it would hardly be deserv-

ing of any notice, but might be passed over with silent indifference. There are, however, many true and tender souls, incapable of severe studies, and wedded to beliefs which they have identified with their holiest hours, who are too old or too fixed in opinion to make progress, and who, from honest dread lest they should be dragged into doubt respecting views dear to them as life, cannot get rid of the belief that there is something 'wicked' in free inquiry. Like Cardinal Newman, they think it their duty to treat their reason as though it were a dangerous wild beast to be beaten back with a bar of iron. Ought they not to bear in mind the warning of the great Bishop Butler that our reason is the *only* faculty which God has given us by which we can judge of *anything*, even of Revelation itself?" The first point to which I will here draw the reader's attention is the emphatic statement of Butler adopted by the Dean that "reason is the *only* faculty by which we can judge of *anything*." Has the Dean considered the full bearing of this admission? If reason is our sole faculty of judging, then, the whole work to which the Dean is the first contributor fights for its cause with feather wands, instead of with sword and bayonet. This it does, because it altogether evades the principal foe now invoked by reason, not merely against the Bible, but against the fundamental premises of Christianity. To try to reconcile the "higher criticism" with the Bible; but not to try to reconcile the basical demonstrations of science with Christian fundamentals, is, in my opinion, a stultifi-

cation of the Dean's proposition regarding the function of reason. I suggest to the Dean that he now tries to reconcile his religious foundations with the demonstrations of science regarding determinism and the impossibility of that "free-will" without which Christianity is a phantasy. As an inducement to the Dean, I further suggest that the child's future difficulty when he becomes an adult, will not arise from his perplexity by the "higher criticism," but by the teaching of science. The adult, whether as "professional religionist" or "man in the street," is not really concerned so much about the investigations of "scholars" as about the investigations of biologists and physiologists. The Pope's infallibility is evidently an obnoxious quality, in the Dean's eyes. If the Dean does not claim analogous infallibility for himself as judge of the limits to which scrutiny of the Bible is to be carried, he cannot reasonably refuse to apply, as test of those records, the teachings of science as well as those of the "higher critics." The Dean writes of "true and tender souls, incapable of severe studies, and wedded to beliefs which they have identified with their holiest hours." There are other true and tender souls, *not* incapable of severe studies, yet like the others, wedded to beliefs which they have identified with their holiest hours. What is "holiest," if what is "holy" to one man is "ignorantly superstitious" to another? Is one man holy because he hypnotises himself with a habit-begotten mental attitude; another unholy because he emancipates himself from emotional slavery? No; implies the Dean.

The man whose beliefs are imposed by the "higher criticism" is essentially more holy than the man whose beliefs are held through bigoted opposition to that criticism. This the former is because he exemplifies the truth "that our reason is the *only* faculty which God has given us by which we can judge of *anything*, even of Revelation itself." I hope the Dean will grant analogous holiness to him whose beliefs are imposed by science.

Now to another utterance of the Dean. He writes: "Every one should be a little ashamed and afraid to be of those who are the last to give up their adherence to opinions which have long become naturally obsolete. 'There is nothing so revolutionary,' said Dr. Arnold, 'because there is nothing so unnatural and convulsive, as the strain to keep things fixed, when all the world is, by the very law of its creation, in eternal progress; and the course of all the evils in the world may be traced to that natural but most deadly error of human indolence and corruption that it is our duty to preserve and not to improve.' A study of the past shows us that it has been one of the chief duties of each age in succession to cast off the slough of old ignorance. The advance of knowledge is a direct work: God's revealing power. 'God shows all things in the slow victory of their ripening'; and since the light of all certain knowledge which comes to us from the long results of time is light from heaven, how can it lead us astray?" How, indeed, echo I! I would ask the Dean: is not the "certain knowledge" of biology part of this "light

from heaven?" Must we not therefore "cast off the slough of old ignorance" embodied as the basal premise of Christianity: that a man can thwart God and for doing so will be punished by God? Should we not be "a little ashamed and afraid to be of those who are the last to give up their adherence" to this opinion which has "become naturally obsolete"?

Again writes the Dean: "This at anyrate is certain, that if children are still taught to regard as articles of their religious belief opinions about the inerrancy, universal equal sacredness, verbal dictation, or supernatural infallibility of *all* that is contained between the covers of the sixty-six books which we call the Bible, the faith of those children, if they develop any intelligent capacity or openness of mind hereafter, is destined to undergo a rude and wholly needless shock, in which it will be fortunate if much of their religion does not go by the board." As I have emphasised in this work, those children, when adults, will, under the circumstances, lose much more than their "religion." They will lose their *manhood*: become hypocrites, liars, sordid materialists, cunning rascals. Who is to decide the "sacredness, verbal dictation, or supernatural infallibility" of the Bible? Who is to say where and when these qualities begin and end? Suppose science says there is no more of these qualities in the Bible than in the works of Shakespeare, or Milton; the records of Buddhism, or Mohammedism; classic mythology, or modern physics—who shall say science nay, and why? Shall the "higher criticism" deny science? That criticism



supports science by discrediting the Bible. It has certainly left some of the records untouched. Does this prove them infallible, supernaturally inspired? I hardly think the Dean will take his stand on such a foundation. Then how can he decide, by *reason*, about inspiration or the lack of it, unless he appeals to that factor, science, which is "the light from heaven" by which, alone, we can now "cast off the slough of old ignorance"? If he makes such appeal, how can the Dean attribute infallibility to any portion of a record which science has totally, the "higher criticism" largely, discredited; and which common experience compels us to repudiate as a criterion of action?

Dr. Farrar again writes: "Let us take the case of the Pentateuch. Those who now regard it as a matter of demonstration that, in its present form, it embodies the handiwork of at least four different writers, and that it contains at least three varying strata of legislation, do not, on that account, lose one essential element of its moral greatness and religious teaching." Suppose we grant this, in what essential respect does the Pentateuch or any other part of the Bible differ, as miraculous inspiration, from an ordinary product of a moral writer? If God did not "inspire," in the theological sense, the writers of the Pentateuch, why is the work more sacred than the religious records of any other cult? To what extent should we even see pre-eminent moral grandeur in the Pentateuch, had not habit pre-disposed us to the view? This question is at the root of all modern

implication of supernatural quality to the Bible. In these days, we cannot allow habit to justify belief. Again, Mr. Farrar writes :—"Half the errors about the Bible would vanish if men would remember that revelation is *continuous*." So say I, and I would add : one of these errors that would vanish is that the Bible is anything more than a human product, to be judged by the criteria humanity applies to any other pretended statement of truth.

The Dean again manifests his solicitude on behalf of the children by reiterating the fact that : "If children are left unaware that the views of those most competent to represent their generation are widely different from those which were all but universal in the days of their grandfathers, the discovery will certainly come to them later on, and may come so suddenly as to imperil their faith"—and, I repeat : their manhood. Who are those "most competent to represent their generation," if, as the Dean tells us : "reason is the *only* faculty which God has given us by which we can judge of *anything*?" Surely, these people are those whose truth is decided solely *by* reason. These people scout, as exclusively divine, not only the Dean's Bible, but the very essence of what he calls his faith. Then, why are the children to be taught the Dean's faith, against the verdict of those whose sole criterion of truth is reason, any more than the faith of the Dean's grandfather? Why is not the one faith as truly killed by God as is the other?

Here is an admirable utterance of the Dean : "We should be profoundly and unswervingly *truthful*. We

ought never to practise that *falsitas dispensativa*, that 'economy of truth,' which found favour among some of the Fathers" (and which, I may remind the reader, the Rev. A. Craufurd attributes to the founder of Dean's faith) "and has often been an avowed principle of action in the Church of Rome. Truth is too sacred a thing to admit of manipulations or juggling. Traditionalism or professionalism, or self-interest should never for a moment be suffered to obscure our sense of its eternal obligation. We are not bound to teach children all we know, but we are most solemnly bound not to teach them anything which we feel doubtful as though it were certain, and still more are we bound not to teach them anything of which we ourselves begin to suspect the reality." What beautiful sentiment! Does the Dean exemplify it as practice? Will he show how it is rationally possible, in these days, to accept as truth the proposition that a creature can thwart its Creator? If the Dean cannot demonstrate this rational possibility, will he tell us why he sanctions impressing on children, as the most vital truth, that creatures *can* thwart their Maker and thereby court penalties more terrible than man has ever imposed on his most hated victim?

The Dean writes: "The object of the best and most sacred Bible teaching is to form the character, not to store the intellect. It is moral; it is spiritual; it has to do with things eternal." Are not all books written of high purpose moral, spiritual, and, if they dispense what reason apprehends as truth, do not they, on the Dean's showing, also deal with "things eternal?"

What can we posit about "things eternal" more than that reason imposes them as belief? If one man propounds as a "thing eternal" what another man scouts as a "thing temporal," how are we to decide between the two, except by appeal to the accumulated experience embodied as science? If we reject the decision of science, do we not manifestly repudiate reason: "the *only* faculty which God has given us by which we can judge of *anything*, even of Revelation itself?"

Again writes the Dean: "The manner in which the Higher Criticism has slowly and surely made its victorious progress, in spite of the most determined and exacerbated opposition, is a strong argument in its favour. It is exactly analogous to the way in which the truths of astronomy and of geology have triumphed over universal opposition. They were once anathematised as 'infidel'; they are now accepted as axiomatic." This can be said of the truths of modern biology which I logically elaborate in this work. If biology is not to be obeyed, why obey the "higher criticism" or astronomy?

I have now done with Dean Farrar, and will deal with the next contributor to the work under consideration: the Rev. R. F. Horton, M.A., D.D. He writes: "When the foundations are suspected the defenders will use any device to prevent an examination of them. If you propose to rest your religion on an infallibility of any sort the only chance is to surround your infallibility itself with an inviolable ring which forbids criticism, and to resent any suggestion of doubt, dealing with it as impiety to be

denounced, and not as argument to be met." Is not the basical doctrine of Christianity itself such an "infallibility?" Does any theologian concede argument to the biologist who attacks this central "infallibility?" Does not every theologian surround this "infallibility" with an "inviolable ring?" Like his fellow-contributors, Dr. Horton drops heavily on the old orthodox open-your-mouth-and-shut-your-eyes-and-see-what-God-will-send-you school; and like his fellow-contributors, the Doctor consciously or unconsciously closes his eyes to the ultimate goal to which concession to the "higher criticism" logically leads. According to the Doctor, the "old orthodoxy" has dire results at its door: "Plymouth Brethrenism on the one hand, and infidelity on the other. It is this" (orthodox) "view which has enabled the infidel publication, *Reynolds' Newspaper*, to regale its Sunday readers lately with columns of extracts from the Bible which run counter to even a worldly man's sense of righteousness, as the 'word of God.' If the Plymouth Brethren account of the Bible is correct, *Reynolds' Newspaper* is justified. As to the honesty of *Reynolds'* in assuming that Plymouth Brethrenism is the religion of Christendom, and ignoring that no man of scholarship or education holds the view of the Bible which would justify this procedure, I will say nothing, for that is a side issue. But while the loudest and most vehement defenders of the Bible persist in advocating this impossible view, infidelity will have a thousand weapons ready to its hand." I will not take sides in Dr. Horton's quarrel with *Reynolds'* and the Plymouth



Brethren, though it seems to me that, as the "higher criticism" has only come on the arena within a decade or so, while the Biblical canon has been fixed for over a thousand years, Dr. Horton, from his standpoint, as an ecclesiastic, can hardly claim to monopolise the crowing.

The point I now wish to labour a little is Dr. Horton's dread of "infidelity." What is this "infidelity"? To the Plymouth Brethren, one of its implications is not accepting the Scriptures, *literatim*. According to Dr. Horton, "infidelity" is not involved in rejecting parts of these Scriptures as being "not of God." What is "not of God" to the Doctor is "of God" to the Brethren. Well, suppose I say, and prove by science, that what Dr. Horton says is "of God," is, in the sense he uses the terms "of God," *not* "of God"—am I not, on the conditions, equally entitled to tax Dr. Horton with infidelity as he is to deny the imputation of it, by implication by the Brethren? If Dr. Farrar is right in asserting that reason is "the *only* faculty by which we can judge of *anything*," have I not as good ground of complaint against Dr. Horton for infidelity as he has against *Reynolds*? Who is to decide between me and Dr. Horton? He has invoked reason, as the "higher criticism," why shall I not invoke reason, as science? I will leave the Doctor to solve this conundrum and turn to the next writer.

The next contributor on the list is Mr. Arthur S. Peake, M.A., Tutor in Biblical subjects, Primitive Methodist Theological Institute, Manchester. This

gentleman tells his "young people" that "their feet are planted on a rock of certainty which no criticism can shake. If I may repeat a phrase I used in an article some years ago, criticism 'has drawn the fangs of the secularist lecturer,' perhaps I ought to add: only he is not aware of it. In other words, criticism has swept away many of the things most chosen by the Secularists for attack. It is our privilege to place our young people at the right point of view, and preserve a faith which shall not be incompatible with intellectual integrity. We must vaccinate them with criticism to save them from the smallpox of scepticism." Mr. Peake "vaccinates" with the "higher criticism." I suggest that he also vaccinates with some of my criticism. Mr. Peake tells his "young people": "It is highly important that the Bible should be revered as the record of the revelation and redeeming activity of God, that it should be set above all other books, and indeed placed in a unique position." Yet, this unique record has come down to us as corrupted text. Says Mr. Peake: "The corruption of the text both of the Old and New Testaments must be urged to prove that Providence has not attached so much importance to the exact transcription of the words of the autographs as to secure miraculous immunity from errors of copyists." I trust Mr. Peake's "young people" may find this explanation convincing. Personally, I should like Mr. Peake to tell me how he has got on such intimate terms with Providence as to be enabled to tax Providence with a method which, in the case of

a human being, we should call idiotic. If a sane man wants to transmit a collection of his dicta to posterity he does not deliberately allow a transcriber to garble a large part of the collection and leave posterity to wrangle about the genuine dicta. What are we to think of an omniscient, omnipotent entity that adopts this curious method of perpetuating his dicta? Surely this entity might as readily have had his *ipsissima verba* properly transcribed as garbled from the "autographs."

Mr. Peake nimbly extricates himself from the quandary he has created through his intimate acquaintance with the method of Providence leading him to stultify verbal inspiration. Thus, he writes: "Another thing that should be insisted on is that there is no orthodox doctrine of Inspiration, in other words, there is no doctrine to which the Church is committed." If the Church is committed to no such doctrine, we may ask, why should Mr. Peake's "young people" be so committed? Mr. Peake tells us, thus: "The teacher should make it clear that the only satisfactory way" (of settling the doctrine) "is not to spin theories out of one's own inner consciousness, but to set to work patiently to investigate the phenomena which the Bible presents, and form the doctrine as a result of the investigation." Then, we may assume, the result will be to eliminate just those doubtful parts of the Bible to which, as Mr. Peake informs us, "Providence has not attached so much importance as to secure miraculous immunity from errors of copyists." Mr. Peake appositely reminds his "young people," "If a man discovers a blunder

in his daily paper he does not jump to the conclusion I have heard formulated with reference to the Bible in this way : 'If all of it ain't true, there's none of it true.' " I will not gainsay Mr. Peake's right to compare the Bible with a daily paper. Many of us think the "daily's" proportion of truth and untruth is like Falstaff's bread and sack. Mr. Peake says : "A man should treat his Bible as fairly as he treats his newspaper." If Mr. Peake's Bible comes out of the ordeal as does my paper, I fear he will not get much solace from it.

Mr. Peake writes : "Criticism has made the Bible more precious to us because it has made it intelligible and interesting. It has made the uniqueness of the religion of Israel and of Christianity stand out with far greater clearness." I dare say "criticism" would be able to achieve an analogous feat for the Buddhist. Half-baked religionists are mostly adepts at discovering consolation in criticism of their cults. People who are led by intellect don't want consolation. They merely want belief. Says Mr. Peake ; "It (the Bible) has driven us to Christ, the only 'impregnable rock,' as our supreme religious authority." But, the "impregnable rock" guarantees the traditional authorship of Old Testament books. Mr. Peake is equal to the occasion. His intimacy with Providence enables him to inform his "young people" that "the Incarnation involved a surrender of omniscience that He might be like us in all things except sin, and that even if His knowledge on these points transcended that of His own time, it would have been to cast a needless

stumbling-block in the way of His hearers to discuss critical questions with them." So the "impregnable rock" turns out to be either an indifferent, as merely human, religious authority: or a "supreme" authority exercising that "wise economy of truth," or *faisitas dispensativa* rebuked by Dr. Farrar, in order to mislead his followers. So much for the teaching administered to the "young people" at the Primitive Methodist Theological Institute, Manchester. I surmise that they must be very young, or very naïve if they get credal nourishment from Mr. Arthur S. Peake's tutorial pabulum as represented by his contribution to the work under consideration.

We now come to the fourth contributor, Mr. Walter F. Adeney, M.A., Professor of New Testament Exegesis, History, and Criticism at New College. He writes: "If we know the facts" (revealed by the "higher criticism") "what reason or justification have we for continuing to teach children just as we did before we had reached them? I have no wish to perplex and puzzle children with abstruse questions; but I feel the grave mistake of ignoring the fairly established results of criticism. We may not be able to explain Kepler's laws to young children, but that is no excuse for doggedly persisting in representing to them that sun, moon, and stars all revolve round the earth." I ask Mr. Adeney, why shall he not teach children in conformity with the facts of biology, that man is determined by his Creator and can do nothing but what his Creator wills, but teach those children, in conformity with astronomy, that the earth



and sun are not in the relation affirmed by the Bible ; or again, teach those children, in conformity with the "higher criticism" that all parts of the Bible are not equally authoritative? Why shall Mr. Adeney "doggedly persist" in teaching those children, as truth about God, what the whole of science stigmatises as utter falsity? If Mr. Adeney accepts astronomy as better authority than Scripture regarding the rotation of the earth, why shall he refuse to accept as like authority against Scripture, biology, physiology, and psychology, regarding the facts of human determinism? Why shall he decline to teach as truth what astronomy has demolished, yet refuse so to teach what the other sciences have established? Obviously, prepossessions are here as rampant factors as they are in the case of those "ignorant" people whom Mr. Adeney castigates for taking "upon themselves to heap indiscriminate denunciation upon the higher criticism." The motive in both cases is identical. Reason has as little to do with the ignorant denunciation of the "higher criticism" as with Mr. Adeney's implied rejection of the demonstrations of biology, assuming Mr. Adeney to be aware of them. If he is not aware of these demonstrations, I say it is his duty to lose no time in removing his ignorance. A Professor of New Testament Exegesis, History and Criticism is not equipped for his post if he has no acquaintance with the broad facts revealed by modern biology and cognate branches of science, which bear more vitally on the New Testament than does the "higher criticism."

Mr. Adeney writes of the "religious wonder of revelation" and of "inspired writers," assuming by implication that the "religious wonder of revelation" and "inspired writers" are limited to what theology pleases to call "revelation," and "inspired." He assumes, by implication, that he has a monopoly of revelation and that what he calls religion has a monopoly of inspired writers. These implications are to-day as ridiculous, made by a University Professor of Theology, as would be the implications by a Professor of Mathematics that there was no science of chemistry. Every University professor should, in these days, recognise the organic continuity of knowledge and the fact that every branch of knowledge is equally a "wonder of revelation," and every revealer of truth, "inspired." Personally, I fail to perceive the real use to mankind, in these days, of a professor of biblical exegesis who deals with the records as a closed circuit of knowledge shut out from the rest of collective experience and to be thrust on humanity in defiance of vitiation by that collective experience. I can see no more use in such a professor of biblical exegesis than in a professor of mathematics who tells the world that Euclid's Elements are to be accepted as immutable truth governing human conduct, no matter what empirical experience may have to say on the subject. Religion, to be worth anything in these days, must embrace as its own truth the organised experience of humanity. Biblical records and theological theories can now no more be rationally measured solely by the criteria of their own

contents, than can the fantastic notions of an asylum-inmate. Within their arena, as truth to the lunatic, his notions are valid ; as truth applicable to the world at large, they are invalid. So it is with the biblical system of cognition. To its appropriate epoch it was valid ; to us it is useless—indeed, noxious. If we would rationally investigate this system, we must recognise its limitations. So soon as we set a fence round any one of its affirmations, as being final, infallible, universal, we proclaim ourselves out of touch with our age, and, if we officiously thrust our effete truths on the public, we have, essentially, no better justification than has he who wilfully spreads a contagious disease, or utters base coin. Whatever be our motives, we are essentially quacks whom it is the best interest of society to suppress. If, as Mr. Adeney says : “ we have no excuse for doggedly persisting in representing that sun, moon, and stars all revolve round the earth,” we have no excuse for doggedly promulgating the fundamental affirmations of a rationally defunct religious cult. Of course, if we are merely special pleaders interested to maintain a partisan cause, that is our affair. Then, we must answer if society holds us responsible for spreading intellectual disease. If a barrister defends a suspected thief, his action is recognised by society as necessary to the thief’s obtaining justice. If he urges the suspect to swear a lie, the barrister is a moral criminal. Similarly, if a cleric defends, and uses his privileges and influence to spread, as basal truth, what he cannot intellectually justify,

he is an enemy of society, because he is an enemy of morality.

In dealing with the tales, legends, and myths of the Old Testament, exploded by the "higher criticism," Mr. Adeney writes: "Children have to learn how all history begins among the mists of uncertainty, in the dim ages of a far-off antiquity. They know this with regard to the story of Britain, and it does not make them sceptics of the history of the Norman and Tudor lines. If they are told that possibly King Arthur was a myth, they are not thereupon so confused as to doubt the landing of William the Conqueror." Here the analogy is false. In the one case, we have a pretendedly special, divine communication to humanity. In the other case we have merely a set of human narratives. The tale of Jonah is really transmitted to us as being as much part of divine revelation as the account of William the Conqueror is transmitted as part of history. If the history recounted that William lived in a whale's belly while crossing the Channel, the child's scepticism about history would be as probable and reasonable as is the man's scepticism of an ostensibly divine communication containing a multitude of affirmations equally incredible as is the whale story. Of course, nothing is easier than for interested partisans to say that this or that transmitted part of an ostensibly special divine communication is not really part of the communication. Such an apologist, given the necessary medium of public prepossession, might successfully apply this method to establishing the authority, as

divine, of Grimm's fairy-tales. There is always something plausible, as actuality, even in the most grotesque feats of imagination.

Touching the story of Adam and Eve, Mr. Adeney writes: "To know nothing of this would argue gross ignorance; and it is better to come upon it in the grand simplicity of its original form in Genesis than to meet with it for the first time clothed in Milton's strange mingling of Puritan theology and sensuous poetry. This story is not only touched with antique charm; it is replete with profound lessons concerning man, his sin, and his fate." Where are these "profound lessons" in the narrative? What notion of a Creator is an intelligent child to derive from a story turning that Creator into a human monstrosity, powerless to control two creatures, yet powerful and vindictive enough to eternally afflict them and their posterity for some petty offence which the deity pleased to consider heinous, but which, in the creatures, could only be rationally considered natural self-indulgence? What reverence for a human being, who indulged his rancour as did this deity, would such a narrative extort? Again, as the tale is the basis on which is erected the whole fabric of Christianity, of what consequence are its "antique charm" and "lessons" (assuming their existence) in comparison with the mischief effected in young minds through the false implications regarding God? If we want to impress the young mind, in these days, with the majesty of Omnipotence, surely the worst means we can adopt



is to direct its attention to such a story as that of the "Fall!" Mr. Adeney writes: "When we feel the Spirit of God breathing on us from the pages of the Bible, we may regard the work of criticism with equanimity, having the satisfying inward assurance that no arguments can touch our one supreme, indubitable fact" (the divinity of Christ). . . . "Above all, while we have a settled faith in Christ, confirmed by the experience of the Christian life, we may as well imagine that some new theory was about to filch the sun from our sky as fear that any criticism would ever rob us of our Lord." People who have "made up their minds" are proverbially repellent to argument. I fail to see why, logically, Mr. Adeney should not "make up his mind" regarding the divine truth of the Garden of Eden incident as he has done regarding Christ. I fail to see why, logically, Mr. Adeney should bother himself about the "higher criticism." But society has also a say in the matter. The question which concerns society is whether people who have "made up their minds," whether about Christ or anything else, are to have licence to impose on children what collective experience demonstrates to be falsity. I have already discussed this point, *in extenso*, so need not dilate on it here. I do not want to rob Mr. Adeney of his Christ. All I want is to prevent him and his like from rotting the roots of social life by sapping away the foundations of morality.

The next writer on the list is the Very Rev. W. H. Fremantle, D.D., Dean of Ripon. Like his

fellow-contributors, this writer pretends he preserves the Bible by accepting the "higher criticism," yet obscuring its true bearing on a revelation, ostensibly divine, by plausible eloquence regarding the underlying "religious spirit" even of discredited passages. Nobody denies that the Jewish records are religious. What is denied are their pretensions, as advanced by religionists, to greater authority than that of human intellect as verifying factor. If these records state, as fact, what we are compelled to mentally reject, we need something more than their "religious spirit" to validate them as such authority.

Dr. Fremantle writes: "Even now, with all our advance in knowledge, how little do we know of the secret forces of Nature. The saying of Newton is still true, that we are like children picking up shells on the shore of an ocean whose depths are unexplored. Our philosophers have to speak of an 'energy' which is the source of all action, yet, is in its essence unknown." Here, the writer deals with that false notion of "knowing" which I hope I have exploded in this work. We know all that is to be known (for us for the moment) when we believe anything. There is, for humanity, no such thing as the absolute, final "knowing" implied by Dr. Fremantle. If humanity cannot believe Dr. Fremantle's proofs for Christianity, then humanity *knows* that Christianity is false. If Dr. Fremantle believes his proofs, he knows differently from humanity, but he has no ethical right to tell children they must accept his proofs on the mere warrant of

his believing them. Before he is justified in thus dealing with children, Dr. Fremantle must so authenticate his proofs as to impose on intelligent and cultured adults the sensation of belief in his proofs. Remember what Dr. Farrar says about reason: "it is the *only* faculty which God has given us by which we can judge of *anything*." Before Dr. Fremantle has any ethical right to impose his proofs on children he must reconcile the reason of intelligent and cultured men with those proofs. What we believe about the "secret forces" of nature, as definable objects, is all there is to know about them as such objects. To imply something we do not know as being what would enable us to know the "forces" better as definable objects, is puerile. As humans, we know as well now as we ever can know. So the ancient Jews knew as well as it is possible for humans to know. We do not know absolutely better or worse; we only know differently. The great concern is not knowing, but *acting as we know*.

Dr. Fremantle writes: "We need not scruple, therefore, to tell our children, as they are able to bear it, that expressions like the long curses, of Ps. cix., ending with 'Let this be the reward of mine adversaries from the Lord,' could not be allowed in the mouths of Christians. With the younger children such passages may best be left unread, and in devotional exercises they must not be introduced." (This of a divine revelation!) "I presume that few pastors who have free choice would dwell upon them in the congregation; and I think that, when these

passages are set down to be read in the appointed order in church, the liberty which the law now gives to vary the Psalms under special circumstances may be held to justify the exclusion of expressions of hatred." (God's words!) Here, Dr. Fremantle wants to exclude certain passages because they are repulsive to his reason. The whole essence of Christian doctrine is equally repulsive to the reason that accepts collective experience as criterion of truth. Dr. Fremantle wants to pick and choose when the question is to decide what he shall renounce at the bidding of collective experience, and what he shall retain against that bidding. So far as he is concerned, this is a personal matter. So far as concerns children under his influence, it is the affair of society. If he is to exercise his arbitrary rejection and retention in imposing truth on children, society demands that he shall justify the procedure, by reason. To do that he will have to controvert what I have written in this work.

The next contributor to be noticed is the Rev. Washington Gladden, D.D. His main discourse is of the English Bible as literature. He is eloquent about its "strong and simple Saxon." "Literature it is," he tells us, "beyond all controversy, and not science nor philosophy nor theology." Nobody can reasonably demur to Dr. Gladden's estimate of the Bible, as literature; but, as the Bible is neither science nor philosophy, we may reasonably ask Dr. Gladden on what grounds he maintains, as truth, what the Bible propounds against science and philosophy, and

what authority inheres in a theology which is built on biblical statements. "Grievously do we abuse it," (the Bible) "when we take its phrases as theological formulas, and undertake to piece them together in what we call systematic theology. . . If our Sunday School teachers could get possession of this truth, a good foundation would be laid for a spiritual and vital theology." Then Dr. Gladden proceeds to discuss the nature of language, with the implication, so far as I can see, that we are to take conflicting biblical utterances and evolve from our "inner consciousness" what he calls an "average of results." He instances, as an example of this method, engineering, in which "it is often necessary to repeat measurements or tests a great many times, and take the average results that vary greatly." Well, if an engineer builds a bridge according to his "averages," and that bridge won't stand, it has to come down. After all, the test of the bridge must be empirical. So, if Dr. Gladden's theological bridge won't do its work, it must come down, whatever "averages" he may have adopted in building it. Dr. Gladden is enthusiastic about the "kindling eloquence" in which the Bible expresses "God's love for man," while Dr. Fremantle warns us against reading certain psalms before children and in church, because these psalms are mainly expressions of hatred.

The next contributor is Mr. Frank C. Porter, Ph.D., Professor in Yale Divinity School. Here, again, we have a writer pleading for the Bible as literature. Nobody can object to this sort of advocacy, except to the extent that it is exemplified to



impose the Bible as divine authority not to be questioned by human intellect. Then, the advocate drags the Bible into an arena, in which literature, as such alone, is of no account, and subjects his records to criticism, as statement of truth or falsity. The real concern of humanity is not with the Bible as literature, but as such statement. I need not quote from Dr. Porter. He touches no issues that I have not dealt with in noticing other contributors.

The last of the series of contributors is the Rev. Lyman Abbott, D.D. He tells "intelligent boys and girls from twelve years of age and upwards . . . what the modern scholar thinks about the construction and growth of the Old Testament." He tells them nothing of what modern science says regarding the truth propounded in those records. This is, at least, as important information for intelligent boys and girls, as is what scholars say about the records.

I have now done with "The Bible and the Child." It constitutes what I have earlier designated it: a symposium of surrender of the essentials of Christianity. Not a single great issue raised by science is touched in it. All its criticism assumes as given unquestioned one supreme falsity on which is based the structure it seeks to maintain: the falsity that man can act against God's determinism. It surrenders the Bible as an accurate statement of events, to the "higher criticism," and turns what it calls divine inspiration into a "wise economy of truth," or inept bungling such as even a child would not naturally think of attributing to a Creator. The writers have

altogether missed the great fact, revealed to modern seers, that the Bible is merely one item in what I may term the universe of inspiration. They have yet to learn what constitutes the Volume dictated by God. Their vision is limited to but a line or two of that Volume.

## CHAPTER IX

### EVOLUTION AND THEOLOGY

DURING the month (October 1896) there was held, at Shrewsbury, what is called the Church Congress. At this Congress some significant remarks were made, to which I wish to draw the reader's attention. The discussion with which I am now concerned was about the bearing of the Darwinian theory of evolution on theology. The clerical comments I am about to quote are as they were reported by the Press.

The Rev. L. W. Denman dismissed Darwin in these words: "I had the honour of knowing poor Darwin, a most learned, persevering and kindly man; but, the best thing he ever did was to give a subscription to a missionary society." Then, in a less flippant mood, the Speaker said: "I hope members of this Congress will pause before they give in to the theory of evolution. The discussion that has taken place seems to me to tend rather to weaken the faith of Christians than to strengthen it."

Another speaker, the Rev. C. Lloyd Engström

(secretary of the Christian Evidence Society), submitted that there was nothing intolerable in the difficulties of evolution. Modern thought, he argued, was not incompatible with Christian doctrine of the most unimpeachable orthodoxy.

Now I come to the most important speaker at this meeting—Archdeacon Wilson. He remarked: “The theory of evolution correlated, he supposed, the greatest quantity of knowledge, and had effected the greatest transformation of thought that the world had witnessed. It was the contribution of this century towards the progressive mastery of the idea of the Creator as displayed in nature. We ought, therefore, of course, to welcome it. Theology, if it was living, must be progressive . . . How did this theory of evolution affect the Christian doctrine of God? In the first place, it had made it, at first sight, more difficult to attribute personality to God. Any theory of evolution which was not dogmatically materialistic or agnostic, assumed the universal immanence of God as mind and will in nature. This was the religion of the theistic evolutionist. Evolution thus deanthropomorphosed God, and, therefore, came perilously near depersonalizing him. Evolution seemed at first to divest the God of the evolutionist of everything that he could love, of every definable or imaginable relation to the individual soul. God seemed lost in the dim infinity of law which science had revealed. There was nothing in this difficulty which was not familiar to theologians in the doctrine of the Eternal Word, which had

taught us of a Personality without the limitations of the human mortal individual. In our thought of the Personality of God, however, lay, he suspected, the problem which would tax the next age. For ourselves, we had to acquiesce in an imperfect solution. . . . How far did evolution affect the Christian doctrine of the creation of man? He thought not at all. It was no part of the doctrine of the Church—it was a comparatively modern theory of naturalists, rashly accepted by the theologians of two centuries ago—that man was a special and underived species. No doubt, it was to some of us still a novel, and even repulsive thought that man might be physically related, however remotely, to other animals. But to those who have looked the thought in the face, it appeared in a different light. He could imagine no sublimer conception of the nature or the dignity of man than that which saw all nature as the self-manifestation of God rising into self-consciousness in man. . . . *Christian doctrine could adopt the evolutionary view of creation of man; it was pledged to no other.* (Italics mine.) What was the bearing of the theory of evolution on the Christian doctrine of sin? Here we approached less familiar ground. He thought the popular view of sin *as connected with a definite fall of the head of the race was considerably affected.* (Italics mine.) Man fell, according to science, when he first became conscious of the conflict of freedom and conscience. Now this conflict of freedom and conscience was precisely what was related as “The Fall.” It



told of the fall of a creature from unconscious innocence to conscious guilt, expressing itself in hiding from the presence of God. But this fall from innocence was in another sense a rise to a higher grade of being. It was in this sense that the theory of evolution taught us to interpret the story of the Fall. It gave a deeper meaning to the truth that sin was lawlessness. Where, however, with this theory of sin, were the doctrines of Redemption, and of the Atonement; of the Incarnation and of the Trinity—the characteristically Christian doctrines? Were we here on solid ground, or did the expression of these doctrines need similar transformation before they could be harmonized with the theory of evolution? In brief, and as far as at present he understood the matter, even if the theory of evolution and of continuity were the final word of science—and scientific results are merely provisional—he did not think that it made these doctrines, except in their crudest statement, otherwise than more natural than before, and even inevitable. To the evolutionist with the preconception of theism—to his mind the only reasonable preconception—the world was instinct, alive with God. To such an evolutionist the world was destined to unfold perfect reason and perfect righteousness, of which we had, at present, only the foretaste. This was alike the doctrine of the theologian and of the evolutionist. The doctrine of personal immortality, apart from the special assurance involved in Christ's resurrection, seemed to him rendered much more

difficult by the theory of evolution, because human life was by that theory so closely correlated with animal life. The difficulty of continuity came in here as everywhere. At what point in the chain did consciousness, freedom, personality, conscience, soul, immortality, come in? *He could not say.* (Italics mine.). . . Whatever the effect of the theory of evolution might be on special doctrines, this was certain: *it had made all lower forms of worship ultimately impossible.* (Italics mine.) The evolutionist might perhaps be a materialist; he certainly might be, for many a long year, an agnostic; and were we not all agnostics to some extent? But, he could not have an unworthy and childish conception of God. The theory of evolution was a very wholesome and much-needed study for us along with our theology. One final word. . . . Christian doctrine, apart from the statement of historical facts, was the attempt to create out of Christ's teaching a philosophy of life which should satisfy these needs, and it would therefore remain the same in substance. But the form in which doctrine would be presented *must change with man's intellectual environment. The bearing of evolution on Christian doctrine was therefore, in a word, to modify, not the doctrine, but the form in which it was expressed.*" (Italics mine.)

I think the reader will grant that, under the circumstances, the above is a memorable—we might almost say, epoch-making—utterance. Here, in what may be termed the very nucleus of ecclesiasticism, a prominent cleric makes declarations

which, ten years ago, would have ensured him ecclesiastical, if not popular ostracism—declarations affecting the very foundation of his faith, and the very existence of his order. For, undoubtedly, if the few saving clauses on which the archdeacon relies for the perpetuation of ecclesiastical religion, are invalidated to popular apprehension, sacerdotalism, as now constituted, will have lost its *locus standi* as a factor in the affairs of civilization. If these saving clauses are thus invalidated, the function of ecclesiasticism, as the special depository of a supernatural revelation, is destroyed. Then sacerdotalism becomes but as any ordinary human institution: to stand or fall by its merits, or demerits, as a social product. If, under such conditions, it frankly renounces its pretensions to stand on a foundation of supernatural and *final* revelation, and devotes itself to the fearless and unselfish upholding of the highest idealism, sacerdotalism may, for some time, preserve its integrity as a living factor in human affairs. But if, after its supernatural claims are rationally demonstrated, and popularly recognised to be, untenable, it tries to preserve itself on the basis of these claims, it will be incontinently swept away.

Let us now glance at the saving clauses by which the Archdeacon hopes to obviate the destruction of his creed through the doctrine of evolution. He tells us that the doctrine of evolution is not inconsistent with the Christian doctrine of the creation of man. But, the only evidence he affords us for the justness

of his contention is, practically, that there is no Christian doctrine of creation, and that, therefore, being pledged to no doctrine, the Christian apologist is free to accept the evolutionary, or any other hypothesis. He tells us that the theological doctrine of special creation of man is a mere theological sprout of a couple of centuries' growth, issuing through the over-eagerness of theologians to accept the erroneous conclusions of the ill-equipped naturalists of two centuries ago.

This seems to me a proposition hard to digest by the average biblical reader. If one biblical statement is less ambiguous than another, it is the statement that God created man, in His own image, in a very special manner.

The creation of man, according to the Archdeacon, and accepting to the full what he concedes to the evolutionist regarding "sin," must involve that man has some power to oppose God by acting independently of God. But, one of the most irrefragable axioms of any rational evolutionary theory, is that no product of creation can be free in such a sense as enables it to oppose God. I need not here further insist on this point, as it is fully dealt with in other chapters of the present volume. Through this demonstration, alone, the ground is cut away from any Christian apologist who pretends to reconcile evolutionary with the theological doctrine.

Christian doctrine propounds that a man-god was miraculously born to a virgin. It is needless to say more regarding this proposition than that

evolutionary doctrine countenances no such miraculous birth.

Again, Christian doctrine propounds that the man-god, through allowing himself to be crucified, atoned to God for the "sin" God imputed to mankind through the iniquity of one particular man. But if man is determined by God, there is no more scope for an intercessor between man and God than between a cabinetmaker and his chair when it gives way under him. As the whole structure of theological Christianity rests on the foundation of "free-will," before the Archdeacon, or anybody else can make even a plausible attempt to reconcile the two thought-systems, he must obviate the fundamental contradictions involved in the theological proposition that man is a free agent, able to offend his Creator, and the evolutionary, psychological and physiological demonstration that man thinks and acts through a nervous system hereditarily determined before he emerges from the womb. So far as regards reconciliation between theology and evolution, all else is extrinsic and trivial, until these fundamental opposites are rationally obviated.

The Archdeacon has cut the knot, by repudiating by implication the doctrine of "original sin." According to the Archdeacon, man did not *fall* from an original state of righteousness, but he *rose* to a perception of unrighteousness. In other words, evolution, not a certain garden-incident, caused man to sin by transforming him from a virtual brute into a rational animal, gradually, by experiment, learning



that certain actions were good, others bad. From this standpoint, man only became answerable to God, for his "sin," so soon as he reached a certain stage of perception. Then, on this hypothesis, no man is answerable to God for "sin," who has not reached that stage of perception. It is evident that this cuts away the whole foundation of theological Christianity.

Instead of telling us that a definite act of one individual recoiled on humanity, the new doctrine of the Archdeacon sets up some arbitrary standard of a purely supposititious stage, when man attained the capacity to discriminate between certain acts. It leaves us entirely in the dark as to when the particular acts arose exciting the discrimination. Virtually, it merely tells us that, at some hypothetical period, a number of men, in deciding certain questions of expediency, established "sin." When was this epoch—whether in the age of Nebuchadnezzar, or Rameses; of Moses, or Plato; of Cæsar or Queen Victoria—whether among the Australian aborigines, or "ancient Britons"—the Archdeacon does not attempt to guess.

I leave the Archdeacon to explain the connection between such an hypothesis as the above and an atoning "Saviour." It is sufficient to point out that, according to the Archdeacon, no men require the offices of such a "saviour," except those who acquire an unknown degree of perception regarding the quality, as good or bad, of activities which, to our common knowledge and experience, are, we may say, daily changing in their character, as good or bad.

In view of his present hypothesis regarding "sin," I believe that the Archdeacon will not long be able to resist the ethical considerations I have advanced in this work. I think he will come to accept the doctrines of relative freedom and absolute determinism with their concomitants, as advanced in this work. At anyrate, I feel convinced he will discover the utter incompatibility of his present doctrine of "sin" with the doctrine of "vicarious atonement."

There can be no reconciliation between ecclesiasticism and modern thought, until ecclesiasticism frankly renounces the doctrine of free-will and all its theological concomitants. Christianity, in its dogmatic aspect, must go. If it is to survive, in any shape, it must substitute, on lines such as those laid down in this work, the doctrine of love of principle, for the doctrine of love of persons. It must expound the ethical, or spiritual, in place of the animal. It must appeal to reason rather than to emotion. To my mind, Archdeacon Wilson has cut himself adrift from his "supernatural" moorings, and may as well apply his reason, resolutely, fearlessly, with no *arrière pensée*, to putting his *whole* creed to the ordeal, as endeavour to wrap up its shell in the cotton wool of emotive timidity. He has yielded too much to evolution to logically maintain that one part, but not another, of his creed, is exempt from the influence of evolution. Three points I will again emphasize, for his consideration.

(1) Evolution is inconsistent with free-will.

(2) Theological sin is inconsistent with determinism.

(3) Vicarious atonement is meaningless if there be no theological sin.

The theological doctrine of original sin and expiation through the atonement of a man-god, with its concomitants, no doubt was essential to pre-determined evolutionary change. It came at its appointed time—as did, at theirs, numberless cults before it—and became a dominant factor in the development of humanity. Now, because it has become intellectually repulsive, it has virtually lived its life and become an abnormal excrescence, noxious to the social organism. Clerics practically recognise this. It is obvious that what is called Dissent has practically cut itself adrift from theology. What is now so much in evidence as the “Nonconformist conscience” is, in reality, but a practical avowal by the adherents of Nonconformity that theological dogma is defunct. The “voice” of the Bethels and Salems strident in the political arena, is but tacit confession by the Price Hughes’, Guinness Rogers’, *et hoc genus omne*, that, if they are not to retire into obscurity, they must busy themselves outside the nimbus of supernatural revelation. Similarly, the orthodox representative of ecclesiasticism discreetly consigns his dogma to the background, descanting instead about that beautiful but trite theme of Christian love which is ever about to overcome man’s animality, but never seems to get nearer the consummation.

There is another point of view from which to

contemplate this question of reconciliation, on the Archdeacon's lines. He very truly remarks that the theory of evolution has made all low forms of worship ultimately impossible; that the evolutionist cannot have an unworthy and childish conception of God. Now, it seems to me, as a theistic evolutionist, that there cannot be a more childish and unworthy conception of God than that which attributes to Him what we perceive as the petty passions and caprices of humanity. If there is one thing more than another from which all but the most childish and unworthy conception of God would exonerate Him, it is the sentiment of what we call vindictiveness, one of the lowest manifestations of human sentiency. Yet, if we are to accept the Christian version of God, the first thing which must strike us, as rational beings, is that God is senselessly vindictive towards helpless creatures which He has endowed, on the Christian hypothesis, with an attribute rendering them amenable to unutterably terrible possibilities; that He has designed, in a most senseless and malevolent fashion, to coerce His creatures, by imposing on their imaginations the fear of consequences which only a monster of omnipotent malevolence could devise. I maintain that it is a mockery of the most rudimentary sense of truth, to assert that such a God is merciful, loving, just. I maintain that, had men wanted to set up, as an object of worship, the most passion-blinded, fiendish entity within the conception of humanity, they could not, according to our present lights, invent a deity to

surpass, in blind passion and cruel callousness, the deity of orthodox Christianity. No amount of theological casuistry, no dialectical mystification will long preserve this deity of orthodox Christianity. It is utterly loathsome to human sentiment; utterly offensive to human reason; utterly disproved by human investigation. It must go the way of the other fetishes which humanity has outgrown in its evolutionary progress towards intellectual and moral perfectibility.

Anybody who has given attention to recent investigation of the eschatology of ancient Egypt will readily discern that there could have been no Jewish god, and corollarily, no theological doctrine of sin and its concomitants, had there been no Egyptian Pyramid Texts. The esoteric essence of the Jewish and Christian cults is in the Egyptian *Book of the Dead*. There, thousands of years before the existence of biblical canons, we find the doctrines of resurrection and salvation through the sufferings of a God. Mr. St. Chad Boscawen has just been showing, in his lectures at the British Museum, how passage after passage of the Egyptian ritual is paralleled by the Book of Revelation. With the evidences of these ancient records and of modern science before him, nobody but an intellectual fossil, or a moral eunuch, can longer pretend to mentally tolerate the deity to which lip-service is rendered by nineteen-twentieths of the inhabitants of these islands.

If truth be a matter of feeling, it must be decided by one or the other of two sorts of feeling; emotional



or rational. The question is, to which is Archdeacon Wilson going to appeal as his final court? He has appealed to rational feeling to attain truth regarding the bearing of evolution on theology, and, to a certain extent, he has sacrificed his theology in deference to evolution. Is he going to appeal to the emotional court, so soon as he finds that the rational court will not give him an agreeable verdict? If so, I fail to see the logic of his present appeal to the rational court. I think this latter appeal has disqualified him as an appellant to the emotional court. I think that, if he now abandons the rational court, he lays himself open to the charge of making an arbitrary selection to suit his own ends apart from, and inconsistently with, the pursuit of truth. This, from my standpoint, would be tantamount to laying himself open to the charge of dishonesty.

The crucial question which is now waiting the decision of Archdeacon Wilson and others in his position, is: Are they going to measure the validity of the doctrine of evolution by their reasons, or by their emotive predispositions? In other words: are they going to apply the same verifying machinery to the doctrine of evolution, in relation to theological dogma, as they apply in their common judgments of facts, or are they going to verify the relationship by ultra-rational (which is merely another way of saying irrational) sanctions?

Archdeacon Wilson avows his acceptance of the doctrine of evolution and thinks it conforms with his theology. Will he sacrifice his theology, or his

evolutionary doctrine, so soon as he finds—as find he will—that they do not accord? Is he going to be loyal to his reason, only so long as he thinks it conforms with his unreason, or emotive prejudices; or, is he going to follow his intellect wherever it may lead?

Possibly he may retort, if he answers the question, that, assuming he elects to discard evolution so soon as he finds it in conflict with theology, he will not, necessarily, be less loyal to his intellect than if he throws over his theology in order to retain his evolutionary doctrine. I shall show that such a method of following his intellect would involve an arbitrary choice, equivalent to dishonesty, just as would the method of another intellectual pretender who similarly reconciled his intellect with his predilections in order to annex another man's property. In both cases, the intellectual procedure would similarly lead to an antisocial conclusion, and, in both cases, it would be based on ultra-rational, equivalent to irrational, sanctions.

Of course, if the Archdeacon and his sympathisers like to discard evolution on such grounds, so soon as it conflicts with theology, that is their business. If they like to "die in the last ditch" after abandoning all the others to the enemy; in other words, after renouncing Hell, witchcraft, special creation, and a number of other typical theological products, at the dictation of reason, if these champions like to renounce reason for the sake of retaining free-will, vicarious atonement, immaculate conception and

resurrection, they must do so and take the consequences.

Certainly, if by Christians we are to understand such as honestly accept the doctrines of original sin and a vicarious atonement, there is little comfort for them in the doctrine of evolution. On the other hand, if, by Christians, we are to understand all who, in a hazy sort of way, accept a particular hypothetical idealist as their theoretical exemplar of conduct, while practically reserving to themselves the liberty to adopt only so much of that idealist's supposed teaching as comports with their own notions of rightful self-gratification, it does not seem to matter much whether the Christian doctrine be, or be not, reconcilable with evolutionary, or any other, rational theory. As Christianity appears to be largely composed of such folk, perhaps the ecclesiastical assurances may serve a transient purpose ; but, I do not think, under the most favourable circumstances, they can much defer the inevitable collapse. The masses are fated to lose, at the impressionable stage of youth, those influences which, for many centuries, rendered them amenable to the ultra-rational, or irrational pretensions of theologians. The modern man is nearly emancipated from the emotive impulse to unreason of his ancestors. So soon as evolution destroyed the theological proposition of Divine inspiration, by means outside the natural, of the Bible, this process of renunciation of emotive excitation began. Nothing human can, and we must assume nothing superhuman will, stop its course. Now is the advent of Rational-

ism. All the theology, all the piety, all the pleading of the Church will no longer avail to compel the masses to adopt the theological method of stultifying reason by ultra-rational sanctions. Modern humanity is destined to follow its intellect, by not sacrificing reason at the altar of emotion, even for the sake of preserving the Christian Church. Modern humanity will accept Evolution, though that Church go the way of the Babylonian, Assyrian, Egyptian and heaven knows how many other Churches. It is worse than futile, inasmuch as it is contrary to honesty, for clerics who accept the doctrine of evolution to make such statements regarding its consistency with that of Christian dogma as have been made by Archdeacon Wilson and the Rev. C. Lloyd Engström. I maintain that the honest man who accepts the doctrines of the immaculate conception and vicarious atonement must not pretend to square them with the doctrine of evolution. Either he must repudiate one or the other type of doctrine. The question here is not one of subsidiary detail. It is a question, to our apprehension, of utterly antagonistic fundamental postulates, and it is a question of fundamental principle in regard to conduct. A man cannot believe what his reason rejects. If he professes to believe what offends his intellect, that man, by offending the very root-principle on which depends all we understand as right conduct, consciously or unconsciously betrays himself and those whom he pretends to guide. I maintain that, if Christian dogma has to depend on such "reconciliation" with

the doctrine of evolution, as is averred by Archdeacon Wilson and the Rev. C. Lloyd Engström, the sooner Christian dogma is swept away the better it will be for humanity. I maintain that Archdeacon Wilson's declaration that the bearing of evolution on Christian doctrine is to modify, not the doctrine, but the form in which it is expressed, is an obvious perversion of the facts. I maintain that it is not the form, but the very essence of the Christian doctrine which is invalidated by the doctrine of evolution. I maintain that to pretend to reconcile the doctrine of vicarious atonement with the doctrine of evolution is as vain as to try to reconcile the doctrine of evolution with Hellenic mythology. I maintain that the Rev. C. Lloyd Engström's statement that the doctrine of evolution is not incompatible with Christian doctrine of the most unimpeachable orthodoxy is an insult to the understanding of anybody who has given proper attention to the question. I can better tolerate the Rev. L. W. Denman's flippancy regarding Darwin than I can tolerate the efforts of Archdeacon Wilson and the Rev. C. Lloyd Engström to make the public believe that there is no essential divergence between the doctrine of evolution and the cult which these gentlemen are professionally retained to uphold, and which propounds as its central axiom that a human unit has the power to offend Deity, by actions outside the control of Deity. I think most intelligent persons will conclude that the remarks, in this connection, most consistent with truth, made at the particular Church meeting, were those of Mr.



Denman, in his more serious mood : that the discussion which had taken place tended to weaken the faith of Christians, rather than to strengthen it.

Since the foregoing was written, the Rev. S. D. Brownjohn has protested against the appointment of the present Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Temple. The opposer was not allowed to formally lodge his protest. The grounds stated by Mr. Brownjohn for his objection to the appointment were : "that the said Dr. Frederic Temple is a self-confessed believer in the full doctrine of evolution, and because I believe acceptance of the teaching of evolution concerning the origin of man to be absolutely incompatible with fidelity to the teaching of the Book of Common Prayer and of the Articles of Religion of the Church of England, as those formularies are worded at this present date, December 19th, in the year of Our Lord, 1896." That the self-evident truths urged by Mr. Brownjohn have not stood in the way of the appointment of the highest dignitary in the Church of England is demonstration to any open-minded person who now needs demonstration, that the Church of England, as a sacrosanct institution, resting on supernatural and final revelation, is non-existent. How long it shall exist, in its present character, as a political institution and mercenary profession, will depend on how long the nation takes to find a conscience. I think we may reasonably conclude that evolution has decided for an early discovery of the national desideratum.

## CHAPTER X

### PERSONALITY FETICHISM

LOYALTY to persons is, in my opinion, destined, before long, to give place to loyalty to principle. In my opinion, to-day, loyalty to persons, involving that the individual's judgment is vitiated by the glamour of one or another commanding personality, constitutes a grave peril to this nation. When we have properly assimilated the implications of the demonstration of determinism, I surmise we shall free ourselves from the fetiches we worship as what are called great personalities. Reading some of the press comments on the late Mr. Gladstone has afforded me a vivid notion of the ease with which we could construct a new pantheon, had we not the cold douche of science to modify our zeal. I am really constrained to believe that the writers of some of the paragraphs I have read, regarding the late statesman, are either gross humbugs, or have a vague idea that a divinity has left them in the person of the great orator and politician.

What future generations may think of Gladstone,

I venture to surmise, will be something very different from what the press has recently promulgated. I will hazard the suggestion that, when future generations read our newspaper stuff written in glorification of the dead leader, those generations will be obtrusively reminded that the ages of Shakespeare, Raleigh, Drake, Cromwell, Pitt, Nelson, were of a fibre different from the age of Gladstone and the "Daily Gusher." Such mawkish idolatry as I have lately read in what purports to represent the mental and moral calibre of this nation is more appropriate to the ebullient journalism of a young ladies' seminary than to the press of a nation of MEN. In view of modern knowledge, I hold to be symptomatic of the decay of moral fibre the acceptance, without protest, by the educated public, of what has recently appeared as the tribute of self-contained men to the qualities of one who owed his virtues no more to his own intrinsic merit than the meanest vagabond owes his vices to his own intrinsic demerit. I emphatically assert that it would have better become this age had it soberly recognised that the vast majority of his contemporaries, equally deserving as was the late leader, got infinitely less self-gratification from life than did he, and that, whatever moral qualities and intellectual faculties he manifested were as fully the outcome of determinism outside his own individuality, as are the qualities and faculties which send the "found-out" rascal to the treadmill. As Archdeacon Wilson says, we sadly need religion that is an "intensely real thing." Through lack of it

we are fast becoming a nation of emasculate sentimentalists, callous cynics and purblind idolaters. We are so busy squinting at the ends of our own noses to appreciate the contour of personalities that we have become insensible to the immensities constituting God.

I surmise that, judged by the future, great orators, and what we call great personalities, will bulk very small as compared with the men through whom truth is changed for humanity. I think the future will recognise that one Darwin is of more account to humanity than are all the orators and "personalities" who have swayed England since her history began. I think the world is going to recognise that the orator, as such alone, is the man best endowed by nature to mislead his fellows, and that he is vastly more likely to prove a useful social product, muzzled than unmuzzled. Fifty years hence, I venture to surmise, there will not be much hero-worship in the world. Then, man-gods, divine or otherwise, will cease to divert our attention from the greatness of the non-human God.

So long as we make fetiches of persons, we shall take words for things, and grope instead of see. So long as orators sway us, we shall approve ourselves puppets, instead of men. Truth needs no dressing. Those who want truth, do not want to be hypnotised by personalities. The orator's day is passing away. Soon we shall inter him with the magician, prophet and man-god. We now want "character" in every man, so we want every man to seek his own truth.

Accordingly, we don't want the "character" of one man we call great, noble, sincere, to destroy the "character" of his fellows by intoxicating them, to the stage of imagination that the "great," "noble," "sincere" character, merely because it is great, noble, and sincere, is decreed by its Maker to absolve the general run of humanity from seeking truth for itself, and so attaining "character" for itself.

If a great orator expounds sounding nothings, that he is a great orator does not constitute those nothings somethings. His character, his diction, his incentives have no necessary connection with truth. Indeed, in the great majority of cases in which character and oratory sway us, they divert us from truth. If we could ensure that the orator's art was always, or mainly, exerted on behalf of truth, then, of course, he might effectively guide the multitude. However, the orator, as we now have him, is essentially a charlatan, inasmuch as his faculty is hardly ever concomitant with that of the genuine thinker. The orator is innately prone to appeal to, and be driven by, sentiment and emotion. Accordingly, I maintain that the exercise of his special faculty is inimical to the interests of society. In an analogous way, the personal influence exerted by the Christ of tradition is now prejudicial to the community. The personality of such a man as Gladstone, or of such a pretendedly divine personality as Christ, is ill-adapted to the environment which is now moulding humanity. This environment involves that personalities, *qua* personalities, as authori-



ties for specific decisions, are of no account in determining the God-decreed aim of humanity: the realisation, by conduct, of truth revealed by intellect.

I maintain that this popular outburst regarding Gladstone, like the common run of press-created ebullitions, is essentially a spurious manifestation—a product of the mere glamour of success added to longevity; of partisan wire-pulling to utilise a personality-fetich for political ends; of the hysterical sentimentalism of a number of self-hypnotised journalistic Mantalinis ready to go into raptures about the *beaux yeux* of anything or anybody offering an escape-valve for morbid emotionalism; of “shop” enterprise in exploiting whatever can be turned into vulgar “sensation.” Just as many of these press-writers, for party ends, knew no limit to epithets in vilification of the living man, so, for expedient ends, now the man is dead, they see no possibility of extravagance in eulogy. Their maxim seems to be: damn, or deify; whichever “pays.”

I believe that future generations, whatever may be their verdict regarding Gladstone, will, in the light of what these generations recognise as our knowledge, read the unmeasured clap-trap now deemed appropriate honour to the dead leader as sign of the decadence of the generation in which he died, rather than as just estimate of his achievements and calibre. Those future generations, applying our knowledge of the conditions under which human faculty is exercised, as we ourselves fail to apply that knowledge,

will perceive that though we had nominally ceased to worship brazen images, we but prostrated ourselves before the Baals of old in new dress.

The more we besot ourselves by contemplating personalities, the more we incapacitate ourselves from visualising principle, and so invite the social collapse which will surely occur unless principle dominates us early enough to avert cataclysmic readjustment. I maintain that, in these days, personal example is an infinitely trivial modifying influence on general character, as compared with conviction derived from intellectual verification of right principle. I say that no man will, in these days, become noble through the example of noble personalities. Men are now too astute and cynical to be influenced by example. Gladstone's personality, assuming it to have been as depicted by his worshippers, will not turn one slippery politician from his route. Nothing but belief will, in these days, modify the sensual lusts of humanity. The less resolutely we fix our gaze on personalities, and the more resolutely we fix it on principle, the better able we shall be to attain belief.

Conduct is, nowadays, conditioned either by external compulsion, or by belief. Emotive appeal, however it may transiently stir the individual, has no real effect on conduct : circumstances running counter to such appeal always nullify it. If the circumstances are resisted, as incentive, nothing but external compulsion, involving fear of consequences as the result of yielding to the circumstances ; or, on the other hand, belief, involving self-subjection to prin-

ciple, will ensure the resistance. An emotionally noble exemplar imposes neither compulsion nor belief. If such a man's nobility has not "paid," leaving him obscure and impoverished, his fellows covertly jeer at him, even though they overtly extol him. If such a man's nobility *has* "paid," so that he becomes a "personality," his fellows extol him, but are sceptical as to nobility "paying" in their own case. Accordingly, their admiration of the successful Simon Pure does not involve imitation.

True nobility is only possible through belief imposing right principle, and volition exercised conformably with the belief. So far as Gladstone acted according to belief involving right principle, he was noble. If Gladstone acted according to emotional impulse, he did not act according to belief, but, according to his likes and dislikes: in other words, according to his animal predispositions. However well-meaning and well-appreciated a man may be who, acting through such predispositions, is what is conventionally called virtuous, he cannot be really noble, inasmuch as he merely mechanically follows the line of least resistance in manifesting what we call his virtues. If one man's inclinations lead him to what we call virtue, while another man's inclinations lead him to what we call vice, the inclinations of one or the other, *qua* inclinations, are insignificant in deciding nobility, or debasement.

When we imply that the emotionally (by innate predisposition), virtuous man is noble, but that the emotionally (by innate predisposition) vicious man is

ignoble, we make things mighty easy for the former, and mighty difficult for the latter. We virtually say to the emotionally virtuous man : let your likes and dislikes have free fling ; be a voluptuary ! But, to the emotionally vicious man, we say : mortify your likes and dislikes ; be a martyr ! Before we decide who is noble—the emotionally virtuous, or the emotionally vicious man—we must have fair competition : no penalties or rewards for mere likes and dislikes. We must apply a standard outside the accident of innate preferences. We must compel the emotionally virtuous, equally with the emotionally vicious man, to curb his likes and dislikes. Then, the one who fails to reach the standard is ignoble, even though he be a Gladstone in prominence, and the one who reaches the standard is noble, even though he live in a doss-house !

However we may admire the emotionally virtuous man, we are no more justified in imputing intrinsic merit to him on account of his virtue, than we are justified in imputing intrinsic merit to a woman, merely because she happens to be beautiful. Under such circumstances, the man's volition (as distinct from mere impulse born of emotional predisposition) has as little to do with his virtue, as a woman's volition has to do with her beauty. Before what we call virtue can involve personal merit, the virtue must be a *moral* product. Only when intellect conditions action by, as it were, eliminating the incentive of mere hereditary predisposition, and affording an impersonal, universal criterion of decision, does action

really involve virtue or its opposite. If a man is only emotionally virtuous, whatever name we apply to his action, it can involve no *personal merit, or demerit*. If virtue and vice are to have significance as distinctive terms, we must demonstrate personal merit as corollary of virtue, and personal demerit as corollary of vice. Therefore, virtue and vice as we commonly apply the terms imply fallacy, because they involve no proper standard of morality and attribute morality or immorality where neither exists. Of course, as "practical" folk, we are at present, superior to mere scientific demonstration. However vital may be the consideration of incentive, we do not bother ourselves about it. All we require to constitute saints are human machines set going in one way ; all we require to constitute rogues are human machines set going in another way. This nonchalant classification will have to go. Even "practical" people must ultimately surrender to scientific demonstration. Now that we can measure human character much as we can measure the temperature of a poker, we shall have to recognise that a number of our saints are essentially but so many villains spelt differently !

In view of the fact that the very existence of society may now be said to depend on the judgment of a majority, exercised conformably with intellectual determination of right, it is manifest that the less the public is impressed by personalities, the sooner it will attain the essential of independence of judgment. Accordingly, platform and pulpit oratory should be discountenanced by the press and public, and prin-



ciples should be set before the public in print, and advocated on such intellectual lines as will prevent the public from confounding extrinsics with essentials. Assuming that journalism becomes transmuted into the machinery of laying bare to the public the essentials of issues and advocating views on a basis of intellectual honesty, then the press will, indeed, be a mighty factor for good. Then we shall have no *Morning Posts* to sneer at "abstract justice"; no "rags" to disguise the stink of political corruption by the stink of literary trickery. Then we shall have an honest press. Then, there will be as much virtuous indignation of the "respectable" press at what now passes current as honest journalism, as we see manifested by certain immaculate organs at the methods of the financial Hooley-sucker.

From this standpoint it would obviously advantage the community were politicians debarred from dealing orally with important national concerns, but were compelled to formulate their views in writing, so far as these views were communicated to the public. Oratorical wiles are essentially opposed to the attainment of proper judgments, through importing sentiment and emotion into issues which should be decided solely by intellect. A great orator, as politician, is vastly more likely to imperil than to advance the interests of society, inasmuch as the mere fact that he is an orator implies the probability that he is more prone to apply emotion than intellect in his judgments, and will impel the public to yield to his own incentive. This applies also to personal character, so

far as it is accepted as guarantee for right decision. What we call an honest, pure party-leader may, quite conceivably, do his society infinite harm by imposing his assumed probity as credentials for the intellectual validity of his decisions. What a rational society immediately requires from its governors, *qua* governors, is not reputation for high character or oratorical ability, but the ability to decide specific issues according to intellectually valid premises and inferences. Of course, this involves that any governor who so decides issues shall perforce, in regard to those issues, be honest. As between himself, as governor, and the rational society, that is all such society demands from the governor. On the other hand, when such a society deals with the *character* of the governor, he then, of course, comes into the category of the governed, and, if he is a rogue, will get suitable treatment. But, I surmise, when orators are denied the exercise of their special ability there will be comparatively few rogues among politicians.

We do not now need personalities to hypnotize us. What we want is *conviction to rule us*. A saintly personality, through his saintliness, is as little likely to afford us conviction as is a rascal through his rascality. If a Jabez Balfour, or a W. E. Gladstone, tells us what is true, or untrue, does not affect the quality of the information. That a great orator tells us falsity does not render it less falsity than if Tom, Dick, or Harry tell us it. If we accept falsity from an orator of grand personality, or from a nonentity, is the same thing, so far as we are con-

cerned. If we go to watch a conjurer, we go with the knowledge and intention of being deceived. If we go to hear a great orator, most of us go with the intention of not being deceived. Yet, under his art, the probability is that we shall be deceived. His vocation is, as likely as not, to deceive himself and those he addresses. He has probably hypnotised himself into a prejudiced upholder of certain opinions, and he will hypnotise you, if you give him the chance. You will so vividly feel his sincerity, his intensity, his persuasiveness, his great reputation as a "personality," that you will mistake these appeals of the orator for proper credentials of his statements. Then, you will imagine he has convinced you. Really, he has prevented you from getting conviction, by preventing you from exercising the only faculty (intellect) by which you can attain conviction, and by encouraging you to exercise another faculty (emotion) which will merely drug you into acquiescence.

Still as new truths are first seen only by a few men—often only by a single man—we cannot do without propagandism. The man who advocates a new truth necessarily becomes a proselytiser, or his truth lies fallow for an indefinite period. If he is a believer, such man will fight for his truth and assail whatever opposes it. In these days of facility for publicity, society cannot afford to wait for the slow percolation of new truth, merely through its own intrinsic merit. Like the patent panacea, that truth must be advertised. The mechanism of publicity must ram that truth into the nob of the public as

that mechanism rams Dr. Ollapod's pills down the public's gullet. Now we must achieve in a year, in the way of propagating new truth, what it formerly took a century to accomplish. In these days, the seer must also be fighter—a partisan, if you like. But, between such partisanship and the blind championship of unreasoned conclusions which constitutes all conventional partisanship, the difference is of kind, not merely of degree.

I say : the more zeal the better—always with the proviso that what we are zealous about will bear the test of intellectual scrutiny. For instance, given a man who has studied the evidences for supreme determinism, and who has logically thought out the bearing of those evidences on social and individual conduct, I am ready to welcome that man as a proselytising orator or writer. The harder he hits his opponents, the better that man will serve his age. Though it will be *best* that his hearers examine evidences for themselves instead of taking them on trust from the champion, it will, on the other hand, be *better* that his hearers take his truth on trust than that they retain their old fallacies.

The case is radically different when oratory or partisan writing is applied to thrusting mere *opinions* on the public. The opinion—as distinct from demonstration—of one man, is no better than that of another man. Take the “Home Rule” question about which the Liberal party, under Gladstone's hypnotism, went mad a few years ago. Was this agitation based on anything approaching scientific

investigation? I think hardly anybody capable of forming a just estimate of the circumstances will now pretend that Gladstone's infection of his followers involved any better incentive than his personal prepossessions and the prospect of a successful party-move. If there were anything approaching intellectual conviction involved in the matter, why is the Liberal party about to drop—in fact, why has it virtually dropped—this foremost demand of the Gladstonian regime? Again, why are certain press-organs and prominent members of the Liberal party now rabid about what they call social legislation? Is it because they have suddenly become zealots for principle, or because they think sops to the masses will “dish” the Socialists and rehabilitate a disintegrated party? Again, why does a certain eminent politician wax indignant against Roman ceremony in Protestant churches? Is it because he is intellectually convinced that “low” church is true religion; “high” church, false; or because he reckons on the attraction of “no Popery” as a party appeal to some millions of “nobs” that know little more about the genesis of what they call their religion than a cat knows about trigonometry.

The orator is out of place when his tricks are applied to advancing mere opinion. All political oratory, as now existing, is so applied. Here, no *demonstrations* are championed. Here, the appeal is to sympathies, apart from intellect. Every orator, or partisan writer, appeals to emotion. Unless he appeals to emotion on behalf of intellectual demon-



stration, his appeal will deceive instead of guide. If an orator uses his art to enlist his hearers against a theological system built on the assumption of free-will, that orator necessarily bases his appeal on the demonstration of science. The emotion he then wins from his hearers, in favour of what he propounds is, as it were, ejected from a nucleus of intellectual demonstration. Therefore, let him be zealous as he may, he can only achieve good. But, if another orator advocates, say, war with Turkey, and, likely enough, with the most powerful military despotisms in the world, in order to enforce his own notions of what constitutes national morality, that orator exerts his art on behalf of opinions, not of demonstrations. Then, the emotion he wins for his opinions, as such alone, has no intellectual authentication, and he, as orator, is enemy of his society.

As we have virtually no orators who are also scientific thinkers ; as all political oratory deals with opinions, not with demonstrations, I say : the sooner political oratory is stopped the better for this nation. The wiles of oratory, under such circumstances, can merely render more elusive the clues to whatever truth may underlie the particular opinions advocated. The assumption on which we act, in politics, is that the public shall be the ultimate judge of opinions. Gesture, eloquence, theatrical make-believe of sincerity, or even sincerity itself—all the tricks of the orator—merely serve to turn the public away from scrutiny of essential issues by appealing to the eyes and ears instead of to the intellect. Accordingly, I

repeat : politicians should be compelled to formulate their views, as literature, not as oratory. Then, the public would be able to form its own opinion, undisturbed by the aberration induced by personality. Then would be eliminated the mountebank element in those who pretend to be political beacons, and no frippery would impose on the public the political fool as mentor.

An illustration of this point I am now emphasising is to hand as I write these lines. In noticing an article in the *Nineteenth Century*, the *Daily Chronicle* of June 1st, 1898, quotes the following : "A great personage and violent political adversary of his (Gladstone's) once said to me : 'I have just been meeting Mr. Gladstone at dinner, and I assure you that the magnetism of the man is such that whatever he'd told me to say or do I'd have done it. If he had told me to go out into the street and stand on my head, I'd have done it.'" This "magnetism of the man" it is which renders the political orator as dangerous as is a loaded revolver in the hands of a child. The public, like this "great personage" referred to by the writer of the article, is ready to stand on its head at the bidding of personal magnetism, and personal magnetism is quite ready to seduce the public into such inanity. We shall see how Mr. Gladstone's personal magnetism was likely to work, if we read, in connection with the above quotation, another from a different source. Mr. H. D. Traill writes of the dead leader : "Mr. Gladstone's studies in this branch of learning" (Homeric literature)

“ may, excusably enough, perhaps remind more erudite scholars of the famous description of another distinguished amateur, as ‘ a wit among lords, and a lord among wits.’ It is, no doubt, true that only ‘ among statesmen ’ could he be accounted a Homeric scholar, and that, in the company of such scholars, he would at once sink to the level of a statesman who took an intelligent interest in Homeric scholarship. Indeed, it is not unfair to say of him—what possibly could be said of most men of his intellectual versatility—that his reputation for omniscience reposed largely on the certificates of experts who made exception of their own special subjects. Theologians who thought lightly of his theology were impressed by the amplitude and accuracy of his scholarship ; scholars who demurred from this attribution were, on the other hand, eager to testify to his theological acquirements, while both united to find a value in his occasional excursions into the philosophy of politics which the historian and political philosopher failed to discern. Like the mysterious assassin in Edgar Poe’s grim story of ‘ The Murder in the Rue Morgue,’ he spoke on all these subjects in a language which none of his hearers recognised as their own, but which each of them confidently pronounced to be the native tongue of somebody else.”

Why should the public allow itself to be gulled by personal magnetism? In what respect is a Gladstone’s fallibility so different from the fallibility of other men that his personal magnetism should be accepted as credentials for his right leadership?

What conceivably accurate guidance exists, for national concerns, other than the guidance of logical inference from intellectually verified premises? Why should the "wit among lords, and lord among wits" be permitted to juggle with national concerns by applying personal magnetism to work that should be effected by intellect? I say: the political orator, as such alone, is a pernicious quack and should be treated as such.

In my opinion, such a man as Gladstone could be considered great only among people that had not learned to apprehend the significance of intellectual truth. He is great to this nation because, at present, the nation is only emerging from the final emotional stage of evolution. When intellectualism is established, as in my opinion cannot long be deferred, the "greatest man of the century" will have many steps less to his pedestal. I think, for the future and this country, Gladstone will be the last supremely dominant personality motived by emotion. All his political inconsistencies and reversals were attributable to his excessive emotional bend. The following comments by an American writer, E. M. Macdonald, illustrate the instability which characterised Gladstone, and which must ever characterise the judgments of those in whom emotion usurps the proper function of intellect. "Americans accept the judgment of their English brethren that the late William Ewart Gladstone was a great man. This course is easier than to demonstrate the proposition by reference to the record. From the public

sketches of his life, we find that Mr. Gladstone early inclined to the Church, and that except for the intervention of his father, he would have taken holy orders. He began his public career as an advocate of slavery, which he justified by scriptural precedent. He believed in the union of Church and State, and insisted on the importance of religion in public affairs. As an author, his first work was 'The State in its Relations with the Church,' in which he took the position that every State must have a conscience, and that this conscience was afforded by a State-religion. He then maintained that it was against the spiritual interests of Catholic Ireland to disestablish the English Church in that country. As is well known, he afterwards took an opposite view. In 1847, he opposed the measure making marriage with a deceased wife's sister lawful. At the same time he proposed the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Pope of Rome. Ten years later, he worked tooth and nail against Lord Palmerston's Divorce Bill. In his view, marriage was a sacrament to be dissolved only by Parliament acting in its ecclesiastical capacity. At the time of our civil war, he took the side of Jefferson Davis, who, he declared, 'had made an army, had made a navy, and, more than that, had made a nation.' When the Union won, Gladstone changed his opinion. About twenty-five years ago, Mr. Gladstone published his celebrated pamphlet attacking the Catholic Church in a way it has not been assailed by any other writer of note in the nineteenth century; but persons of the shortest



memory will recall his efforts at a union of Christendom, made within the past year or two, with a view to securing papal acknowledgment of the validity of Anglican orders. Associated for years, in office and out, with a 'nobleman' whose private life was a public scandal, he drove Parnell from his side because the latter had been named as co-respondent in a divorce suit. A champion of religious liberty for Catholics, he allowed Freethinkers to go to jail and serve their sentences for blasphemy. He was a mediæval theologian, and gravely defended doctrines that were exploded before he was born. His work on the 'Impregnable Rock of Holy Scripture' parallels the efforts of the senile and demented Sir Isaac Newton to unravel the prophecies of Daniel, or of Sir Christopher Wren to demonstrate from an architectural point of view how the blind Samson, by the removal of two pillars, could bring down a house large enough to accommodate an audience of three thousand persons on its roof. As an orator, Mr. Gladstone is said to have been effective, albeit at the close of his speeches few who heard them knew what they meant, while those who read verbatim reports of his remarks were just as much in the dark. We enjoyed his acquaintance this side the Atlantic through his writings, which are neither luminous nor instructive. While in advance of his class politically, he was a laggard in the more important matter of modern rationalistic thought; and, even on questions of political reform, he was anticipated by one who found it difficult to speak of his

religious performances 'without a sense of humorous humiliation.' ”

My own measurement of Gladstone may be thus concisely put : He was, by hereditary predisposition and habit, a theological mystic. He had no doubt of the validity of ecclesiastical authority, because he had no incentive to test it by any other authority. His subjection did not involve conviction, but self-intoxication by words, forms and precedent. He used his intellect, not to attain belief, but to reconcile with his emotional prepossessions whatever obtruded itself against them. He had no serviceable acquaintance with science, so his attempted reconciliation of theology with intellectual demonstration virtually excluded any exact criterion and resolved itself into futile casuistry. He applied his theological method to politics and statesmanship, with the result that one part of his parliamentary life was devoted to contradicting another. Emotion being his prime motor, he was, politically, the creature of whatever expediency promised most gratification to his personal inclinations. Having no impersonal criteria of truth, he, politically, followed the line of least resistance to his own prepossessions, deluding himself and others, by sophistry, that his self-gratification was equivalent to the intellectual rightness of what he sought to accomplish. That his emotional intensity, undisciplined by science, involved a spurious form of sincerity, was a standing menace to the nation he controlled, while it was also the great factor ensuring him the devotion of a following prone to confound

sincerity born of emotion and insensibility to exact standards, with sincerity born of intellectual judgment applied to such standards, and corollarily prone to lose sight of principle through the glamour of personality. In a word, Gladstone was a great man for little men.

Gladstone was a great hypnotist. So long as men are not hypnotised by their own intellects, they will be the puppets of zealots. If these zealots happen to be intellectualists, they will probably use their hypnotic powers for the advancement of the general weal. If they happen to be emotionalists, their hypnotic powers will be a distinct menace to the general welfare. As I wrote in "Rhythmic Heredity" (Williams and Norgate, 1894): "How many men, but a few months ago, saw in 'Home Rule' the one vital question of the day, who, a few months still further back, treated the doctrine as a ridiculous and dangerous innovation on national integrity? We will leave our readers to decide the number of patriots who performed these chameleon-evolutions under the stimulus of Mr. Gladstone's masterly hypnotism. Every dominant spirit, whether he be a Napoleon or a school-bully, exerts over his fellows an influence perfectly analogous to that of the hypnotist over the medium." (page 268.)

If one man hypnotises a number of people in order to gratify himself by political prestige, or by enabling his sentiments to prevail over others, he is called honest; while if another man hypnotically wheedles a weak-minded, erotic old lady into

“cutting off” her kindred and making him her heir (as was recently, according to the jury’s verdict, unjustly imputed to a medical hypnotist) he is called a dangerous rascal. Well, I grant that, looked at sentimentally, there is deeper perfidy in the latter than in the former action. Still, measured as intellectual honesty or dishonesty, there is no essential difference between the two exercises of hypnotic influence. Intellectual honesty is as conspicuously absent in the one as in the other case. Only a vivid perception of, and loyalty to intellectual principle; or, external compulsion by society, will enable the hypnotist, whether he be a Gladstone or a pushing nonentity, to run “straight.”

My object is to minimise this dictatorship of a few individuals by affording standards of truth outside personal predisposition, and by inducing the average man to appeal to these standards by using his own intellect. Accordingly, I deem orators and “personalities,” as such alone, pernicious products and I would have opinions advocated coldly in print, rather than urged by the adventitious accessories of gesture, speech, and what we call personal magnetism. I want no man to be loyal to persons, if loyalty to those persons prevents the man from being loyal to his own will and so constituting that will relatively free. The only will that can be called really free, in the relative sense, is the will conditioning a man’s actions in conformity with his intellectual apprehension of truth. All other sorts of wills are the slaves either of empty conventions or of other wills. Even

though it hypnotise other wills, if a will do not hypnotise according to intellectual apprehension of truth, it is but a slave like the wills it hypnotises. Gladstone's will, though it hypnotised thousands, was as abject slave as any of them. The traditional "echo" of other wills hypnotised his will as effectively as that will hypnotised the thousands.

This all applies to loyalty to the "person" championed by Archdeacon Wilson, just as it applies to loyalty to a Pitt, Palmerston, Bright, Gladstone, Disraeli, Spurgeon, Beecher, Talmage. So long as we are driven by personalities and sound and gesture, instead of guided by our own intellect applied to intellectually established propositions, we shall get hypnotism in place of conviction. This hypnotism is what Archdeacon Wilson calls faith and loyalty to a "person," and what blinds the vast majority of Englishmen to vital issues by turning them into the partisan puppets of ambitious masterful adventurers.

Another great personality, in the conventional sense, has passed away since I wrote the foregoing. Judged by the common standards of to-day, Bismarck was a long way the greatest figure of his age. Judged by the scientific standards of the future, I surmise that he will be recognised as that age's most magnificent degenerate. He was an honest filibuster—no "moral" snivel, no oleaginous simper, no "Christian" lamb-like pose about *him* before he bludgeoned you and rifled your pockets. He was the ultimate consummation, the masterpiece, of the venerable doctrine that "success" is the only atoner. He was an



Everest among the Alps, Snowdons, Primrose-hills and dunghills which some of us look up to as old parliamentary hands, imperialist colossi, Tammany bosses, financial Jupiters, affluent and philanthropic lead and phosphorus poisoners, sweaters and exploiters. He was the loftiest pinnacle among those social elevations who manifest their pre-eminence by trampling, crushing, squeezing, sucking, cajolling, bullying the rest of humanity into adopting the useful—to the eminences—but somewhat ignominious business—for human beings—of the step-ladder and football. *Our* “greatest man of the century,” compared with this Teutonic colossus, was as a dormouse to a Norway rat or a sparrow-hawk to an eagle.

Having no intellectual criteria of right, or having them but not applying them, Bismarck was, on the former assumption, a mere emotionalist with, I should say, predisposition to what we call vice; or, on the latter assumption, he was a dishonest intellectualist: one who deliberately discards what he apprehends as right in order to accomplish what he believes to be expedient. In either case he was, in respect to the rapidly approaching, if not already present evolutionary epoch, “unfit,” and I venture to assert, his work will soon be obliterated. Already we see signs of this obliteration in the giant advance, in Germany, of the doctrines which Bismarck most loathed and most tried to frustrate. The united Germany which issued through his strong will, acute mind, and lack of moral scruple will, likely enough be the first nation to annihilate the conditions which Bismarck, perhaps

more than any of his contemporaries, exerted himself to perpetuate.

Bismarck typified the human brute : the man who does not will in deference to principle, but in deference to expediency promising the attainment of what he "likes." Any man who so wills lacks the proper interaction between soul (volition) and intellect which constitutes the "fit" or honest product of evolution. Like the Socialist who wants to upset the present dispensation because it involves what he does not "like," Bismarck made his personal preferences and antipathies the criteria of right and wrong. Accordingly, his achievement rests on quick-sand. In the following words, which I quote from the *Daily Chronicle*, of August 2nd, 1898, Bismarck reveals his life-motive as clearly as any biographer will ever reveal it. Thus, he (Bismarck) writes to his wife : "Es ist so viel Müssen in meinem Leben, dass ich selten zum Wollen komme" : (It is so much a case of Must in my life, that I seldom come to Willing). So everybody may write of himself whose "categorical imperative" is decided by emotion. So may the murderer, the garotter, the burglar, the forger, the "noble" and expensive company-director, the open-handed company-promoter, the press vestal, write of themselves. Whatever their particular objects may be, all these people, like Bismarck, discover that "fate" is their master : they do not "will" ; they only "must." If their "must" involves welding an empire out of heterogeneous principalities, or hypnotising an electorate so that its constituents become

mental and moral jelly-fish, these children of fate are called great. If their "must" involves picking pockets, they are called social vermin. I fail to see that the great child of fate who dishonestly welds an empire is essentially a different animal from the insignificant child of fate who picks pockets, and I surmise that society will soon be as unable as I am to discern much difference between the two exemplars of "must."

I fail to see why, if one man's "likes" involve dishonest empire-building, while another man's "likes" involve pocket-picking, the "likes" of the one, when he gets those "likes" realised, should secure him world-wide panegyric while the realisation of the other's likes ensures him the attentions of the prison-warder, and I think society is on the way to dealing with the one child of fate much as society deals with the other.

What evolution has doomed must "die the death." Bismarcks, like the conditions that produce them and which they seek to perpetuate, are doomed by evolution. Civilisation will, I venture to assert, never see another Bismarck the Grand—not because the mental calibre and emotive intensity characterising the dead dictator may not be duplicated, but because evolution has destroyed the environment involving the exercise of such capacities and predispositions, as Bismarck exercised them. Evolution has signed the death-warrant of successful and immoral patriotism, as evolution has signed the death-warrant of successful and immoral religion, or commercialism. Evolution

now says : principle before country ; principle as religion. Those who now try to exemplify the patriotism, or the religion inconsistent with principle, may assure themselves the " game is not worth the candle."

Successful Bismarcks will now need to accomplish their ideals according to the rule of intellectual right. Whether these Bismarcks be emotionally virtuous or vicious, they will need, so far as regards their public actions, to be honest. Their zeal to render their country mighty will be appreciated so long as that zeal is exemplified according to the rules of the moral " ring." For them, the end that sanctions the means must be an end that does not involve ignoring God's right. Just as the ordinary man who has the laudable ambition to earn three meals a day must not earn them by surreptitiously emptying his neighbour's cash-box, so the coming Bismarck must not manifest his patriotism by the means of the Hooleyian company-promoter, or footpad.

If I bag my game by shooting, whether I bag an elephant or a rabbit is pretty much the same thing so far as regards the method. Similarly, whether I weld an empire or pick a pocket, is not of much consequence, so far as regards principle. Not *what* I do, but *how* I do is the great consideration. Empires, equally with filled or emptied " fobs," are now to evolution *minutiæ*, in comparison with principle. And evolution—depend upon it—" rules the roast." Whether they be Bismarcks of the types of the dead hero himself ; of the organiser of raids under medical superintendence and the auspices of land-syndicates ;

of the blackmailed victim who transfers a few odd millions from the pockets of confiding dividend-hunters to his own "fob" and the "fobs" of sundry "noble" and ignoble perquisite-hunters—whether they be any of these sorts of Bismarcks, evolution has done with them, as it has done with the dodo. Now: enter the new type of Bismarck—the man whose ideal and method of attaining it are equally laudable! Now: enter the Bismarck with no ideal that cannot be attained honestly!

All modern societies, which flatter themselves that they have cast off the despot and become free, have merely adopted another despot in place of the "heaven-sent" monarch. We, of this great and glorious country, are at present, enslaved by the despotism of talk. The man of fluent tongue, of lack of convictions, except regarding the necessity of accomplishing his personal aggrandisement; of easy or no principle, is he, *par excellence*, to whom this nation deutes its destinies. The cunning, shifty trickster, at whom we all look askance—when he is "found out"—in private life, is now our "heaven-sent" substitute for the other "heaven-sent" product. He is the exemplification of the political virtues. He is our Cæsar. Let him, in addition to those other essentials of Party-fitness, be imbued with the theological virus of emotive unreason, and lead that "strictly moral" life so dear to villadom, he becomes a party's demi-god. Partisan-worship then develops into a kind of mania, and the demi-god rides the whirlwind. His worshippers do not trouble to measure his specific activities



by the common standard of consistency they apply among themselves. That would be dishonouring the Mumbo Jumbo, before whom the conventicle decrees prostration. Great is then the elect of the Philistines. His blunders are deadened by his thunders ; the mob is hypnotised.

Party-government means the mob's power to select its despot. The mob flatters itself it governs. It carries the hod, and, in carrying the hod, the mob fulfils its present proper function. The mischief is that social conditions do not enable the mob to carry the hod for those who will repay it for the portage. It mainly carries the hod for people whose object is to befool it, instead of to earn their positions as outside the function of hod-carrying. It does this because social conditions at present involve that the measures for the office of despot are tongue and, to adopt a mild term, adaptability, instead of intellect and honesty.

The survival of the social "fittest" to-day, means the survival of the most cunning and unscrupulous. The political despot is merely a product of his conditions. Alter these, the despot will alter. When Party-government goes to the wall, as go it will, sooner than many imagine, we shall still be governed by despots who may possibly hanker as strongly for personal aggrandisement as do the present patterns. However, the would-be despot, in the coming days, will need to be a fool if he tries for personal aggrandisement through any other means than his own honest effort to benefit the community. The game

of politics will then be worth playing by men who hold convictions, and are honest enough to stand or fall by them. Then, the mob will save our Leckys the trouble of prognosticating about popular incompetence, by deputing to the despots themselves the selection of despots. It will then be so expensive a luxury to act the trickster, that the most ambitious would-be despot will hesitate to exert his abilities in that direction. Activities are conditioned by circumstances. Circumstances are going to produce social despots whose activities will best benefit themselves when they best benefit the mob. Then, our aristocrats and autocrats will be useful, rather than azurely sanguineous, and the greatest will be the best servant of the least.

The average man is Tory, or Radical; Churchman, or Dissenter; Materialist, Spiritualist, not so much through innate predisposition as through the pressures of the media through which he is habituated to view contingencies. The average Tory, or Churchman, given the necessary social atmosphere, would make as good a Radical, or Atheist. The ruck of mankind is as plastic to its surroundings as is the wet clay to the potter's manipulation. Only an infinitesimal minority of humanity is so constituted as to offer effective opposition to its surroundings. Of such minority are the people who move the world and whom the world often rewards with martyrdom. First, the world gibbets, then, apotheosises the people whose souls are too stable to be moulded to the conventional pattern, and yet are so responsive to the

mind-environment or god-soul, as to fashion future conventionality. The average man does not get his personal *timbre* from these exceptionally stable yet responsive types. He gets it from a type which, like himself, is plastic to circumstances, though, unlike himself, is endowed with such intensity of soul-energy as enables this sub-dominant type to impress, by hypnotic suggestion, its own special product of plasticity on the more plastic, or unstable type represented by him, the average man. Pre-éminent among these comparatively stable "hypnotists" are the agile politicians and clerics who cram the masses with the virtues of various shibboleths and divide those masses into faithful Radicals, Tories, Churchmen, Dissenters, "*antis*" in respect to this, "*pros*" in respect to that, particular subject of popular concern.

I am inclined to believe that the average personality is not far removed from that of the perturbed inmate of the Salpêtrière, in respect to responsiveness to hypnotic suggestion by circumstances and persons. Yet, that average personality delights in strutting about with "free and independent" emblazoned on its banner! Like the Bedlamite "emperor," that average personality constructs its world out of its hallucinations and illusions and fails to perceive the fact. Were the average personality not thus dependent on outside influence for its character, the editorial "we" would be a superfluity and "grand old" men would find no hypnotic work to do! The average personality would then do its own thinking and feeling, instead of employing deputies to shape its

own pattern. The average personality would then be born. At present, it is made by an army of hypnotists and their lackeys, the editorial "we-s." Before the "we-s" came into existence, the hypnotists did the work, alone. Now, the "we-s" are almost as indispensable for the formative business as are the hypnotists themselves.

A day or two ago I was chatting with a certain borough surveyor, essentially what is commonly termed a practical man. He asked me if I knew a locally popular Non-conformist minister. I replied that I knew the reverend gentleman well by repute and by reading his effusions in the local press, wherein his discourses about "pocket editions of Hell," the "accursed traffic in drink," and cognate subjects constituted a prominent feature. I told my friend that these effusions had not inspired me with a high regard for the intellectual status of their author. "Ah, but," said my friend, "have you heard him preach?" I had to own to lacking this advantage. "Then," said my friend, "you don't know the man." I suggested, that, possibly, I might know the reverend gentleman all the better for reading and not hearing him. My friend incontinently rejected the suggestion. "You must hear him; reading him is nothing," he urged. "You must realise the earnestness of the man, the force of his personal magnetism, his oratorical energy." I replied that I was not much concerned about the reverend gentleman's personality; that, if I wanted to be intoxicated I could satisfy myself at home, or at one of the numerous hotels near the

reverend gentleman's chapel ; or, if I wanted to be tickled to laughter or moved to tears, I could go the theatre or music-hall. So far as the reverend gentleman was concerned, I told my friend, I only wanted to know whether what he propounded was intellectually acceptable, and that in estimating this, my judgment would be merely warped by the reverend gentleman's oratorical accomplishments, personal magnetism and sincerity. I suggested that, as the reverend gentleman's business was to expound religion, his prime requirement, in my eyes, was the ability to render religion tolerable to the intellect of his congregation, and that, as the reverend gentleman's own intellect was, to my apprehension, obviously in need of repair, I should defer, *sine die*, the opportunity of hearing him demonstrate, in the pulpit, what he had already demonstrated in print.

My friend, the surveyor, is typical of the conventional religionist. What he wants, as religion, is not belief, but vulgar "sensation." If I asked my friend to accept, as authority about land-surveying, the personal magnetism, sincerity and what-not of a clod-hopper who could not multiply two by four, my friend would likely enough tell me I was an ass. Because I scout the authority of a theatrical ignoramus who presumes to expound religious truth, my friend implies that I am an ass. My friend the borough surveyor is a busy man. What with his official duties, reading the papers and listening to his pet Boanerges, he will probably lack leisure to study *Heresies*. For him and his like, we, who are trying to render



religion credible must wait. The tide will have to permeate other strata before it reaches people who measure truth by leather lungs, acrobatic energy and gaseous rhetoric. In the meantime, I have forwarded my friend the *Agnostic Journal* for October 23rd, 1897, and underlined the following tit-bit from Saladin's "At Random." "When the old lady waxed eulogistically eloquent on the peroration of her favourite soul-saver and exclaimed 'Oh, wasn't he gran', wasn't he gran'?' was asked, 'But did you understand him?' her spontaneous reply was, 'Wad I hae the presumption? But wasn't he gran' when he focht himsel' fairly out o' breath and held his han's owre his heid and glowered awfu' and cried Hoich! Hoich! Hoich!'" I am sanguine enough to expect that even my friend, the surveyor, will eventually emerge from the "hoich!" stage of religious evolution and will come to demand something different, as a heavenly beacon, to the "hoich!" pulpiteer. In the political and sociological spheres, also, I surmise that the days of "hoich's" supremacy are numbered.

The views expressed in this chapter were published in a Rationalist magazine, about two years ago. In closing the chapter, the reader may be interested if I quote from a speech delivered by the Bishop of London, at the Liverpool Athenaeum, in the month of December, 1898. He said: "The great spread of education accounted to some extent for a certain state of things. Enough education had been given to remove the impression of ignorance. There was, perhaps, not enough at present to give any real know-

ledge. This was a stage in human progress which was inevitable. They had got rid of the natural ignorance which, however, had its advantages as well as disadvantages. One of its advantages was that while ignorance prevailed, and a man did not know about a subject, he did not say anything about it. But the disadvantage of cultivated ignorance was that in proportion as a man knew little about a subject, he said a great deal about it. That was a phenomenon which at the present day they had to face. *There was an increased importance given now to speaking. Utterance was doubtless a valuable thing, but it was merely valuable for what was said, and not for the mode of saying it. Any system which perfected the art of saying nothing, and substituted it for the habit of stammering through something, was not a distinct gain.*" (Italics mine).

## CHAPTER XI

### THE PRESS

WE Britons point with pride to our newspaper press as emblem of our emancipation from the despot's terrorism. To me, it seems that the newspaper press may claim to be the emblem of the newest form of despotism, and one eminent journalist, Mr. J. F. Nisbet, writes: "The leadership of men is passing from the public orator to the newspaper scribe—from the statesman to the editor, and if only because the editor is chosen for other reasons than his statesman-like capacity, and is swayed by obscure and perhaps unavowable motives, I cannot affect to regard the change as one for the better. It tends to import into the management of public affairs a degree of passion, impulse, headstrongness, and, I am afraid I must add, ignorance and irresponsibility previously unknown. Why, actually I see a London daily of great circulation advocating our going to war with Spain for the *beaux yeux* of the United States. The same paper would have had us go to war with Turkey the other day, and with every other Power that then

stood behind Turkey for the sake of those vain-glorious Greeks. Was there ever such folly advocated outside the columns of a newspaper? Yet these are our leaders nowadays. It is such feather-brained advisers who are plunging two countries into a war fraught with unknown possibilities which to them are nothing compared with a fever of public excitement and an inflated circulation."

Under intellectual conditions, there would certainly be no such license as now enables unqualified people to ventilate their opinions, as journalists. Then, we should no more tolerate the quack-publicist than we now tolerate the quack-doctor. Any man who had the present editorial facilities for imposing opinions on the public, and who thereby misled the public, ventilating spurious premises and inferences with regard to great social questions, would, under intellectual conditions, court penalties similar to those imposed on the quack who killed his patient by wrong prescriptions. Under intellectual conditions, every editor who presumed to decide, for the masses, great social issues, would need, at his peril for failure, to advocate his cause from an intellectual basis. Accordingly, it would then no more be possible for such an editor to play on the mob by spurious appeals, than it is now possible for the medical quack to blunder with impunity, in prescribing for those who resort to him.

Every great social issue being amenable to exact intellectual scrutiny, were an editor, as is now a common event, to foment popular excitement about

any important issue demanding expert treatment, and of which the editor's treatment was manifestly inconsistent with intellectual honesty, he would, under intellectual conditions, be held criminally responsible. It would then be recognised that, for an unqualified person calling himself editor, to mislead the public, was at least as injurious to the community as is the killing here and there of an individual by another such pretender. We now recognise that there are enough fools in the world to call for legislation against medical quacks. Under intellectual conditions, we shall recognise that the supply of fools renders advisable similar legislation against journalistic quacks.

Of course, under present conditions, involving that the state means virtually a governing minority motivated by emotion—in other words, by dishonesty—a restricted press would merely mean the suppression of opinion obnoxious to the prepossessions of the particular section that happened to be uppermost. We see, in the case of the continental press, what this means, and naturally we prefer our own system. But, the circumstances would be entirely different were the State the representative of intellectual honesty. Then, the only State-restriction on the journalist would be the requirement that he should advocate with such specialistic ability as is demanded from the medical practitioner in prescribing. What, at present is called the liberty of the press, is license to pander to any passing caprice, or to work up any excitement seeming to offer partisan, and corollarily commercial, advantage, quite irrespectively of the intellectual validity of what



is advocated. Such appeals to the prejudice and ignorance of the million inevitably produce the contagions of excitement, of which we had the latest instance in the United States, and another a few months earlier in this country, when we were within an ace of starting a European conflagration, on behalf of what Mr. Nisbet calls the "*beaux yeux*" of a nation then taken under the wing of a certain "largest circulation." Given zeal, money, and rhetoric, nothing is easier, as regards this country, than to fan the million to a white heat of frenzy on behalf of any cause the support of which flatters the national idea of "moral" superiority, while affording the average man no great concern on account of his personal, material interests. So long as you respect his "pocket," the average Briton is in a chronic state of "half-cock" on behalf of what he calls religion and morality. With this national trigger "largest circulations" play, to the menace of international relations and the peril of the nation.

It is a greater social crime to poison the individual's mind with quack doctrine, than to poison the individual's body with quack potions. I am all for an *Index Expurgatorius* so soon as the authority that expurgates is an intellectual one. When nineteen out of twenty men imbibe opinions much as an infant imbibes milk, I cannot share the general admiration of freedom of opinion, unless the opinion be treasured as too precious to publish. On the other hand, when ninety-nine out of a hundred men are, consciously or unconsciously, intellectually dis-

honest, it is, perhaps, of no vital consequence how many, or how few of them have the liberty to swagger as oracles. Whether one or another fallacy crows loudest is not perhaps of much consequence.

It is sometimes a wise father who knows his own child. I surmise that, had the average man, under present conditions of mental flabbiness, to logically establish the identity of what he calls his opinions, he would convince even himself that those opinions were no more his own than his next-door neighbour's, or than any one's of a thousand of his neighbours. He would probably discover that the opinions which he called his own were administered to him by the particular partisan "daily" which a fortuitous concomitance of circumstances had fated him to accept as his mental Whiteley. Then, the average man might possibly tolerate some authority competent to analyse and certify the genuineness of the mental commodities which he had to purchase from his universal provider. However, the misfortune, from my standpoint, is that the average man has a holy horror of examining his opinions. Once he gets them, he no more thinks of changing them than of changing his wife, or of cutting off his fingers. Certainly, he will need a lot of drubbing before he awakes to the possibility that freedom of opinion may not be an unalloyed blessing.

Principle, not men, is to be the coming dictator. Intellect, not individual impulse, is going to fashion our national destiny. Whether we fall, as a nation, through the change; or whether we rise to further

national importance, is really insignificant consideration in comparison with the great evolutionary inevitability : the victory of intellectual Right. In the face of the stupendous revelations of modern science, and what they intellectually involve, the rhetorical ebullition of what calls itself the patriotic press is as the gibbering of monkeys. We "men of to-morrow and the day after" contemplate these "patriots" much as we contemplate the hierarchy of the Established (temporarily) Church of England. We commiserate these "patriots" as coming under Archdeacon Wilson's category of "men of the past." When these "patriots," inflated with the gas of "national prestige," "imperial interests," and so on, *ad nauseam*, imply that devotion to justice will involve England's downfall, we "men of to-morrow" say : so much the worse for the national "coo !" Justice, like railways, must come, whatever happens to "coos," national or quadrupedal. To these opportunist moles, these hireling cynics, these arm-chair fire-eaters, these "imperial expansionists," we "men of to-morrow" say : try a little *personal* expansion : see if you can expand mannikins into Men : divert your gaze from the petty personal to the sublime objective : cease squinting at personalities : look straight at principle and GOD ! We "men of to-morrow" say to these "patriotic" squinters : cease your babble about the "struggle for life" and "survival of the fittest" : learn what the doctrine of evolution means, before you presume to apply it ; learn that the "fittest"—nationally and

individually—is not necessarily equivalent to the sow that gets her snout deepest into the swill-trough: learn that the “Union Jack,” bad whisky, syphilis, calicoes, and bibles in every corner of the globe, and “potter’s rot,” “phossy jaw,” “sweating,” Manchesterism, Hooleyism, devil-take-the-honest-manism, at home, hardly constitute this nation such a “fit” product that patriotic Britons need make no effort to render it “fitter,” even though its downfall be one of the possible consequences of the effort. Say we “men of to-morrow”: if England cannot survive the advent of honesty, let England sink, and you patriots, see you die facing her executioner before she cries “surrender!”

The poet tells us where is the white man’s burden. I tell the poet that the burden is not where he locates it, but is at home under the white man’s nose, and part of that burden are the jingo poet and the jingo editor!

## CHAPTER XII

### TRUTH

A GREAT source of confusion, to those who superficially consider the function issuing in thought, is that they arbitrarily set apart, as an exceptional verifying factor, what has a claim to such exceptional position merely because it affords us a special experience issuing in a peculiar sensation which we call truth. We imagine that this "truth" is something essentially different from any other human sensation. Granted that, as sensation, it is different from all other sensations, this does not involve that truth is *not* sensation: that it is not a product of functional response to external excitation, just as is pain from a wound. Truth is but one of the multitude of sensations we derive from our vitalised body. Our brain can *absolutely* decide no more than can our stomach. Between truth, as our nervous system reveals it through thought, and "truth," as that system reveals it through, say, dyspepsia, we can postulate no *absolute* difference. Whatever difference we experience between the two is the product of our physical limita-



tions. That God has decreed us to attain one experience through one functional activity, another through another activity, should not cause us to baffle ourselves by vain imaginings. Of course, that we have the imaginings, involves that God has decreed them. However, as we are now able to discard them, God has decreed that we shall do so.

One proof, that truth is merely sensation, is that it is continuously changing according to the change in our surroundings. Our truth is not that of the Assyrians; it is even not that of our grandfathers. Were there anything in thought rendering it, pre-eminently, to our apprehension, extra-sensational, it would be its unchanging nature in respect to truth. If we found that primitive man possessed the same truth as we hold, we might argue, in view of such a contradiction to the perpetual change, we recognise, in respect to all other phenomena, that this truth was an extra-functional product, and that, consequently, what we call mind had existence independently of body.

When we ask ourselves what is the use of argument, if truth be merely a mode of feeling, we may answer that just because truth is a mode of feeling, there is great virtue in argument. The masses, being normally sensitive to truth, will respond to those who are adapted to excite their sensation of truth. Consequently, argument must be an all-important factor in ensuring those mental changes which constitute, to our apprehension, moral and intellectual evolution. There is really no more reason for the question: what is the use of argument, than

for the question what is the use of music, or of any other form of nervous excitation. The use in all such cases is that the nervous response decreed by God to affect mankind is suitably stimulated.

Argument is essential, because it is the machinery by which dominant sensation, as truth, manifests itself. Gratification is the incentive to controversy. From my standpoint, there are two sorts of such gratification—good and bad, honest and dishonest, social and anti-social. If the controversialist unflinchingly follows his intellect, he will get the good sort. If he dodges his intellect, he will get the bad sort.

The state of feeling, called truth, destined to prevail, is first experienced by a few individuals, and they make the rest feel as they feel. All the truth of the world has, practically, emanated from a few individuals, here and there. The masses have simply been "inert matter" waiting to be moved. How many people have taken the trouble to verify for themselves that the earth revolves round the sun? They have had the feeling impressed on them by a few, and it has thus become truth. Again, how many people have taken the trouble to measure the validity of Gladstone's utterances *re* the Armenians? Yet the masses, and, largely, the "classes," go transiently mad (as I think) through feeling as Gladstone feels. He intellectually hypnotises them. Then, another man, Rosebery, counter-hypnotises them. Truth is simply the states of intellectual feeling predetermined to prevail at various epochs. It is essentially what

theologians call faith. In its originator, it is faith in himself. In those who follow, it is faith in him. Faith is a mode of sensation.

Truth is intellectually futile, as what is called opinion, or is intellectually valid, as reasoned conclusion from sound premises. The latter sort of truth is either abstract or practical. Abstract truth is based on arbitrary premises. Practical truth is based on sensory, or bed-rock, experience and logical inference therefrom. This is the only sort of truth of real moment to humanity. Emotional preference is a form of truth-sensation. It has no significance except as arbitrary personal prepossession.

We may divide society into two main classes, so far as regards the sensation of truth. These classes are: (1) those who are convinced, that is, who feel truth, by what is adequate (*i.e.*, normal) excitation. They may be considered, what physiologists term, normally excitable by nervous stimuli. (2) Those who feel truth by what is, normally, inadequate excitation. These are inclusive under nervous states to which physiologists apply the term hyperaesthetic, that is, abnormally sensitive to nervous stimuli. We commonly call such people credulous.

Besides these two main classes, there is another much smaller class of those who experience the sensation of truth. Such are those chronic sceptics who sometimes call themselves philosophic doubters. These people, when they are not mere affected prigs with a craze for posing, are in the category of nervously perturbed people whom physiologists term

anaesthetic, that is, devoid of normal nervous excitability. They are flabby intellectual molluscs.

The feeling for truth is divisible into two great classes, rational and emotional. The rational feeling is the later and higher evolutionary product. The lower the human type, the more it is dominated by the emotional feeling for truth.

We may distinguish the rational from the emotional feeling by asking ourselves and deciding the simple question: is the special truth conformable with the vast preponderance of our truth? If so, it will be rational. If it be not thus conformable with our other truth, the special truth will be emotional. What we call opinion is largely emotional truth. Through inadequate data, we sometimes feel a rational truth which, on more adequate examination, turns out to be fallacy. In fact, we are continuously doing this, and by so doing, we evolve intellectually. Though such fallacy may be apparent to some, it may not be apparent to others. These latter retain the fallacy as rational truth. While it dominates them, as rational truth, the fallacy, for them, *is* rational truth. Even after we have been directed to the more adequate data, if we still refuse to amend our inadequate rational truth, it may still remain, for us, rational truth. But this can only occur through our lack of normal sensibility to demonstration, or through our lack of mental training rendering us unable to apprehend the more complete data.

But let us now suppose another case. Let us suppose that, after we have been directed to the

more adequate data, we still cling to what was once our rational truth, not through failing to apprehend the new data, but through having habituated ourselves to the old truth, or through its being conducive to our material enjoyment—then, it loses its character as rational truth, though of course, it may remain rational, *as expediency*, after it has ceased to be rational, as truth. Thus, on the conditions, our truth becomes rational, as expediency, but emotional, as truth.

Now we can answer the question: Why should we consider the rational superior to the emotional feeling for truth? We do so because the rational truth is felt independently of our lower sensual desires: because it is feeling further removed from the brute stage than is the emotional. Again, the rational feeling is superior because it is honest and the other is dishonest. I venture to assert that the emotional feeling for truth, as we see it manifested in these days, can only be honest on one condition—that it is based on ignorance. As in the great majority of cases it is not based on ignorance, but on sordid expediency, I maintain that practically, all the emotional feeling for truth, at the present day, is dishonest.

I stipulate for intellectual, as against emotional, truth, because we can perceive in the former, but not in the latter case, the organic sequence from sensory experience (primordial bed-rock sensibility) to conviction, involving identity in the experience of such truth by all percipient minds. That I like or dislike,



fear or spurn, love or hate a particular person, or thing, involves that I have a truth (emotional) regarding that person, or thing; but this truth is only applicable to myself, and I cannot convey it to anybody else. Nobody will hate, or love, because I hate, or love; in other words, nobody will "believe" my emotion. Here, my truth has no organic connection with other people's truth. That I hold that the earth revolves round the sun involves that I have truth (intellectual) which is not only applicable to myself, but also to others. Other people can here partake of my "emotion," feeling my intellectual truth as I feel it. Here, I and they have a common excitant and a common responsiveness: our truth is common property: a "common denominator." Why? Because this truth has organic connection with the collective truth of humanity. It has this quality because we can, as it were, externalise it: scrutinise it objectively. This is impossible in regard to the emotional truth. So soon as we try to externalise that, we at once transform it into intellectual truth. When I try to scrutinise my emotional truth of loving or hating, I have lost the emotional truth and am dealing instead, with a number of intellectual truths which I call concepts.

Against the above propositions, it may be urged that people *will* hate because I hate, and love because I love. The objector may urge that emotional contagion of the sort I indicate, as not occurring, is rather a common occurrence, and he may instance, in support of his contention, the various hysterical epidemics

of pietistic eccentricity by which whole communities have been impelled to the most, rationally, outrageous ecstatic excesses, as cases in point (Flagellants *et hoc*). Indeed, the objector might urge that what we call taste, fashion, conventionalities of all sorts, including religious "faith," are the outcome of this emotional contagion. In all such cases, it might be urged, there is really organic connection between the individual's emotional truth and that of his fellows, and that, accordingly, my distinction between emotional and intellectual truth will not stand.

I reply that this supposed organic connection between emotional truths is only apparent: that the connection is really not between emotional truths, but between intellectual superstructures built on the particular emotions. If I influence a person to hate another whom I hate, I do not produce the effect I desire, through my own hating, but through appealing to intellect. The mere fact that I hate has no effect on the person I turn into a hater. I excite his *belief*, not through my emotion, but through my dialectics. He hates because I tell him to hate, not because I hate. The organic connection is then not between our emotions, but, between my intellectual superstructure and his belief. My hatred is a primary emotion arising, say, from wrong action by the person I hate; the hatred I excite is, on the other hand, a secondary emotion arising from intellectual excitation involving belief that certain statements I make, regarding the person I hate, are true. These statements constitute the intellectual superstructure

between which and the intellectual sensations of the person I cause to hate, there is organic connection. Between his and my *emotions* there is, on the other hand, no such connection or continuity.

Let us now take a somewhat different case. If I ape the Prince of Wales in the shape of my hat, I do not "believe" the emotional truth, or so-called fancy, urging the Prince to adopt the particular shape of hat. I do not *feel his emotional truth*, or fancy, as I feel his intellectual truth, say, that "twice two is four." In the latter case, there is *identity* between the Prince's truth and mine; there is genuine organic connection. My truth and the Prince's are then, virtually, one organism. In the former case, there is no such organic continuity. If I ape the Prince's hat, my emotional truth and the Prince's, in regard to the hat, are two totally distinct manifestations. He wears the hat because he likes to wear it; I wear the hat, not because I like to wear it, but because the Prince likes to wear it. He wears the hat through the compulsion of *emotional truth*; I wear the hat through the compulsion of superstructural *intellectual truth*. My intellectual truth, because it is based on emotion, here constitutes me a poltroon who considers it "good form" to be an ape. The Prince's emotional truth, though it may constitute him an eccentric, cannot demonstrate him a poltroon. To demonstrate him a poltroon, a man's action must be intellectually imposed. The Prince believes his emotional truth; I, the poltroon, on the assumption, believe my intellectual superstructure. Similarly, if,

merely to be considered "fashionable," I conform to the conventionalities of society, I demonstrate myself a poltroon, not by emotional truth, but by intellectual superstructure.

Again, if I feel acutely the sufferings, or what I suppose are the sufferings of my impoverished fellows and, on that basis, erect an intellectual superstructure such as, at present, impels a large part of the Socialistic propagandism, I am really moved by my superstructure. I argue, from a non-intellectual basis (the state of my personal feelings regarding poverty), and thereby attain a non-rational conclusion regarding justice and injustice. What is commonly called altruism is one form of selfishness: a deceptive self-gratification which appears unselfish merely because we usually measure it by our own prepossessions instead of by objective standards. The whole Christian fabric of self-renunciation is, essentially, a doctrine of selfishness.

If I yield to the desire to aggrandise myself, I am called selfish. If I yield to the desire for self-renunciation, I am called unselfish. Really, I am as selfish in the one as in the other case. Similarly, if I yield to the desire to gratify myself by pity, I am called tender-hearted; whereas, if I yield to the desire to gratify myself by callousness, I am called hard-hearted. Whatever I may be called, I am, judged objectively, as selfish in the one as in the other case. In each case, I equally gratify *myself*. In neither case is their genuine self-renunciation. Such a visionary as Tolstoi is, essentially, as selfish as the ordinary

“man of the world,” inasmuch as each is equally the slave of his personal prepossessions. There is no genuine unselfishness except that involving the subjection of personal prepossession, by objective demonstration, or intellectual truth. This unselfishness can only occur when action arises from an intellectual basis.

The ecstatic imitative epidemics above referred to are not apposite to the point at issue. They are merely pathological reflex activities divorced from personality, as is epileptic convulsion, or locomotor ataxy.

The impulse to steal constitutes emotional truth, just as does the impulse to respect proprietary rights. As a product of emotional truth, there is no essential difference in quality between the action of the thief and that of the so-called honest man who does not steal. As emotionalists, both are on the same plane. The difference between them arises only so soon as we scrutinise their emotional, by intellectual truth: so soon as we can apply the “common denominator” issuing from the organised truth of society. Then, society proves itself poltroon by oppressing the vulgar thief and allowing the “honest” man, say, as a bishop, or an eminent politician, to oppress it! “Honest” people, like these latter, have their peculiar emotional truth, just as has the thief his; the intellectual truth of society has not yet compelled the general conviction that, of the two classes, as emotionalist, the vulgar thief is a socially less objectionable product than is the “honest” bishop, or the eminent politician of the current type. When society, as, in my opinion,



is sure to happen, attains this intellectual truth regarding bishops and eminent politicians of the present type, society will treat these people much as it now treats the vulgar thief. Then, I imagine, the bishop or eminent politician of the present type will be as circumspect in exercising his special emotional truth as is, now, the vulgar thief; for it will then be as perilous to be "found out" a bishop, or eminent politician of the present type, as it is now to be "found out" a vulgar thief.

All the above will occur because "evolution" causes intellectual truth to change, whereas it only affects emotional truth to the extent of involving its suppression, as activity, when the emotional opposes intellectual truth. A man's emotional truth, so far as he is personally concerned, is an independent factor arising from the incentives to, and needs for, animal self-gratification. It only becomes a *dependent* factor so soon as intellectual truths, through evolutionary change, condition its exercise. Emotional truth alone would involve no difference between primeval man and him of to-day. The emotional truths of primeval man were essentially those of him of to-day.

The cleric and politician of the current type, no more than the murderer or thief, would be possible, did their volitions arise from an intellectual foundation. We often call the murderer insane; the politician and cleric we call sane. Really, this decision is a matter of conventionality. The essential sanity, or insanity involved is the same thing. The difference between the "insanity" of the murderer and the

“sanity” of the others consists, essentially, in the mere fact that multitudes act as do the politician and cleric, while very few act as does the murderer. Objectively considered, the one is no less, or rather as little sane as are the others. Objectively considered, we can only measure sanity and insanity by the incentive. If this arises from an intellectual basis, as truth, the resulting action is always sane (though, of course, it may be erroneous). If the incentive arises from an emotional basis uncomplicated by an intellectual superstructure (as in what we call blind impulse) the action is outside standards of sanity or insanity. If the incentive arises from an emotional basis, complicated by an intellectual superstructure, the action is invariably insane, in other words, dishonest. Insanity and dishonesty are, essentially, convertible terms.

To constitute an action sane, or honest, it must always arise from an intellectual basis, involving the “common denominator” to which I have adverted. “Impulse” is outside the standard of sanity, or honesty, because it involves neither an intellectual basis nor superstructure. The attempt to compromise between an emotional basis and the “common denominator,” involves an intellectual superstructure. Then, the ensuing action is necessarily insane, or dishonest. In the case of action apparently arising from an emotional basis and yet conformable with the “common denominator,” the apparent origin of the action is illusory. The action then really arises from an intellectual basis with which an emotional superstructure happens to conform. Whether we

first experience the emotion, or the intellectual basis, is then insignificant to decide what really involves the incentive. To illustrate this, let us consider the converse case in which we restrain an emotion, as activity, by intellectual truth. Here, the emotion also first occurs to us, yet this does not constitute it the basis governing the action. Such basis is manifestly the intellectual truth which suppresses the "prior" emotional truth.

The above contingencies all arise from the fact that emotion (whether as love or hate, generosity or stinginess, or in any other form), is a primordial endowment involving *selfishness*, while intellect is a later-evolved manifestation involving objectivity, or *unselfishness*. Whatever involves the "personal equation" involves selfishness, and so soon as we import selfishness as an incentive, we import insanity, or dishonesty. The conventional, narrow interpretation of the term itself involves insanity, being based on selfishness (our emotional prepossession towards one or another activity) instead of on intellectual demonstration, or unselfishness.

In the above propositions, I am giving rationally exact definitions of what demarcates sanity from insanity. I am not sanguine enough to suppose that the individual will, to-morrow or the day after, become so rationalised as altogether to govern his common activities according to these standards. On the other hand, I venture to assert that, in his public capacity, the individual will, at a not very distant epoch, have to accomplish this feat, or make a pass-

able show of doing so. Moreover, I venture to assert that a number of enthusiasts now adumbrating the coming social reorganisation, before their aspirations can take efficiently practical shape, will have to carefully ponder the true standards of sanity and insanity. I venture to assure these zealous people that, at present, their incentives are by no means so sane as the supreme importance of the issues they advocate demands.

During past evolutionary stages, the individual was, necessarily, emotionalist. Intellect, as arbiter of truth, had not then appeared on the social arena, and emotion was dictator. Then, there was no intellectual superstructure rendering men dishonest by impelling them to compound with their "consciences" for the sake of emotional indulgence. Then, men really believed emotion. Nowadays, though men feel emotion as keenly as ever, they do not believe it; yet they are very anxious not to forswear it. They like it because it is the "line of least resistance," as incentive to action. However, they have now to be discreet in the indulgence. Like the tippler afraid of Mrs. Grundy, they enter their home of solace by a side-alley. People now, perforce, sugar-coat the pill of resisting emotion. They try to render delectable the pill, by perverting intellectual into conformity with emotional truth. A good illustration of this sort of thing is afforded by the clerical efforts to reconcile theology and science. You can hardly open your morning paper without finding, if you look for them, other illustrations of the phenomenon. An

example I have just noticed. Mr. Long, President of the Board of Agriculture, has been sugar-coating his pill by trying to render credible the proposition that, in order to stamp out rabies, it is essential to muzzle all dogs, *excepting those used for sport*. Obviously Mr. Long has a pet emotion in favour of masters of foxhounds. He sugar-coats the necessary concession to Grundy, with passable ability, inasmuch as his intellectual superstructure just serves to obscure, to uncritical folk, his emotional basis.

The cosmos, for us, is a product of our personality, or mind. This "mind" itself is the product of external excitants acting on the multitudinous channels of nervous intercommunication constituting our cerebral and sensory systems. Thus, "mind," for us, is an effect, not an entity in itself. According to this view, all we know of what surrounds us is the effect of the units of consciousness and units of stimulus constituting, as I shall show, external objects of sensory experience, and acting on the units of stimulus and units of consciousness constituting, ourselves as sensorially percipient, and intellectually conceptive matter-systems. Some people would have us limit our knowledge of what surrounds us to what we sensorially perceive, excluding, as knowledge, what we intellectually *conceive*. I hope to show that, though what we sensorially perceive is, undoubtedly, the basis of what we know, what we rationally infer as transcendental truth, from this sensory basis is as valid as is the basis itself: that, just as the top of a tower is as fully part of the structure as is its founda-



tion, so is our intellect in its most abstract phases, as fully part of our verifying machinery as is our sensory perceptivity. So long as the tower rests intact, on its foundation, no part of it is greater, or less, as a constituent of the tower, than is any other part. Similarly, so long as intellectual inference is a logical outcome of sensory perceptivity, the one is as much an integrant of the structure of knowledge as is the other. Essentially, what we call sensory experience is not distinct from what we call intellectual experience. Our intellectual sensation of the truth of an abstract proposition, *qua* sensation, is essentially the same thing as is our sensory experience of the quality of a concrete object. Accordingly, our abstract truth, so far as regards its character as sensation, is the same type of experience as issues directly from sensory perception.

From this standpoint, our present knowledge is the latest product of successive displacements of cerebral sensations, by other cerebral sensations. To illustrate this: the earlier doctrine of "special creation," on which rests our ecclesiastical system, was, in its day, as fully truth as is our present doctrine of evolution. That the older doctrine, to us, is fallacy, merely involves that our cerebral sensations have been changed. To put the matter familiarly: the older doctrine is untrue because we cannot believe it, *i.e.* do not get the older sensations from it. *Thus, the difference is not fundamentally a question of doctrines, but of cerebral sensations.* This implies that we never attain what we conventionally mean by the term "truth." All we attain is specific cerebral

sensation, quite analogous to what we call sensory "feeling."

What we feel cerebrally, as ratiocination, involving what we call truth, or knowledge, is imposed on us from without, just as is what we feel, sensorially, as physiological pain. Each form of sensation—psychical, or sensorial—comes to us through external excitants arousing specific responses in what, for want of more accurate conception, we commonly call nervous molecules. Whatever psychical, or sensorial, sensation we may experience, has, as its counterpart, a corresponding excitation of these "nervous molecules." As above indicated, the conception: "nervous molecules" is subject to revision, which I try to afford in this work. Still, when we have revised our conventional concept of nervous molecules and adopted some other concept in its place, there will be nothing to choose, as *absolute truth*, between what we have adopted and what we have discarded. Our new concept will simply represent a new cerebral sensation decreed for us by God, as what we call evolution. Every new discovery, every new theory which comes to prevail, represent manifestations, not of what I may term the dynamical initiative of humanity, but of its plastic inertia. The new sensations are not really products of the human "ego," but the "ego" is itself a product of the multitudes of such sensations coming to it during what we call life.

A Newton who revolutionises thought is not a whit less the product of these external pressures on cerebral inertia than is the yokel who cannot add two

fractions. The one sensationalist is no more creator than the other. That we form an arbitrary estimate of our Newtons is, of course, a necessary consequence of our relative judgments. Still, when we dispassionately, and according to our latest evolved cerebral sensations, measure the genius and the yokel, we cannot deny that, absolutely, there is nothing to choose between them.

The psychical evolution of humanity depends on its cerebral plasticity. All humanity has to do is to be moulded by the cerebral sensations decreed for it by God. What is decreed to dominantly affect the common plasticity constitutes the common truth of the particular epoch. What is destined only to so affect an individual, here and there, constitutes *un*-common truth, or what we who do not feel it call aberration, error, illusion, superstition and so forth. Though the majority does not accept this uncommon truth, it does not fundamentally differ from the truth of the majority. It is simply what biologists term sporadic, or dissimilar from the normal. Through its differentiation from the normal it is badly adjusted to its environment, and to that extent "unfit." Nevertheless, such "unfit" truths often become the "fittest." Then, the generation that realises them as "fittest" calls the person a seer, prophet, genius, who was once called a dreamer, or even lunatic.

Whoever does not feel truth as the ruck of humanity feels it, "pays the piper" for his erratic "dance." Fashion governs truth as despotically as it governs bonnets. Not only does this slavery to

fashion and commonplace condition the non-intellectual part of the community, but the very *élite* of what we call the brain of the country, to wit, the leaders of "science" are as completely in the rut of commonplace as is the Mudie-patron. To illustrate this, we have only to consider the present attitude of so-called science to certain obscure psychical phenomena transcending conventional methods of investigation. The covert and open sneers lavished, by their "scientific" *confrères*, on such men as Wallace and Crookes, merely because they are not too enslaved by precedent to apply scientific scrutiny to what offends the fashionable conventions of physics, physiology, and chemistry, show that these scientific sneerers suffer from the same psychical anaesthesia as afflicts the patrons of our newest Shakespeares and Scotts.

When a new cerebral sensation is launched on its career of what I may term social infection, it only becomes part of the body of truth so soon as it displaces prior sensations of a different character. It displaces these prior sensations by infecting what we call normally intelligent people. The "thinker" who originates such a new cerebral sensation is, himself, infected by what I have termed the mind-environment. This mind-environment is the source of what we call inspiration. Such successive changes of cerebral sensation, affecting communities, are, to their development, as successive morphological changes are to the development of what we call organic species.

However, that such a new cerebral sensation infects the majority of intelligent people does not imply

that it enables them to *know absolutely better* than they knew when they felt the older cerebral sensation. All it does imply is that the new sensation enables such people to know *differently*. I have used the word, absolutely, above, to qualify the word, better. Why did I write *absolutely* better rather than better? For this reason: Though we cannot know *absolutely* better, no matter what new cerebral sensations we may acquire, we can still know *better*. I shall elucidate this point later. Of course, had we no criterion of the superiority of one, over another, cerebral sensation, as knowledge, I might spare myself the trouble of trying to supplant cerebral sensations of any sort.

The great desideratum, so far as regards the average individual, is not that he feels a specific sensation as truth, but that he attains the feeling through his intellect, and, when he has attained it, that he acts up to it. If a man believes that it is right to steal, let him steal, and, let those who do not believe it right to steal, lock him up. But, let those who do not believe it right to steal, and represent society, also take care that they do not act according to sensations of truth as unintellectual as those of the man who thinks it right to steal. If society acts according to sensations of truth as unintellectual as his, society as richly merits punishment as he does—and society will get it, or I am a ninny!

Mr. J. F. Nisbet has just propounded, in one of his interesting dissertations, the remarkable proposition, based on my demonstration of truth as sensation, that one man's truth is as good as another's. He asks:



“what does it matter whether the Archbishop of Canterbury, Mr. G. W. Foote, General Booth, or the Pope is right? They are all right from their points of view—the only valid standpoint for them.” Now, I think it matters a good deal what these people, as prominent members of society, believe; and that whether they be right from their standpoints is a question subsidiary to that of whether their standpoints are right. I will illustrate the justness of my contention by Mr. Nisbet’s further avowal, in the same paragraph, that “I am equally right from my point of view, when I say that the universe is too vast and too complex, and the mystery of life too deep for minds of the calibre of ours to grasp.” Here Mr. Nisbet virtually asserts that he *does* grasp the universe and mystery of life, and finds them too “vast,” “complex,” “deep,” to be grasped by “minds of the calibre of ours.” Surely this is a self-stultification! There are, on Mr. Nisbet’s hypothesis, no “contents” to be grasped, yet he virtually professes to grasp them, by pronouncing them beyond grasping. He has here laid down, and at the same time stultified, a dogma about what he implies should not be dogmatised about. If the Pope and the rest attain belief on this principle, though, so far as they are concerned, they may be “all right from their points of view,” it would be advisable for them to alter those points of view.

A point which Mr. Nisbet seems here to overlook is, that no sensible person pretends to “grasp” the universe, or the mystery of life. All that sensible

people pretend to do is to try to get the sensation of truth by inferring from collective experience regarding the universe and mystery of life. If their premises or inferences are wrong, these sensible people stand to be corrected. Though Mr. Nisbet fully accepts my proposition that truth is sensation, he writes about the universe and mystery of life as though what is propounded about them, satisfactory to him, as the result of the sensation of truth, must be something different as truth from what is propounded about any other experiential fact. He might just as well write that the mystery of a potato is too vast and complex for minds like ours to grasp, as make the assertions about the universe and life.

Mr. Nisbet asserts that "the ancients divined this conclusion" (regarding truth, as sensation) "of our latter-day philosophy, when they declared 'so many men so many opinions'; and after it has once more been expounded in a new guise, I . . . am entitled to say: well, what then? Alas, alas! This 'what then' is the stumbling-block of all the philosophies." I fail to perceive the "stumbling-block." Philosophy would not be worth the name had its truth no practicability, and I, assuredly, should not bother myself by thinking and writing philosophy unless I could show its practical applicability.

"The ancients," in propounding their truism, had in mind something totally different from the modern conception of truth, as sensation. They had much the same conception of truth as is implied by Mr.

Nisbet himself, when he writes: "Nothing proves more convincingly the illusory nature of truth than the fact that so many parties profess to have a monopoly of it, to the exclusion of all their rivals." One of the practical objects of my philosophy is to obviate this confusion of rival parties by showing them accurate standards by which they may measure questions of public moment, and by displaying the perturbing factors involving partisan rivalry.

The modern conclusion regarding truth denies that it is "illusory" any more than is, say, the sensation of pain. Truth is real, whatever may be said of people, "who profess to have a monopoly of it." Personally, I can vouch that I profess to have no such monopoly, and I think no intelligent persons who have arrived at my conclusion regarding truth will profess to have such monopoly. My truth is a product of normal intellectual sensation, just as the sensation from a pin-prick, as generally experienced, may be considered the product of normal sensory reaction. To illustrate this; if I advance, as truth, the proposition that a plant springs from a seed, I assume normal intellectual sensation in those to whom I make the proposition. If another person advances, as truth, that plants never issue from seeds, I am bound to assume that he has *abnormal* intellectual sensation, and I say my truth is better than his. In saying this, I pretend to no infallibility. I simply assert that my truth is better than his, because I believe that my truth is normal, his abnormal. Then the question arises: who is right—he or I? To decide

this, he and I must appeal to collective experience regarding seeds and plants. Similarly, what I propound, regarding the universe and cognate subjects, must be measured by collective experience and inference therefrom.

The real questions, in regard to truth, are not questions of *opinion*, but of normal inference from universally conclusive data, involving rational *demonstration*. "Opinions" are *personal*; demonstrations, *impersonal*. Opinions, as such, are only significant to the extent that they accord with, or contradict *demonstrations*. The maxim of the ancients, "so many men, so many opinions," in the light of the modern demonstration regarding truth, is a mere jingle, and a false one to boot. Opinions do *not* vary with the number of those who hold them, unless the people who hold them lack common sensation regarding the premises from, and inferences by which they attain the particular opinions.

Until the average man habitually thinks out truth for himself, he will necessarily largely feel it by authority. Accordingly, advisable as it is that the ordinary man shall get his sensation of truth through his own intellect, it is still more necessary that those who supply him with truths he perforce takes without critical examination, shall eliminate partisanship and prepossession from their own decisions. A vast responsibility, taken very lightly, rests in these days on the Press, and those who, in any way, presume to lead public opinion. Forgery is venial compared with intellectual prostitution by such dispensers of truth.

Mr. Nisbet writes : "For what Mr. Hiller has got the process reduced to is this : that our thoughts are the outcome of sensation as experienced through our nervous system. . . . with the organising of which we have nothing to do." As consequence, Mr. Nisbet postulates that we may be led "to experience anything or nothing," and, on this account, he implies that the philosophical demonstration of the conditions of thought and truth leads to nothing of practical moment. I think that Mr. Nisbet here ignores one all-important factor in thought—habit. Through the very conditions enabling us to experience, as Mr. Nisbet puts it, "anything or nothing," habit imposes on us "something" which, as normal thinkers, we are all prone to "feel" in a similar way. Thus, through habit (*i.e.* instruction forcing on us specific mental sensations) we all agree that "five times twenty is a hundred." Now, to a savage who had not been habituated to count above five, there would be no meaning implied in the above proposition. But get that savage to think according to our habit, by instructing him as to numerical data, he will agree with us that "five times twenty is a hundred." The very fact that his nervous sensibility is, as it were, *tabula rasa*, enabling him to experience "anything or nothing," would then, if he had normal logical faculty, compel him to think according to our collective experience regarding numbers. He would then exchange his earlier habit of thought for ours.

Now, we must rationally assume that our collec-



tive experience is superior, as an evolutionary product, to the savage's, as a standard of mental habit, and that, consequently, if the savage fails to assimilate his habit to ours, he will succumb in the racial "struggle for life." Well, just as this superiority occurs between our habit of thinking and the savage's, so does superiority occur, within our own habit, as between the ignorant and emotional, and the enlightened and intellectual.

The great majority of people are so constituted that, emotion apart, they think according to similar fundamental "patterns," emanating from sensory experience. These "patterns" involve what we understand as collective experience and logical inference therefrom. Given normal capability to apprehend premises, and normal logical capacity, average men, according to their elimination of emotion, will more and more closely approximate as to inference from specific premises. Practical unanimity is attainable by normal humanity as soon as it eliminates emotion from any specific judgment. Accordingly, it is a matter of the highest moment that people who are able to set just premises and inferences, regarding debatable questions, before the public, shall do so, and I strongly demur to Mr. Nisbet's implication that, because "our thoughts are the outcome of sensation, as experienced through our nervous system," we are not relationally able to mould common thought in conformity with reliable standards of what is best in thought, and corollarily, action. As we are all normally prone to take the same *intellectual* view of

contingencies, so soon as we *intellectually* grasp those contingencies, we may all become moulded to habits of thought involving judgment by just inference from collective experience.

I am now going to apply my definition of truth, as the sensation of belief, to removing some misconceptions which, to judge from the tone of what sometimes passes as criticism of the Bible, seem to be entertained regarding the validity of those records. What is called the higher criticism has, of course, rendered obvious *to us* that the Bible is a mass of misstatements. Moreover we are compelled to believe that these misstatements, as well as being unconscious, were often the deliberate work of people interested in propagating a particular cult. To put the matter plainly, we are compelled to believe that writers of the Bible deliberately lied and forged, besides blundering, in piecing together the records on which is based the Christian religion. I need not now discuss this proposition in detail. It is admitted, as true, even by theologians themselves, and is self-evident to anybody who has given attention to modern textual, anthropological, and archæological research. Taking this misdirection (according to our lights) as an admitted fact, I now wish to point that it is inconsistent (and the inconsistency is often overlooked) with modern collective experience, to estimate the evolutionary value of Biblical records by our present estimate of the methods by which those records were concocted, and by the inaccuracies of their contents. Granting, to the fullest, the dishonesty, according to

our present notions of honesty, involved in the concoction of these records, what we have to consider, in order to form a true estimate of the evolutionary value of these records is, not the lack of conformity, of their writers, with what we understand as veracity, but, the power of those records to *impose belief*. We must judge their evolutionary efficiency, not by their fallacy *to us*, but by their truth to past generations. Did these past generations get the sensation of truth from the Bible? is what we must decide, if we would accurately estimate its evolutionary value to humanity.

Judged by the standard above indicated, the Bible was, undoubtedly, a product essential to the evolution of humanity, and it has now lost its earlier efficiency only because our system of investigation has disabled us from obtaining the sensation of truth, as did our ancestors, from the Bible. We have now a revelation which has displaced the Bible, by affording us sensation of truth inconsistent with that afforded by the biblical revelation. Perhaps some future generation may be just as unable to obtain the sensation of truth from our records as we are to obtain it from the ancient Jewish and Christian records.

We are too apt to judge ancient truth by our own truth, as a final and unchangeable standard, and thus to constitute *our* truth what the intelligent among us blame those who contend for the plenary inspiration of biblical writings, for constituting the truth of the ancient Jews and early Christians. Again, when we judge the morality, or lack of morality, enunciated in the Bible, by our own

standards, we fall into the same error as that above indicated. We then imply that we, and only we, have an absolutely accurate standard of morality, just as we imply that we, and only we, have an absolutely accurate standard of occurrences, generally. In the light of our present collective experience, we must confess that our divergence, as *knowers*, from the biblical knowers, merely involves that we know differently: that we have different sensations of truth. The nescience and general inaccuracy of the Bible only exist relatively to us; they did not exist relatively to earlier ages. Though we are rationally compelled to renounce these biblical records because they do not afford us the sensation of truth, we are not rationally warranted in treating them with contempt, implying that we have an unchangeable standard of truth, denied to earlier generations. Such superficial judgment will proclaim us ignorant of one of the most important and obvious issues of our own knowledge: the "fact" that all human truth is merely the sensation of belief, and that the sensation of belief, of future ages, may be as different from ours as is our sensation from that of the time of the apostle Paul.

What we have to do is, not to discriminate between beliefs, in order to disparage what afforded belief to earlier ages, but, in order to attain, for ourselves, the sensation of truth. Moreover, when we have attained that sensation, it is our business to act up to it. If our truth does not also involve its practical exemplification, it merely turns us into

hypocrites. So far, this seems to be the main result of our achievement in supplanting biblical truth, by fresh truth. We are very industrious in seeking to attain new truth, but, we are equally dilatory in acting upon it when we have it. In fact, so dilatory are we, in this respect, that, while we, theoretically, hold our new truth, we often practically repudiate it. Thus, though we hold that Adam did not "sin" against God, as the Bible tells us he did (with the rider that all men "sin" through Adam's "sin"), and though we further hold that, if Adam did not "sin," there is no atoning work for the "Saviour" who, the Bible tells us, came to earth to conciliate God for humanity's "sin," through Adam—although all intelligent men, especially ecclesiastics, are convinced about the fallacy of the Bible's account regarding "sin" still, week in, week out, these intelligent people affirm creeds and administer sacraments which have no rational significance, unless the Bible's account of the origin of "sin" is held as one of the most vital truths vouchsafed to humanity. People commonly turn themselves into humbugs, through the mere attaining of new sensations of truth, which these people are too morally obtuse to practically exemplify.

Iconoclasm is not of much account unless it also involves new images. Demolishing the Bible is a poor game, if we put nothing in its place. And, it is even a poorer game if, when we have demolished the Bible, we try to "make believe" that we have not demolished it. This is, at present, a game popular



with ecclesiastics, and, among the results of their diversion, are such books as *The Bible and the Child* in which religion is debased into an expert attempt, by interested partisans, to render dishonesty the first requisite in worship of God ; and self-gratulations such as those of Canon Eyton, for the fact that he is in a Church in which he is not obliged to believe anything which seems to him ridiculous or superstitious, so long as he “merely assents” to it, and is content to pocket stipends for foisting on the public, as God’s truth, creeds as “superstitious and ridiculous” as anything imaginable by the most mentally derelict asylum-inmate.

It may be asked : if following the intellect involves honesty, how are we to account for such works as Balfour’s *Foundations of Belief*, Drummond’s *Ascent of Man*, Kidd’s *Social Evolution*—is not intellect followed in the case of such productions, and are they honest productions ? I reply : intellect is, by such writers, merely exercised, not followed. In the case of such productions, prejudice, or emotion is what is followed. Mr. Balfour’s work is a stultification of intellect, by intellect. What he follows is prepossession bred of habit and hereditary idiosyncrasy. The same may be said of the other writers. Mr. Balfour argues from unverified premises which are to him ostensibly verified because they conform with his peculiar mental bias, habit of thought, and resulting notions of expediency. He does not want to learn, or teach truth, but to exploit his mental acuteness in order to plausibly establish what he

desires to be accepted as truth. If Mr. Balfour followed his intellect, he would never have written such a work as *Foundations of Belief* because his intellect would then have been employed in inferring from collective experience, instead of in elaborating premises from which to infer *against* collective experience.

It is merely through the conventions of a society that has not yet learned to apprehend the true significance of intellectual domination, that intellectual roguery is not treated as essentially the same thing as what we now consider criminal dishonesty. When the true significance of intellectual domination is recognised by society, the man of culture solicitous about his reputation for intellectual integrity will no more contemplate writing such a book as Mr. Balfour's than he will think of forging cheques.

The highest phase of human knowledge, to our apprehension, must arise from collating the conclusions of the various specialistic methods of investigating sensory experiences. These methods we call science. They depend primarily on sensory perceptivity. Science, in the conventional sense, is the application of certain sensory, or, as I shall later show, pseudo-sensory, experiences of "time," "space" and "number," to other sensory experiences which we call natural phenomena. Necessarily, if any extra-sensory method of investigation is available to humanity, this "science" cannot recognise the method. In this connection, "science" may be compared to a congenitally blind man who declines to discuss the

question of colour. "Science," *qua* "science," is perhaps as fully justified in rejecting what is outside its limitations as is the blind man in ignoring what lies outside his limitations. However, "science" exists for humanity, not humanity for it. If "science" is demonstrably unable to satisfy the highest requirements of humanity, in regard to knowledge, then, "science" must abandon its pretensions to afford the best available truth, so soon as means of satisfying those supreme requirements of humanity, in regard to knowledge, are discovered ; or, on the other hand, "science" must assimilate those newly discovered means by absorbing them into its own system. I am trying to demonstrate, in this work, that such an extra-sensory method of investigation as that above indicated is now available to humanity, and that by this method, and it only, modern civilisation will be enabled to replace what it has lost as religion and incentive to right conduct, at present conspicuous through their absence because of the "scientific" demolition of earlier compulsions to belief. Thus, this extra-sensory method of investigation, in a certain sense, has come to undo "science," as "science" came to undo the emotional incentives once efficient to urge humanity in the decreed path of evolutionary change.

Just as the ordinary physicist, or chemist, applies his intellect to the problems arising in his special branch of enquiry, so does the investigator by extra-sensory methods, whom we call a philosopher, apply his intellect (or he ought so to apply it) to the consensus of testimony of all specialised branches of

enquiry, which he elaborates to their logical issue. Necessarily, if his intellect is such as to enable him to deal efficiently with the material to his hand, the philosopher must attain conclusions more rigidly compelling the intellectual submission of humanity than are attainable by any investigator in the realm of specialism ; inasmuch as the field of induction of the philosopher is as wide as, and the field of inference wider than, those of all specialists combined. The ultimate demonstrations of each branch of specialism are, or should be, to the philosopher, as is each separate problem to the specialist. Just as the latter establishes his conclusions by weighing and inferring from the accumulated specialistic acquisitions of his predecessors, so does the philosopher establish his own conclusions by weighing and inferring from the totalised results so ensuing of each separate "science." Each "science" is, to the philosopher, as is each "scientific" problem to the "scientist." Thus, the "sciences" may be called the specialistic warp and weft of philosophy, and the genus philosopher may be considered the evolutionary ultimate of the genus scientist. Of course, such philosophy as that I am now discussing has only become possible in modern times. The philosophy which preceded it was quite another thing. In earlier times, lacking scientific warp and weft, philosophy had to evolve its material from the depths of its "inner consciousness." This is equivalent to saying that such philosophy was mainly a system of subjective guesswork and dialectical ingenuity. Consequently such philosophy lacked

practical applicability to human affairs as must all mere logic not emanating from a sensory foundation and poised thereon as its pinnacle.

The truth we attain from mathematics is, in itself, as a conceptual product, the most cogent within our apprehension. But this very cogency is dependent on its quality as mere conceptual truth—on its being a *type* distinct from experiential truth. The latter is continuously changing; mathematical truth is final. Experiential truth embraces the cosmos; mathematical truth embraces but an infinitesimal unit of the cosmos: the human brain as a purely intellectual mechanism. Experiential truth depends ultimately on what I must term, in defiance of the “hard-headed” school, intuition. In most cases, this is primarily a sensual derivative. On the other hand, it must, in rare cases, be attributed to some peculiar form of response to the mind-environment which, so far as regards human scrutiny, may be compared to the present state of Röntgen’s “x” rays. Whether we term this form of cerebral response “inspiration,” or exceptional acuteness of intellect, it is entirely beyond human identification, as a cerebral process analogous to any others embraced in the term “intellectual.”—In fact, what we conventionally consider as intellect seems to have little connection with this exceptional responsiveness; we may even suppose “intellect” to be rather adverse than conducive to its fullest manifestation. However, whatever intuition—whether manifested by the amoeba, or the human “seer”—may involve as a thing, it is the only means by which humanity can



attain experiential truth. Purely intellectual processes, such as mathematical, can afford us no experiential truth beyond their conformity with intuition. To the extent that they pretend to explain phenomena, they are as futile as the crudest *a priori* method. It may be urged that intuition itself is an *a priori* process. Undoubtedly it is, and, on that account, the intuition of no individual is sufficient to afford the collective organism, society, experiential truth, though, of course, affording the individual such truth. Collective experiential truth must issue through the convergence, from different aspects, of a multitude of individual intuitions. Thus we see that the intuitions even of such a "seer" as Newton have been largely discredited by subsequent convergences of intuition from different standpoints. I maintain that, now, the biological standpoint must similarly disqualify the intuitions of a number of contemporary "seers." As we get a wider collective grip of phenomena, through extended response to our environment, we must inevitably discard our older visions.

Whenever the application of mathematics to phenomena enables us to attain an apparently just conclusion, the fact merely demonstrates that normal cerebration is part and parcel of the rhythmic system governing the cosmos, and we can only accept the conclusion as experiential truth when we can confirm it by sensual experience. Of course, sensual experience, in itself, can afford us but a limited experience of truth. Nevertheless, it is the essential basis of every valid conclusion, no matter how remote from

itself. Unless we can clearly trace the genealogy of our speculative inference backwards to sensuous response, such inference must be faulty.

We get certain mental sensations which we symbolise by the terms circle, square, angle, and so on. The origin of these geometrical concepts is our sensual perceptivity of visible objects. From this has become evolved all mathematical procedure elaborating the primitive responses into abstraction. Necessarily, this abstraction as truth can only have significance as conceptional sequence. When we assume that it has significance outside this sequence, as many people do, we tacitly try to isolate ourselves from our relatives. This involves the fallacious procedure which underlies transcendental physics. I shall show that we have no warrant to postulate space, as having any real existence. Yet, we find mathematicians gravely discoursing about space as an objective reality. Some of them go so far as to tell us that space has four, instead of three, dimensions. A whole system of so-called transcendental geometry is based on the assumption of non-Euclidean space. Such mental involution seems to me akin to some of those manifestations instanced by pathologists as denoting mental degenerescence. This physical transcendentalism is based on the fallacy that what can be imagined by a logical process must necessarily have its counterpart as reality. From such premises we may argue that the vagaries of dementia, which are often logical enough, though based on abnormal premises, likewise correspond with reality. Why

then do we sane people, who cannot perceive the correspondence, keep those who can under restraint? So far as regards their relation to objective reality, I can see but slight difference between the hallucination of pathological states and the issues of that mathematical license which has given the world pangeometry, or, for the matter of that, in a modified degree, the "statistical" method of determining molecular impacts, or vortex linkings. To argue about "space" of four dimensions, or of any dimensions, is as profitless as arguing about integrity, or rascality of four dimensions.

Again, it is a curious example of the vagaries of human subjectivity, that eminent mathematicians who gravely discourse about transcendental space should wax indignant merely because eminent speculators of another type employ formal statements which concisely symbolise the results of genuine empirical investigation. Let Herbert Spencer tell the world that: "Evolution is a change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent, heterogeneity, through continuous differentiations and integrations," these eminent mathematicians lash themselves into a turmoil of indignation against people "not in the slightest degree entitled to rank as Physicists (though, in general, they assume the proud title of Philosophers)," for "errors," into which, so these mathematicians tell us, it is impossible "for a genuine scientific man to fall, so long, at least, as he retains his reason." To me, it would appear that, if the "genuine scientific man" can assimilate

“transcendental space” his capacity for deglutition should not be overtaxed, even by the “errors” of “philosophers.”

From the man-in-the-street, whose horizon is limited by market-reports, to the man-in-the-chair, whose horizon embraces what he imagines to be the totality of things, we hear much glib invocation of “experience.” This or that, according to the particular standpoint of the investigator, is a matter of “experience”—or, if the investigator be in a particularly dogmatic mood of “*common* experience,” sir!—or, on the other hand, this or that is dead against experience, common, or uncommon. In the vast majority of cases, the people who thus nonchalantly pronounce their decisions have never troubled themselves by the questions: what are we trying to decide? What do we mean by experience? I will try to enlighten these good folk. Experience is sensation, physical, or psychical; in other words: sensory, or intellectual. The “experience” of the sensualist is what results, as sensation, through the response of sense-organs to external excitation by what are conventionally termed matter and motion. The “experience” of the scientist is the sensualist’s “experience” elaborated by reason, into certain concepts which do not transcend “matter” and “motion.” The philosopher’s “experience” is the scientist’s “experience” elaborated by reason into concepts which *do* transcend “matter” and “motion.” Thus, what may be experience to the scientist may not be “experience” to the sensualist, and what may be “experience” to the philosopher

may not be "experience" to the scientist. I may observe that I here employ the term scientist, in its conventional sense, to the systematic empiricist who deals solely with "matter" and "motion." The intellectual results of the above three classes of "experience," we term "facts." So, we will consider experience as "fact," or something realised to consciousness, as a mental picture of actuality.

That matter and its manifestations objectively exist is what we call "fact," to sensory perceptivity. However, when we come to analyse this sensory experience of "matter," we find, that our sensory "facts" tend to become transformed into what may be termed sensory phantoms, or illusions. We effect this transmutation by what are conventionally termed scientific demonstrations, and by logical inference from these demonstrations. In "scientifically" attenuating and differentiating the gross "matter" of sensory perceptivity into "molecules," "atoms," "vortices" "centres of force," and similar conceptual entities, the physicist, by implication, asserts that what is "fact," to sensory experience, is not "fact" to intellectual experience. To take another illustration, the physicist discredits sensory experience when he tells us that our sensory "fact" that a lump of iron is normally "colder" than, say, a woollen rug, is not scientific "fact," inasmuch as the two objects are of the same temperature, only one appears "colder" than the other through its greater capacity for rapidly absorbing a certain conceptual entity which the physicist calls heat.



Thus, we see that our "facts" are very much dependent on the standpoint from which we try to arrive at them, striking our apprehension as very different things, according to our method of contemplating what we try to apprehend. Limiting ourselves, at present, to "facts" of our crude sensory experience and to "facts" of our intellectually refined, or "scientific" experience of "matter," we must grant that there is an essential difference, as conceptual experience, between the "scientific," incessantly moving "vortex," or "kinetic" atoms and the ordinary sensualist's dense, rigid, inert, gross "matter." On purely sensory grounds, we have adequate reason to deny the physicist's "fact," just as, on intellectual grounds, he has like reason to deny the sensualist's "fact."

In my examination of physical hypotheses, I shall show that a similar justification exists for those who, on philosophical grounds, reject the physicist's "facts." I shall show that, just as the sensualist's "facts" are too crude for the physicist, so are the physicist's "facts" too crude for the philosopher, who thus stands to the physicist as the latter stands to the ordinary sensualist. Now, unless the enquirer is prepared to take his stand solely on sensory experience, denying the physicist's "facts" for the sole reason that they transcend sensory experience, he has obviously no ground until he has rationally refuted the physicist's "facts," for denying them. If, under such circumstances, the sensualist does deny the physicist's "facts," without rationally refuting them,

he must necessarily deny them purely on the ground of prejudice. Similarly, if the sensualist, or the physicist, denies the "philosopher's "facts" because they transcend sensory or scientific "facts," he does not deny, on rational grounds, but, through prejudice.

Thus, there are three types of "facts" at present available to humanity: sensory, scientific and philosophical "facts." Of course, the term "scientific" is now applied in a somewhat restricted and conventional sense to methods of investigation by sensory empiricism and mathematics. In the fullest sense of the term, philosophy is just as much science as is mathematical physics. In fact, as I shall show, it is the highest science.

In our present consideration we will term the "facts" of philosophy transcendental, inasmuch as they reach beyond the "scientific" order of "facts." Of course, were a higher order of fact discovered than what we now call philosophical, the new order would become our transcendental order of fact. Thus, the transcendentalism of our present philosophical "facts" is merely relational, these philosophical facts being no more absolute, or final, than are the "scientific," or even the sensory "facts." The philosophical facts are merely transcendental in respect to sensory "facts."

As the "facts" of the most abstract mathematics and those of ordinary arithmetic are of different orders, so are sensory, scientific, and philosophical "facts" of different orders. As the "facts" of ordinary arith-

metic, within their own sphere, are as conclusive as are the "facts" of the most advanced mathematics within their own sphere, so are the "facts" of sensualism, science, and philosophy, within their own spheres, equally conclusive. To the ordinary man, the mathematical "facts" of Lord Kelvin are not "facts" unless the ordinary man has sufficient "faith" in Lord Kelvin to submit to his intellectual dictation. Similarly, to the ordinary sensualist, the "facts" of empirical physics are not "facts," so long as he has no "faith" in the people who advance these "facts." Talking to a boor about "vortex linkings" is about as effective, so far as regards inculcation of "fact," as talking on the subject to an oyster. Similarly, talking to some people about any matters transcending sensory experience is equally unprofitable. As I have not attempted to verify the intricate mathematical procedure which Lord Kelvin and others have applied to demonstrating certain conceptual products which these people advance as "facts," I am content, within their spheres of investigation, to yield to Lord Kelvin and his fellow-investigators. I recognise that, to disprove or confirm their conclusions, as "facts" of mathematical physics, I must work from their standpoint. As I am not a mathematical physicist, and find full occupation in investigating from my own standpoint, I trust Lord Kelvin and his fellow-investigators, so far as regards their "facts." Similarly, if Lord Kelvin wishes to disprove, or confirm my "facts," he must work from my standpoint. I may here remark that I hope to give Lord Kelvin and physicists in

general many opportunities, in later chapters, of disproving facts which I shall demonstrate as of a higher order than are their facts. Nevertheless for either Lord Kelvin or me to reject the other's "facts" without examining them from the other's standpoint, would be childish. This childish procedure is adopted by the ordinary sensualist, who is perpetually ringing the changes on such phrases as "baseless abstractions," "fictions of the intellect," and so forth, in launching his diatribes against those whose standpoint he is, either through hereditary incapacity or through acquired habit, precluded from rationally scrutinising, to say nothing of adopting. In respect to such standpoint, this sensualist is virtually in the lunatic's position in regard to normal standpoint.

Now, there occurs another question: If "facts" are to be measured from the standpoint of those who advance them, why not consider the lunatic's "facts" on that basis? I reply: as "facts," *to the lunatic*, they are as valid as are the "facts" of "sane" people, to them. But, inasmuch as "sane" people represent organised truth, we must rationally trust "sane," rather than "insane" people, *in respect to standpoint*, though, at the same time, we do not deny, as "facts," to him, the lunatic's "facts." Thus, we have arrived at the intellectual "fact" that, though any "fact," within its arena, may be equally valid as any other "fact" within its arena, still, we must take into consideration *standpoint*, as well as "fact." From the standpoint of Cosmas Indicopleustes, we may demonstrate the "fact" of a flat earth. Why cannot we

accept his standpoint? For one sole reason : because it is against accumulated experience. The collective experience is the sole criterion of standpoint, as distinct from "fact." Whatever can be rationally reconciled with collective experience is sound as to standpoint.

So, there are standpoints and standpoints. To take the three great classes of verifying procedure : sensory, scientific and philosophical, is there anything to choose between them, as to standpoints and, consequently, as to "facts"? Yes. How is this relative efficiency to be measured? By the "fact" that causality involves *sequence of standpoints*, as it involves sequence of physical phenomena, and, as the last physical "fact" which has happened, to our apprehension, is the most cogent "fact" so long as it remains "last," so is the last standpoint, the most cogent, so long as it remains last.

The sensory standpoint is the "cause" of the scientific standpoint. Similarly, the scientific standpoint is the "cause" of the philosophical standpoint. (I am now dealing with philosophy as an inductive process, not in the old metaphysical, *a priori* sense.) The philosophical has evolved from the scientific standpoint, as the latter has evolved from the sensory standpoint.

We have now arrived, logically, at the proposition that there are three orders of standpoint : sensory, scientific, and philosophical, and that the last, as last evolved, is the highest, or most conclusive order, Necessarily, the scientific standpoint must be a logical



derivative from the sensory standpoint, and the philosophical, from the scientific standpoint. Accordingly, though each order of standpoint differs from another, none contradicts another, *as standpoint*. Just as the "fact," "twice three is six," does not contradict the "fact," "twice two is four"; so the scientific standpoint involving the "fact:" matter is composed of molecules in motion, does not contradict the sensory standpoint involving the "fact:" matter is gross and inert stuff. Similarly, the philosophical standpoint involving the "fact" that an unconditioned cause is behind the conditioned, does not contradict the scientific standpoint involving the "fact" that every phenomenon must be related to some other phenomenon, either as cause or effect. Thus, when we consider standpoints *cum* "facts," and "facts" alone, there is no mutual contradiction. There is merely differentiation. But, does this differentiation, though it involve no contradiction, involve *difference in validity*, whether in "facts" alone, or in "facts" *cum* standpoints? It does involve very material difference in validity. Why?

The human mind is so constituted that though, within their methods, these three orders of facts are equally cogent, *there is gradational difference of cogency between them in relation to one another*. Though the human mind recognises equal cogency, *within each order*, as between *order and order*, it recognises difference of calibre, or rank, in the respective "facts," thus becoming prone to accept the "fact" of higher rank as of more cogency than the fact of lower rank.

Thus, we believe the physicist, rather than the crude sensualist, regarding the rotation of the earth round the sun ; regarding the question of temperature, as between the woollen rug and the iron plate ; regarding the "molecular" structure of "matter." In all such cases, we are inherently prone to discard the lower, in favour of the higher order of "fact," imputing to the one a higher cogency than that of the other.

Now, just as the scientific is a higher order of fact than the sensory, so is the philosophical a higher order of fact than the scientific. Again, just as the human mind is constrained to attribute a higher order of cogency to the scientific than to the sensory "fact," so is it constrained to attribute a higher order of cogency to the philosophical than to the scientific "fact." Always assuming that, within their arenas, the three orders of "facts" make equal appeals to reason, in the conclusions they involve, still they practically become unequal, as truth, through the mind's tendency to impute extra cogency to the order of higher rank.

In dealing with this question, let us be perfectly clear about one issue : science has very completely transcended sense-experience. It is too late in the evolutionary day to reject transcendentalism, on the ground that we can know nothing outside sensory experience. In other words, it is too late to reject the conceptual, as rational "fact," merely because it transcends the sensual. Professor Karl Pearson has very explicitly acknowledged that all science is merely

pictorial presentment. He is a very eminent physicist, and, by science, he means the specialised systems of investigation which we term physics and biology. He tells us (in *Nature*, November 5th, 1896) that the "conceptions of these sciences" (physics, chemistry, and biology) "are not now identical with real experience."

He calls "particles, molecules, ethers," "inventions of the intellect." He asserts that "mechanism" (the science of sensory experience) "explains nothing, not even physical nature." He tells us that "the old division of science into exact and descriptive sciences is now seen to be illusion"; that "the materialistic view of life—the theory which would *explain* all organic and inorganic nature by force and matter—has disappeared." He speaks of a "revolution which drops *explanation* out of the scientific glossary, or defines its old sense entirely away."

I think that such an expression of opinion by a scientist is enough to dispose of that curious animal which is for ever ejaculating : facts, sir ! Let us have facts ! which reiterates with painful monotony, that we can know nothing outside sensory experience ; which is for ever trying to survey the universe from the top of a mole-hill. When the scientist himself tells us that science is merely pictorial presentment, it is fatuous to pretend to set limits to what constitutes human knowledge. Under such circumstances, we may well reconcile ourselves to the philosopher's pictorial presentment as patiently as we reconcile ourselves to the scientist's pictorial presentment,

accepting the conclusion of the former that, knowledge in an absolute sense, is outside the scope of humanity ; in other words, that truth is what I have defined it : a special form of sensation dependent on special forms of, and excitations to responsiveness.

Let us now consider the following question : If the " facts " and standpoints of the sensualist, scientist, and philosopher are not mutually contradictory, and are, each within its sphere, equally valid, inasmuch as each (on the assumption) is reconcilable with the collective reason (through the scientific and philosophical standpoints and " facts " being rational evolutionary developments from the sensory standpoint and " facts " ) why, under these circumstances, should we not accept the standpoint and " facts " of the Christian theologian as being equally valid with the others, as an evolutionary product ? To answer this question we must investigate the originating standpoint and " facts " from which have issued the present theological standpoint and " facts." When we thus investigate, we find that the theological product differs from the others, as an evolutionary phenomenon, in one all-important respect. While the scientific and philosophical standpoints and " facts " are evolutionary developments from the sensory standpoints and " facts " *cum reason*, the theological standpoints and " facts " are evolutionary developments from the sensory standpoint and " facts " *cum imagination*. Thus, the theological product, at its source, is severed from the only faculty by which humanity has acquired

the changed experiences enabling it to intellectually evolve. Theologians are now trying to evade the inevitable by accepting certain rational qualifications of their fundamental imaginative postulates.

We have now reached the conclusion that the only reliable truth must be conformable with sensory experience or logical inference therefrom. This is the genuine objective standard to which I refer in the preface ; which I have applied in dealing with the doctrines criticised in this volume, and which I shall apply in propounding my own doctrines in later volumes.

Referring to the criticisms, that urged against the theologians is valid because they adopt emotional premises and build thereon various intellectual superstructures. Their thought-systems are necessarily irreconcilable with the objective standard, and, as emotional basis and intellectual superstructure, are inherently dishonest.

The Christian Altruist and Socialist attempt to make their emotional preferences the authentication of the intellectual validity of what they profess to believe. Their "beliefs" are necessarily spurious.

The Monist errs through adopting conceptual premises not derived from sensory experience, but designed to contradict that experience. His system, while it mimics intellectual character, is essentially of the common emotional order.

The Positivist ignores the basical demonstration, logically arising from sensory (biological and psychological) experience, involving determinism, and



imagines certain arbitrary standards of conduct. His system is a mere congeries of personal likes and dislikes.

The Materialist errs through inadequate induction causing him to ignore ethics which is as obvious an evolutionary product, revealed by inference from sensory experience, as is the organic structure itself.

In each case, to which I have applied scrutiny in the foregoing chapters, there is some fundamental inconsistency between inference from sensory experience and the particular doctrine enunciated. The initial defect vitiates the whole series of affirmations built round it.

It will be obvious to the reader that, from the scientific standpoint, there is no such thing as truth, in the conventional sense, as final, complete, absolute certainty. Truth is simply any sensation of belief. It is the business of thinkers to cause "fit" to supersede "unfit" sensations of belief. The test of "fitness" of any sensation of belief is its logical derivation from sensory experience, either directly, or indirectly through inference from such sensory experience. Obviously, all emotional forms of belief are now spurious as tests of socially effective truth. Public concerns ought to be determined solely by the objective standard of truth. Corollarily, all forms of partisanship and impassioned advocacy by which public affairs are now mainly regulated, ought to be repressed, and every great issue decided by the canons of objective investigation.

All great social concerns are ultimately referable to supreme demonstrations in the realms of biology and psychology (which will be fully considered in this work). These demonstrations yield canons of right and wrong which should be sole test of social expediency, deciding social truth and untruth. The business of publicists and governors is to apply the objective canons to social problems and contingencies.

## INDEX

- Abstract and Analytic thought,  
75, 78, 80-82
- Acting as we know, 209, 243,  
305
- Adam and Eve, 206, 207, 221,  
306
- Altruism and honesty, 116 *et*  
*seq.*
- Altruism a form of selfishness,  
285
- Ancient and modern Christians,  
25-26
- Archdeacon and Sensualist—  
their credentials, 8-10
- Argument, 277
- Aristocracy of achievement,  
The, 132-135, 143, 145-  
147, 149
- Artist, The, and the man of  
science, 101
- Atoms, 109, 110, 316
- Atonement, Doctrine of, 4, 65,  
217, 221, 224, 230
- Authority for right must be  
above it, 166
- Auto-suggestion by symbols,  
80, 81, 82, 84, 87, 90, 91,  
96
- Avowal of belief, a social crime,  
13
- Bed-rock of experience, The,  
80, 86, 107, 281, 291, 308,  
313, 316, 318, 325, 327
- Belief and intoxication, 3  
and Principle, 11, 12, 17,  
18, 30, 128, 129, 230, 238,  
296  
is knowledge, 169, 208, 209,  
291, 296, 305, 327
- Believe, The will to, 53-56
- Believer, Profession of faith  
of intellectual, 7
- Bible and the child, 57, 58,  
186 *et seq.*  
and infallibility, 187 *et seq.*  
and reason, 188  
scholars and biologists as  
assailants of the, 189 303  
corruption of texts of, 198,  
199, 200  
and history, 205

- Bible, parts of, not fit to be read, 209-211  
 as literature, 210-12  
 to be averaged, 211  
 one item in the universe of inspiration, 213  
 and truth, 303, 305  
 true criterion of the, 303-305
- Biology and the Bible, 189, 190, 195, 196, 201, 202
- Bismarck, 256 *et seq.*
- Body and mind, 76, 95, 104, 105, 107, 108
- Book of the dead, 226
- Born of a virgin, 220
- Broad Church, 57 *et seq.*
- Brotherhood, 179
- Capitalism, 162, 163, 164, 181, 182  
 and labour, 159, 183
- Cerebral inertia, 293-295, 301  
 sensations, 292-296, 300
- Character and morality, national, 14, 15 *et seq.*
- Children and religion, 34, 36, 38, 40-44, 57, 58, 191, 193, 194, 201, 205, 209, 210
- Christ, 9, 12, 13, 21, 22, 24, 35, 36, 37, 38, 60, 65, 67, 139, 207, 229, 236  
 and a wise economy of truth, 60, 65, 67, 68, 200
- Christian conscience and honesty, 61, 62, 63, 229  
 standard of honesty, 124  
 theologian and ethics, 144
- Christian love, 224  
 standpoint and science, 325
- Christianity, The grace of, 1, 2, 3, 34  
 now effete, 59  
 the principal foe of, 188  
 and selfishness, 285
- Christians, modern and ancient, 25, 26
- Church-matters and religious matters, 1, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 230
- Clerical professionalism, 27, 49, 50, 52
- Closed circuit of knowledge, 98, 105, 202, 203
- Confiscation and socialism, 181, 182
- Conjurer and orator, 244
- Conscience, social and individual, 122, 123, 157, 158
- Corruption of Biblical texts, 198, 199, 200, 303
- Cosmos, a self-existent, 105, 113, 114  
 a product of mind, 291, 297
- Credulity and conviction, 50-52
- Crime, social, to avow belief, 13
- Dark ages, ignorance and honesty of, 12
- Despotism of talk, 261-262, 268
- Destiny, 143
- Determinism, 3, 136, 151, 157, 158, 224
- Devil The, of science, 6, 7, 53  
 of theology, 7

- Devil, the modern, 53, 128  
 Dishonesty is insanity, 178  
 Dissent, 224  
 Dualism, monistic, 102, 103,  
 104
- Ecclesiasticism and Philosophy,  
 27, 28, 29  
 Economy of truth, 60, 65, 67,  
 68, 194, 200  
 Ego, 293  
 Elements, religious, 34  
 Emotion, Appeal to, 3, 10, 15,  
 19, 21, 32, 66, 68, 173,  
 177, 178, 179, 180, 182,  
 189, 227, 228, 230, 238,  
 239, 243, 250, 253, 258,  
 289-291, 327  
 and intrinsic merit, 121,  
 122, 240, 241  
 and selfishness, 289  
 and self-gratification, 3  
 and Truth, 10, 15, 19, 21,  
 24, 32, 180  
 Emotional basis, 117, 288-289  
 and intellectual virtue, 127,  
 128  
 Emotionalism and rationalism,  
 58, 59, 66, 68, 69, 72, 184,  
 227, 228, 230, 243, 244,  
 250, 257, 280-2, 288-289  
 Empire-building and pocket-  
 picking, 258-259  
 Energies, 77, 82, 104  
 English and French morality,  
 28, 29, 30, 31  
 Enthusiasm and wrong incen-  
 tive, 117 *et seq.*
- Ether, 109, 110, 112  
 Ethics and happiness, 165  
 Evolution, 21, 22, 101, 102,  
 109, 113, 114, 115, 120,  
 121, 139, 140, 142, 148,  
 153, 227, 230, 231, 260,  
 294  
 and Atonement and Redemp-  
 tion, 217, 221, 230  
 and doctrine of creation,  
 216, 219, 220  
 and immortality, 217, 218  
 and sin, 216, 220, 221  
 and Trinity, 217  
 and theology, 214 *et seq.*  
 Evolutionism and conception  
 of God, 225  
 Expediency and truth, 281,  
 307  
 Experience—whatitis, 315-316
- Fact, 316-320  
 Faculty-filchers, 141, 148  
 monopoly, 145, 146, 148,  
 157  
 Faith, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 34,  
 35, 41, 193, 279  
 and morality, 35  
 profession of, of intellectual  
 believer, 7  
 Fall, the, a rise, 216, 217, 221  
 False pretension and right  
 principle, 12, 13  
 Falsity, Society and the  
 teaching of, 39, 40  
 Feeling truth, 279-280  
 Fellowship, the, of the spirit,  
 1, 2



- Financial and other forms of capitalism, 163, 164  
 Fish and rice-pudding sincerity, 124, 125, 127  
 Fittest, The social, 262  
 Form and material, 93, 94, 112, 113  
 Forms and ceremonies and religion, 31  
 Freedom in belief, 128  
 Freewill, 4, 16, 17, 136, 137, 145, 152, 189, 191, 194, 212, 220, 223  
 French and English morality, 28, 29, 30, 31  
  
 Genius, 146, 147  
 Geometry, transcendental, 313-314  
 Gladstone, 233 *et seq.*  
   a hypnotist, 254, 256  
 God, 164, 169, 171, 172, 190, 191, 192, 193, 198, 206, 215, 216, 217, 220, 221, 222, 225, 231, 274, 277, 293-295  
   invocation to, 7  
   deanthropomorphosed by evolutionism, 215  
   of science, The, 53  
   Rogues in regard to, 121, 306  
   The Christians 125, 126, 191, 194, 198, 200, 202, 207, 209, 210, 225, 231, 236  
   The love of, 1, 2, 3, 4  
  
 God, thwarting, 192, 194, 206, 212, 220, 221, 223  
 Gods, man-made, 8, 9  
 Grace, The, of Christianity 1, 2  
 Greatness and its reward, 135, 146, 147  
  
 Habit of thought, 303  
 Hæckel, 109, 110, 111  
 Happiness, 164  
 Hating and morality, 33, 185  
 Heat, 76, 77  
 Heir, The spendthrift, 131, 132, 133  
 Hell, 53, 60  
 Hero-worship, 235  
 Heroes of Hell and plaster-saints, 71  
 Higher criticism, The, 186 *et seq.*  
 History compared with Bible, 205  
 Holy, What is, 189  
 Honesty, 13, 25, 26, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 137, 141, 151, 243, 254-255, 286  
   and Altruism, 116 *et seq.*  
   and saints, 118, 121  
   and science, 5, 6, 7  
   of dark ages, 12  
 Human nature, 149, 150  
 Hypnotism by personalities, 254-256, 264-267  
  
 Ideals and philosophical positions, 137, 138, 139  
 Ignorance and honesty of dark ages, 12

- Independent gentleman, the,  
130, 131, 132
- Industrial and financial capital-  
ism, 163, 164
- Inertia, cerebral, 293
- Infallibility and the Bible, 187  
*et seq.*
- Infant, the, and knowledge, 99,  
100
- Infidelity, 197
- Infinity, 102, 112
- Injustice — tolerating equiva-  
lent to perpetrating it, 123
- Inorganic perception of subject  
and object, 92
- Insanity is dishonesty, 178
- Inspiration, 203, 295, 311
- Intellect, difference between  
following and exercising  
the, 307  
the only guide to right, 121
- Intellectual and emotional  
bases, 288-289  
and emotional virtue, 127,  
128  
experience, 15  
honesty, 119  
likes and dislikes, 33  
superstructure, 117, 283,  
285, 290
- Intoxication and belief, 3
- Invocation to God, 7
- Know, acting as we, is the  
great concern, 209
- Knowing not better or worse,  
but differently, 209, 296,  
297
- Knowledge and morality, 14,  
15 *et seq.*  
and sensation, 83, 84, 85,  
86, 87, 88, 98, 99, 100,  
104, 106, 107, 108, 293  
closed circuit of, 98, 105,  
203, 204  
in the infant, 99, 100  
is belief, 169, 208, 209  
light from heaven, 190  
subjective, 106  
the basis of, 82, 85, 86, 87,  
107, 281, 291, 293
- Labour and capitalism, 159, 183
- Laity, the, and religion, 1, 2,  
3, 5, 6
- Land and other forms of capital-  
ism, 163, 164
- Leaders, honest, 243
- Liberty of the press, 271
- Light, 76, 77
- Likes and dislikes, 33, 139,  
148, 170, 171, 172, 173,  
174, 175, 176, 177, 183,  
240, 258-259, 281, 290,  
307
- Line of least resistance, in  
action, 290
- Love, 68 —  
the, of God, 1, 2, 3, 4
- Loving and hating and morality,  
33, 185
- Loyalty to a person, 34, 35,  
36, 38, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48,  
49, 233 *et seq.*
- Loyalty to persons and to  
principle, 233 *et seq.*

- Man-made Gods, 8, 9  
     of science, the, and the  
     artist, 101  
 Masses and emotional appeals,  
     the, 178-179  
 Material and form, 93, 94,  
     112, 113  
 Mathematics, 93, 97, 98, 104,  
     105, 141, 311, 314, 318  
 Matter and motion, 315, 316  
 Men of the past and future,  
     15, 274-275  
     who move the world, 263-  
     264, 278  
 Merit and emotion, 121, 122,  
     240-241  
 Mind and body, 76, 95, 104,  
     105, 107, 108  
     and matter, 102  
     makes the cosmos, 291  
 Modern and ancient Christians,  
     25, 26  
 Monism, 74 *et seq.*  
 Monistic dualism, 102, 103,  
     104  
 Moral code of "Grundy,"  
     13  
 Morality, 32, 33, 34, 64, 141-  
     142, 145, 148, 241, 307  
     and character, national, 14,  
     15 *et seq.*  
     and conventional religion,  
     33, 34  
     and faith, 35  
     and knowledge, 14, 15 *et*  
     *seq.*  
     and loving and hating, 33,  
     185  
 Morality, English and French,  
     28, 29, 30, 31  
 Mosaic cosmogony and science,  
     10, 11  
 Naive experience and philoso-  
     phising, 74, 75, 77, 83,  
     90, 91, 98, 100, 106  
 Nation of humbugs, 13  
 National destiny and honesty,  
     273-274  
     morality and character, 14,  
     15 *et seq.*  
 Nonconformist conscience, 224  
 Obeying the prayer book, 124,  
     125, 126, 127  
 Object and subject, 74 *et seq.*  
 Opinion and demonstration,  
     300  
 Opinions, 150, 245, 279, 298  
 Orators, 235-236, 241, 243-  
     250, 255  
 Pain, 170-175  
 Palliation as against rectifica-  
     tion, 119  
 Parent's liberty regarding chil-  
     dren, 41, 42, 43, 44  
 Partisanship, intellectual and  
     emotional, 245-248  
 Penalties and rewards, future,  
     45, 46  
 Pentateuch, 192  
 Person, loyalty to a, 34, 35, 36,  
     38, 39, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48,  
     49

- Personal equation, 289  
     magnetism, 248, 250, 254,  
     265-266  
 Personality, the average, 263,  
     264, 272, 273, 278, 294,  
     300, 315  
 Persons and principle, loyalty  
     to, 233 *et seq.*  
 Philanthropists, 119  
 Philistines, the elect of the,  
     263  
 Philosophic doubters, 279  
 Philosophical positions and  
     ideals, 137, 138, 139  
 Philosophising and naive ex-  
     perience, 74, 75, 77, 79,  
     92, 100, 106  
 Philosophy and ecclesiasticism,  
     27, 28, 29  
     and practical truth, 298,  
     301  
     and science, 308, 327  
 Physiological organism con-  
     trasted with society, 122  
 Plaster-saints and heroes of  
     Hell, 71  
 Pleasure and pain, 174-177  
 Plenary inspiration and philoso-  
     phy, 304  
 Plymouth brethernism and  
     orthodoxy, 196-197  
 Pocket-picking and empire  
     building, 258, 259  
 Polarising in thought and sense,  
     77, 78, 85, 89, 90, 91  
 Political virtues of to-day, 261  
 Positivism and socialism, 156  
     *et seq.*  
 Positivism and the working-  
     classes, 159, 160  
 Prayer-book, obeying the, 124,  
     125, 126, 127  
 Press, the, 200, 234, 237, 242,  
     246, 268 *et seq.*, 290, 300  
 Principle and belief, 11, 12,  
     17, 18, 128, 129  
     and patriotism, 259-260  
     and pretension, 12, 13, 31  
 Producers and parasites, 130,  
     131, 163  
     the only real, 164  
 Profession of faith of intel-  
     lectual believer, 7  
 Professionalism, clerical, 27,  
     49, 50, 52  
 Prophets, 1, 2, 3, 22, 23, 24  
 Psychical and sensory experi-  
     ences, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79  
     evolution, 294  
 Psychological hair-splitting, 76,  
     105, 106, 107, 108, 109  
 Psychology, a natural history of  
     symbols, 104, 105, 106  
 Puppets and men, 235  
 Quacks and publicists, 270  
 Rationalism and emotionalism,  
     58, 59, 66, 68, 69, 72, 184,  
     227-228, 230, 245, 250,  
     257, 280-282  
 Reason and the Bible, 188,  
     227-228  
     the only faculty by which  
     we can judge of anything,  
     188-189, 193, 195, 209

- Reformers, 139  
 Religion and forms and ceremonies, 31  
     conventional, and morality, 33  
     and children, 34, 36, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 191, 194-195, 201, 205, 210-211  
     and party-cries, 246  
 Religious matters and Church matters, 1, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21  
     Elements, 34, 40  
     teachers, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44  
     Protagonists, 65  
 Respectability, 13, 15  
 Revelation, 203, 219  
 Reward of greatness, The, 135  
 Rewards and penalties, future, 45, 46  
 Right and wrong, 11, 12, 32, 140, 141, 142, 144, 164, 166, 241, 257, 328  
     we are concerned about, The, 140, 141  
     must have authority above itself, 166  
 Rogues in regard to God, 121  
 Romanism, 43, 44, 52, 53  
  
 Saints and honesty, 118, 121  
     villains and happiness, 165  
 Sanity and insanity, 287-289  
 Saviour, 6, 23  
 Scholars and biologists as assailants of the Bible, 189  
  
 Science and freewill, 4, 5  
     and honesty, 5, 6, 7  
     and Mosaic cosmogony, 10, 11  
     and religious teachers, 37, 38, 62  
     the antidote to materialism, 154  
     and the Bible, 191-192  
     and philosophy, 308-327  
 Self-gratification and emotion, 3  
 Self-existent cosmos, a, 105, 113, 114  
 Self-renunciation, spurious, 118  
 Sensation and knowledge, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 98, 99, 104, 106, 107, 108, 276 *et seq.*  
 Sensory and psychical experiences, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 84, 85, 86  
 Sensualist and archdeacon — their credentials, 8, 9, 10  
 Sin, 3, 4, 65, 216, 220-224, 306  
 Sincerity, real and spurious, 253-254, 265-266  
 Socialism, 132 *et seq.*, 257  
     The warrant of, 179-193, 290  
     and confiscation, 181-183  
 Society and the teaching of falsity, 39, 40, 41, 42, 207  
     contrasted with physiological organism, 122  
     an organism, 141  
 Space, Transcendental, 314-315  
 Special creation, The Doctrine of, 292



- Spirit, The fellowship of the, 1, 2
- Standpoint, 316-322
- Subject and object, 74 *et seq.*
- Subjective knowledge, 106
- Success the only atoner, 256
- Supernatural, The, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114
- Systems of thought and self-consistency, 96
- Teachers, Religious, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41
- Religious, and science, 37, 38
- Theology and evolution, 214 *et seq.*
- Theories, Self-consistent, 97, 98
- Things eternal, 194-195
- Thought, 76, 77, 78, 81, 82, 83, 84
- Abstract and Analytic, 75, 78, 81
- Tolerating equivalent to perpetrating injustice, 7, 123
- Trade-union, 147, 157, 183
- Transcendental geometry, 313-314
- Trinity, The, 60
- Truth, 24, 25, 26, 39, 60, 76, 84, 95, 118, 141, 150, 168-169, 171, 193-194, 204, 235, 243-245, 255, 276 *et seq.*
- present and future, 4, 26
- and emotion, 10, 15, 19, 21, 24, 118, 290
- wise economy of, 60, 65, 67, 68, 194, 200
- Truth a mode of feeling, 277, 280-281
- to distinguish rational from emotional, 280 *et seq.*
- and expediency, 281
- and unselfishness, 286
- and sanity, 287-289
- Transcendental, 291-292, 313-314
- abstract and sensory, 292, 313
- and untruth—their essential characters, 292
- and pain, 293
- Fit and unfit, 294, 296-297, 299, 301-302, 313
- Fashion in, 294-295
- and philosophy, 299, 301
- not illusory, 299
- is intellectual sensation, 299, 325, 327
- and the Bible, 303-305
- when it turns us into hypocrites, 306
- and dementia, 313-314
- The only reliable, 326
- Unearned increment, 163
- Units of consciousness, 291
- Unsymbolised sensation, 81, 83, 84
- Vaccinating with the higher criticism, 198
- Vicious and virtuous, 122, 127, 240-241, 257
- Villains, saints, and happiness, 165
- Virtue, 121, 123, 240-241

- |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p>Virtue, intellectual and emotional, 127, 128</p> <p>Visions and revelations, 65</p> <p>Volition and virtue and vice, 240</p> <p>Warrant of socialism, The, 179-181</p> <p>Wheat-cornerer, The, 162-163</p> <p>White man's burden, The real, 275</p> <p>Will to believe, The, 53, 54, 55, 56<br/>and must, 258</p> | <p>Wills, Free and enslaved, 255-256</p> <p>Winning side, The, 10, 53, 54, 55, 56</p> <p>Wise economy of truth, A, 60, 65, 67, 68, 194, 200</p> <p>Words and things, 75, 76, 79, 88, 89</p> <p>Working-classes, The, and Positivism, 159, 160</p> <p>Wrong and right, 11, 12, 32, 140, 141, 142, 144, 164</p> <p>Zeal, 3, 120, 177, 245, 248, 254</p> |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

END OF VOL I.

## PUBLISHER'S ANNOUNCEMENT.

---

THE EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF GOD : An Inquiry into the Origins of Religions. By GRANT ALLEN. Demy 8vo. Buckram. 20s. net. (Second Edition.)

Mr. H. G. WELLS in the *Daily Mail*.—"Mr. Grant Allen has produced a work of extraordinary interest and suggestion. . . . It is on the whole a worthy treatment of an immensely interesting subject, a book for the intelligent general reader, one of those books that bristle with the always plausible and frequently convincing reason why."

*World*.—"This book—the outcome of twenty years of thought and ten years of writing—is certainly one of the most important contributions to the history of the human mind which the last decade has given us."

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE INSANITY OF GENIUS."

THE HUMAN MACHINE: An Inquiry into the Divinity of Human Faculty in its bearings upon Social Life, Religion, Education, and Politics. By J. F. NISBET. Crown 8vo. 6s.

The *Daily Mail* says: "The treatise is curiously persuasive, and it is full of suggestive thought and interestingly debatable philosophy."

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE, considered in its relation to the Character and History of its People. By A. W. BENN. Crown 8vo. 6s.

*Manchester Guardian*.—"We should like to congratulate Mr. Benn on having produced by far the most entertaining account of Greek Philosophy with which we are acquainted."

PIONEERS OF EVOLUTION FROM THALES TO HUXLEY, with an intermediate chapter on the Causes of Arrest of the Movement. By EDWARD CLODD. With portraits in photogravure of Charles Darwin, Professor Huxley, Mr. A. R. Wallace, and Mr. Herbert Spencer. Crown 8vo. Linen. 5s. net. (Second Edition.)

*Times*.—"We are always glad to meet Mr. Edward Clodd. He is never dull; he is always well informed, and he says what he has to say with clearness and incision. . . . The interest intensifies as Mr. Clodd attempts to show the part really played in the growth of the doctrine of evolution by men like Wallace, Darwin, Huxley, and Spencer. Mr. Clodd clears away prevalent misconceptions as to the work of these modern pioneers. Especially does he give to Mr. Spencer the credit which is his due, but which is often mistakenly awarded to Darwin. Mr. Clodd does not seek in the least to lower Darwin from the lofty pedestal which he rightly occupies; he only seeks to show precisely why he deserves to occupy such a position. We commend the book to those who want to know what evolution really means; but they should be warned beforehand that they have to tackle strong meat."

PUBLISHER'S ANNOUNCEMENT.

---

REFLECTIONS OF A RUSSIAN STATESMAN : With a Preface by Mdme. OLGA NOVIKOFF. By K. POBYEDONOSTSEFF, (Procurator of the Holy Synod of Russia). Crown 8vo. 6s. (Vol. I. of the "Russian Library." Edited by W. T. STEAD).

THE SUBCONSCIOUS SELF AND ITS RELATION TO EDUCATION AND HEALTH. By LOUIS WALDSTEIN, M.D. Fcap. 8vo. Cloth. 3s. 6d.

LOGIC : Deductive and Inductive. By CARVETH READ, M.A. Crown 8vo. 6s.

*Mind.*—"It is difficult, without going into elaborate detail, to convey the impression of compactness, vigour, keenness, and unsparing pains, which a perusal of the book gives. . . . I know of nothing which seems to me better for learner or teacher, within the compass of a single moderate volume."

INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF POLITICS. By J. M. ROBERTSON. [*In preparation.*]

IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? By I. BLOCH. Edited by W. T. STEAD. (Vol. II. of the "Russian Library.") [*In preparation.*]

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMAN. By LAURA MARHOLM. Translated by GEORGIA ETCHISON. [*In preparation.*]

---

GRANT RICHARDS :

LONDON : 9 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, W.C.

9





B  
1645  
453 H4  
v.1

THE LIBRARY  
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA  
Santa Barbara

STACK COLLECTION

THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE  
STAMPED BELOW.

10m-10,'63(E1188s4)476D

UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY



**A** 000 877 457 2

